ISRAEL / DOCUMENTS MAY—SEPTEMBER 1948 COMPANION VOLUME

שם תיק: Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Volume 1, 14 May 1948 - 30 Septem
מזהה פיזי 18126/6-ג
מזהה פריט: 001mftg
כתובת 3-308-7-11-3
תאריך הדפסה 14/07/2020

STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, MAY—SEPTEMBER 1948

COMPANION VOLUME

STATE OF ISRAEL
ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL

VOLUME I

14 MAY — 30 SEPTEMBER 1948

Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich

COMPANION VOLUME

JERUSALEM 1981

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FOREWORD

This volume of documents is the first in a series relating to the foreign policy of Israel. It follows the preliminary volume which covers the period between the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine of 29 November 1947 and the proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948.* The editorial policy followed in the present volume is the same as that which governed the preparation of the preliminary volume. The documents selected deal primarily with foreign policy, but a number of documents relating to other matters closely bound up with the conduct of foreign policy have also been included. Among the subjects which fall under this category are the procurement of arms, financial and economic matters, immigration, and Israel's policy with regard to its Arab minority.

The documents have been selected with a view towards providing extensive documentation of deliberations, discussions, the spectrum of opinions and the shaping of foreign policy. A number of documents were chosen with the aim of providing coverage to subjects which, though they cannot be classified with the major themes of foreign policy, were of some importance at the time and must not be entirely ignored. These documents also enable the reader to trace the files which hold further information on the issues in question.

The selection of documents was only marginally affected by considerations as to whether or not deliberations on a particular issue led to concrete results or were of more than transient significance. For instance, this volume contains a number of documents dealing with the correct designation of Israel at the Security Council — a subject of considerable importance to Israel's international standing during the first months of its existence, though it may seem somewhat trivial when compared to the major issues at stake. Nevertheless, this criterion cannot be entirely disregarded and the space devoted to a particular issue must obviously bear some relation to its importance in a historical perspective.

* Israel State Archives/Central Zionist Archives, *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, Jerusalem 1979.

Documents recording discussions and consultations in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs relating to policy planning have been included whenever available, but there is only a relatively small number of documents of this type in the Ministry's files. This is not really surprising in view of the fact that Israel was engaged in a war for its very survival and that senior officials of the Foreign Ministry were preoccupied with urgent affairs and were unable to devote time and thought to long-range planning. It should also be borne in mind that questions relating to the long-range aims of foreign policy, to the extent that they were raised at all, were discussed at Cabinet level and by the executives of political parties rather than in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The minutes of Cabinet meetings have not yet been declassified and are not available for research purposes, but information derived from them has been used by the editors in the preparation of several notes and references.

The documents published in this volume derive mainly from the files of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the files of Israel's missions abroad. All these files are now in the custody of the Israel State Archives. A number of documents derive from other archives, such as the Central Zionist Archives (files of the Jewish Agency's Political Department), the Ben-Gurion Archives and the Weizmann Archives.

Arrangement of the documents. The documents are arranged in chronological order. Documents composed or sent out on more than one date are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the choronological sequence is governed by the earliest known date, in the following order: date of drafting, date of dispatch, or — if neither of these is known — date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing, when known. When the date of writing is not known, the chronological location of the document in question is determined on the basis of the date of the recorded discussion or meeting. (The latter date always appears in the main editorial heading).

The text. The text of the printed documents is identical with the original text except for the following editorial changes and corrections:

a) Adresses of senders and addressees as well as dates in their original form have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in the editorial headings in standard form (see below).

b) A number of passages which have no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted, as have a few offensive references to individuals as well as some passages referring to subjects and names which have not been declassified. All omissions are indicated in the body of the text and explained in footnotes.

c) Minor errors have been corrected without comment and without indication in the body of the text.

d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been replaced by the full terms without comment and without indication in the body of the text. Abbreviations of proper names and abbreviations employed for reasons of secrecy have been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., U.N., UNO) have not been altered.

e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets and preceded by a question mark) or on the basis of a corresponding text of the same document (within square brackets and with an explanation in a footnote).

f) English spelling has been standardized to conform with British usage except in documents originating in American institutions or written by Americans.

g) Faulty punctuation has been corrected. Punctuation words used in telegrams (e.g., *stop, comma*) have been replaced by punctuation marks, and the words *quote* and *unquote* by quotation marks.

h) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant. In cases of faulty deciphering in the incoming text (revealed through comparison with the outgoing text), the wrongly deciphered or missing words are identified by oblique strokes.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia*, the file reference of the document. References to files of the Israel State Archives give only the reference numbers of the record group, the

series, the box and the file. References to files of other archival institutions carry the full or abbreviated name of the institution. (See list of archives and abbreviations in refrences in the Companion Volume).

The destination of a document is noted in the editorial heading except when the document is addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or other central government bodies.

Editorial notes provide information on important events or developments. They usually precede the earliest document which contain a reference to the subject.

Footnotes. The annotation consists mainly of numbered footnotes. The main purpose of the footnotes is to elucidate the text where neessary and to call attention to other relevant documents. There are a few references to documents and files which have not yet been declassified but which will eventually become available to researchers.

Biographical footnotes have been provided where necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the documents is included in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes.

Appendices. There are seven appendices in the Main Volume, containing full text of resolutions relating to Palestine passed by the United Nations General Assembly and by the Security Council during the period covered by the volume, as well as the text of two American draft resolutions and of a British amendment.

Maps. The two maps in the Main Volume show the cease-fire lines of 11 June and of 18 July 1948. The partition boundaries according to the United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947 are also delineated. The maps will also enable the reader to locate most of the places and areas mentioned in the documents.

*

We would like to thank the following people and institutions for their assistance: Mr. Moshe Yuval, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who read the entire manuscript, for his valuable remarks and for his assistance throughout all stages of the editorial work; Dr. Eliahu Elath, who in 1948 served as Israel's Special Representative (later Ambassador) in the United States, for helping us clarify questions concerning Israeli-American relations; Dr. Michael Heymann, Director of the Central Zionist Archives, Mr. Israel Philipp, the Deputy Director, and the other members of the staff for their valuable help; Mr. Chaim Sarid, Director of the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, and Dr. Zehava Ostfeld, the Deputy Director, for her help in locating important complementary documentation; Mrs. Nehama Chalom, Director of the Weizmann Archives, for her general assistane and for her supervision of the proof-reading of the English documents and the English Companion Volume; Dr. Yaacov Ro'i, who helped us clarify various questions relating to Israeli-Soviet relations; Professor Yehoshua Porath, for his guidance with regard to the transliteration of Arabic names; Mr. Yaacov Lazarus, for style-editing the companion volume; Mr. Mark E. Shapiro, who prepared the English draft summaries of the Hebrew documents; Mrs. Lou Kaddar, for proof-reading the French documents; Mrs. Leah Aldor and Mr. Michael Plotkin for their assistance with regard to problems of translation and transliteration; Mrs. Vera Eden, Miss Bina Peer and Mrs. Claude Wallfish, who prepared the typescripts of the documents and the annotation.

We are also indebted to all those who provided us with biographical information on persons mentioned in the documents.

INTRODUCTION

The first volume of *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel* is a direct continuation of *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*.[1] It begins with the day on which the State of Israel was proclaimed, 14 May 1948, and concludes on 30 September 1948, in the middle of the second truce and the beginning of deliberations at the Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

During that period, Israel had four major foreign policy objectives:

1. Prompting the United Nations to halt and terminate the Arab invasion.

2. Striving for international legitimation of the new state and for recognition by other countries.

3. Creating political conditions for the unhampered immigration of Displaced Persons from Western Europe and Cyprus; maintaining contact with the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe and facilitating immigration from there.

4. Ensuring supplies of arms, oil and financial aid.

The invasion by the Arab armies following the proclamation of the state added a new dimension, that of an international dispute, to the deliberations which had been taking place in the Security Council since February 1948. At the Security Council meeting on 15 May 1948, the Israeli representative asked the Council to declare that the conditions in Palestine constituted a threat to international peace and to direct the Arab states to cease their aggression forthwith,[2] while the American representative proposed that the Council order a cease-fire to take effect within 36 hours.[3] However, it was only after prolonged discussions that the Council, on 31 May, adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Palestine for a period of 28 days.[4] Due to difficulties of implementation, the cease-fire did not go into effect until 11 June.

1. Israel State Archives and Central Zionist Archives, *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, Jerusalem, 1979.
2. See No. 10.
3. See No. 18.
4. See Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 666.

During the next four weeks an effort was made to mediate between the parties. In accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly's Second Special Session, of 14 May,[5] a Mediator was appointed who was charged, *inter alia*, with the task of promoting "a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine." The Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, arrived in the region at the end of May. He conferred with Israeli and Arab leaders and subsequently set up his headquarters in Rhodes, inviting low-level representatives of the parties to attend him at Rhodes in the capacity of experts.[6] His proposals, which were submitted to the parties as a "possible basis for discussion" at the end of June, were far-reaching and not a little surprising. Bernadotte proposed that a union be established within the original borders of the Mandatory territory of Palestine and Transjordan; the union was to comprise two members — Arab and Jewish. He suggested that the Central Council of this union have the authority to institute and implement common activities, in the spheres of finance and development, and to coordinate foreign and defence policy. Each of the member-states would be sovereign in its own affairs but would retain the right, after two years, to ask the Central Council to review and render a ruling on the immigration policy of the other, with the United Nations Economic and Social Council serving as the final arbitrator in the event that the Central Council was unable to reach a decision. As to the borders, the following changes were proposed in the partition plan of 29 November: Jerusalem as well as the whole or part of the Negev would be included in Arab territory, while Western Galilee — in whole or in part — would be included in Jewish territory. The Jewish population of Jerusalem was to be granted municipal autonomy.[7]

Even before the cease-fire had expired, efforts were made to extend it.[8] The Government of Israel agreed to a 30-day extension,[9] but the Arab states turned it down. The cease-fire terminated on 9 July, and the subsequent battles of the "ten days" changed the

5. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp.663-4.
6. See No. 205.
7. See No. 239.
8. See No. 267.
9. See No. 291.

balance of forces decisively against the Arabs. Israeli forces captured Lower Galilee, broadened the corridor to Jerusalem, secured access to the city by the hastily constructed "Burma Road", and captured Lydda and Ramle. The Egyptian forces were stalemated in the Negev and Israel's hold on the area was strengthened, but the Negev settlements remained cut off. The change in the balance of forces and the international pressure exerted in the Security Council — including the threat of sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter[10] — led to the acceptance of a new cease-fire, which went into effect on 18 July. This time it was stipulated that the truce thus established would remain in force until a peaceful adjustment was reached.

The deliberations in the Security Council, the trend of its mediation efforts and the problems involved in maintaining the cease-fire in Palestine, all demonstrated the limitations of the United Nations as a peacemaker and mediator between the parties. It became apparent that the United Nations moved slowly, was vulnerable to political pressures and was not responsive to the need for instant action. In Palestine, Bernadotte and his staff failed to implement some of the basic conditions of the cease-fire: a regular flow of supplies over the main road to beleaguered Jerusalem and to the Negev settlements, resumption of the water supply to Jerusalem and free access to the Wailing Wall. As time passed, and especially during the second truce when the military situation looked precarious from the Arab point of view, the impression gained ground in Israel that the Mediator and his staff were favouring the Arabs. The assassination of Count Bernadotte by a splinter group of Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) on 17 September was a dramatic and radical expression of this prevalent feeling. Even though the murder was condemned by broad segments of the population and officially by the Government of Israel, which announced that it would endeavour to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice, Israel's relations with the U.N. were severely strained.

The failure of the United Nations' mediation effort prompted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to seek other avenues to a political solution of the dispute, for the prevailing attitude was that if direct

10. See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70.

contact was established with the Arabs, a settlement would eventually be achieved. At the beginning of July, Eliahu Sasson, the head of the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, went to Paris with the aim of instituting negotiations with Arab representatives. Sasson renewed old contacts and established new ones with statesmen and representatives of various countries. He began by meeting with representatives of Transjordan, with whom he had had extensive contacts in the past;[11] but it soon became apparent that it was the Egyptians who evinced the greatest desire to end the state of war by negotiations.[12] The difficulties were however aggravated by a new major problem — that of the Arab refugees. These refugees — residents of areas allocated to the Jewish state or of territories allocated to the Arab state but occupied by the Israeli army — were conentrated in those parts of Palestine controlled by Arab armies and in the neighbouring countries. The question of their return, their resettlement or the alleviation of their distress became a topic of major importance in the relationships among Israel, the United Nations, the Great Powers and the Arab countries.

When the Third Session of the General Assembly convened in September 1948, the prospects for an immediate solution to the Palestine problem seemed remote. The U.N. had before it the report which Count Bernadotte had prepared before his assassination. It was now suggested, *inter alia*, that the Negev be apportioned to the Arabs and the entire Galilee to the Jews, that Jerusalem be internationalized and that the Arab sections of Palestine be annexed to the Kingdom of Transjordan.[13] The fact that the report was published shortly after Bernadotte's assassination and was therefore perceived as a kind of political testament, and that the Western Powers endorsed his principal recommendations, placed the Government of Israel before a grave political problem in the General Assembly.

One of the major aims of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time was to enhance Israel's standing in the international arena. It accordingly tried to persuade as many nations as possible to grant

11. See No. 382.
12. See No. 541.
13. See editorial note, p. 164.

Israel at least de facto recognition. President Truman announced de facto recognition immediately after the proclamation of the state, but the State Department derogated from the value of this recognition by assigning a Special Representative instead of a Minister to head its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv.[14] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, hastened to grant the state full recognition and was followed by the majority of the countries of the Eastern bloc. A number of Latin American nations also recognized Israel, so that by the end of September she had achieved diplomatic recognition — either de facto or de jure — from sixteen states. However, the efforts to achieve the recognition of the countries of Western Europe, Scandinavia and the members of the British Commonwealth were unsuccessful (except in the case of South Africa). Israel's relationship with Great Britain reflected the strained relations that had prevailed at the close of the Mandatory period. While Great Britain did maintain some kind of representation by means of its consulate in Haifa, the relations between the Consul and the Israeli authorities were tense,[15] and the detention of five British employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation on suspicion of espionage almost resulted in an open crisis.[16] Israel and France maintained amicable relations on the unofficial plane, and France continued to offer aid by facilitating arms acquisition and immigration; but the French Government refrained from formalizing these relations, and the seizure of a number of French religious institutions by the Israeli army remained a constant source of friction between the two states.[17] Great Britain and France — and in their wake the countries of Western Europe, Scandinavia and the British Commonwealth — recognized Israel only at the beginning of 1949, when the end of the war was in sight and an armistice agreement was about to be signed with Egypt.

Another problem relating to Israel's international status was the correct designation of the state in the Security Council. Great Britain and, of course, the Arabs demanded the continuation of the former practice of having the Jewish side appear as representatives

14. See No. 107.
15. See Nos. 261, 453.
16. See No. 327 and note 1 there.
17. See No. 111.

of the Jewish Agency for Palestine or of the "Jewish Authorities in Palestine". The representatives of Israel demanded that they be invited to the Security Council as representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel. What finally decided this issue was the fact that the United Nations Mediator in Palestine officially conducted all his contacts with "the Provisional Government of Israel"; from the beginning of July, the representatives of Israel were invited to the Security Council as such.[18]

The admission of Israel to the United Nations posed a more difficult problem. In order to be admitted, Israel required the support of seven of the eleven members of the Security Council, and its representatives failed to enlist the required backing. An application for admission was submitted in November, but failed to achieve the necessary number of votes in the Security Council.

Israel conducted an unyielding struggle against any limitations on immigration that might impinge on its sovereignty. During the course of the Security Council deliberations on the first cease-fire, the British demanded that the immigration of men of military age be prohibited. Eventually, the prohibition was confined to "fighting personnel" and thanks to a French initiative it was agreed that men not included in this category would be allowed to immigrate on condition that they would not be conscripted or trained as long as the truce was in force.[19] During the first truce, the Government of Israel observed this provision scrupulously and lodged immigrants in special camps under United Nations supervision. However, the Government of Great Britain gave its own rigid interpretation to the Security Council resolution and completely banned the exit of men of military age from the detention camps in Cyprus.[20] Other countries followed Britain's lead and placed restrictions on the departure of men of military age.[21] During the second truce there were numerous disagreements between Israel and the Mediator, who claimed that there was an exaggerated number of men of military age among the immigrants; the Israeli

18. See No. 284.
19. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.
20. See No. 134.
21. See No. 242.

Government rejected these strictures and objected to any intervention in its immigration policy.[22]

Immigration from Eastern Europe was a major consideration in the relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Eastern bloc. These states drew a sharp distinction between political and military aid to the State of Israel — a sphere in which they extended considerable assistance — and matters relating to immigration and official or semi-official contacts with the Jewish communities which had survived the Holocaust. The Soviet Union did not evince the slightest inclination to discuss the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel; other countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, though less inflexible, created difficulties; Rumania proved the most adamant of the East European countries with regard to emigration to Israel, and protracted negotiations produced only negligible results.[23] Bulgaria was the most forthcoming on this issue: she allowed free emigration but postponed establishing diplomatic relations with Israel until all the Jews who wished to emigrate had done so. Toward the end of 1948, the obstacles to immigration from Eastern Europe mounted — a reflection, no doubt, of the growing reservations of the Eastern bloc toward Israel and her policies.

The full sovereignty achieved by the Jews of Palestine on 14 May 1948 freed them from British control over immigration, arms acquisition and economic policies. But the political and military struggle forced on Israel immediately upon its establishment created grave new problems. The United States had imposed a total embargo on the exportation of arms to the Middle East as early as December 1947, and it observed this prohibition scrupulously.[24] The countries of Western Europe pursued a similar policy; only Czechoslovakia allowed Israel to purchase large quantities of arms.

The supply of oil was also a vital issue. When the British left Palestine, work at the Haifa oil refineries ceased, and only a small supply of crude oil remained in stock. Moreover, the flow of oil from Iraq was turned off. Following the failure of attempts to

22. See Nos. 469, 480.
23. See Nos. 374, 549.
24. See e.g. Nos. 4, 82.

persuade the British management of the refineries to restart operations, the Government seized the refineries and ordered the refining of the available supplies of crude oil.[25] As the capacity of the Haifa refineries considerably exceeded the needs of the country, and as Europe suffered from a shortage of oil-refining capacity and refined products, Israel met with a favourable response when it approached various foreign ministries and the large oil companies with a view to resuming the full operation of the Haifa refineries — either by restarting the flow of oil from Iraq or by transporting the oil by tankers from Middle Eastern sources. This plan was never realized, but Israel did manage to acquire a steady flow of oil — sufficient for its own needs — partly refined and partly crude, from sources outside the Middle East, including Eastern Europe.

The heavy expenditures involved in financing the war and absorbing immigration were borne in those first months by the citizens of Israel and the Jews of the diaspora. As early as the end of 1947, the Jewish Agency had requested the Government of the United States to authorize a loan by the Export-Import Bank.[26] This request was renewed a number of times after the state was established,[27] but at that stage did not yield results.[28]

The period documented in this volume was a difficult and decisive one. Israel was engaged in a struggle for its very existence, and even though the decisive arena was the battlefield and not the United Nations Organization or various foreign ministries, political and diplomatic activity was an integral part of Israel's fight for survival. In sharp contrast to the months preceding the establishment of the state, when the link between the military struggle (directed from within the country) and the political struggle (conducted and directed primarily in the United States) was rather tenuous, there was now a large measure of cooperation and coordination. One may cite, for example, the vigorous political efforts to obtain the first cease-fire, when the military situation looked extremely threatening, in contrast to a more reserved and balanced approach to the timing of the second cease-fire. Nevertheless, there

25. See editorial note, Main Volume, pp. 392-3.
26. See *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1947, V, pp. 1090-2.
27. See No. 37.
28. See No. 490.

was still a certain deficiency in regular consultations, oral and written, and in long-range planning — both of which are the product of routine and convention in an established state. This defect is clearly reflected in the documents.

Foreign policy was conducted simultaneously with organizational efforts involved in setting up the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the assembling of a diplomatic corps. As a consequence, work practices and patterns were still in a somewhat fluid state. As could have been expected, certain deviations from accepted procedure occurred from time to time, such as some of the activities of the Israeli Mission at the United Nations[29] or the excessive independence of Dr. Nahum Goldmann in his diplomatic work in London.[30] But the rapid organization of the ministry and of the missions abroad, on the basis of pre-state foundations, as well as the unavoidable improvisations, permitted the system to function quite efficiently during the first trying months of its existence.

THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAELI MISSIONS ABROAD AND FOREIGN MISSIONS IN ISRAEL

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Following the United Nations partition resolution, the Emergency Committee of the Jews of Palestine undertook the planning of and actual preparations for the establishment of ministries and of the administrative staff of the Jewish state. The task of planning the structure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Service was entrusted to the Jewish Agency's Public Service College, under the supervision of its head, Walter Eytan. The first draft was submitted to the Emergency Committee on 30 January 1948, and it was along the general lines thus laid down that the ministry eventually began to operate.

Moshe Shertok, Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, was the obvious choice for the post of Minister for For-

29. See Nos. 82, 495.
30. See No. 38 and other correspondence between Goldmann and Shertok.

eign Affairs. The senior official directly responsible to the Minister was to be the Director-General; Walter Eytan was appointed to that post. The Secretary-General Haim Raday (Berman), was made responsible for administration, finances and manpower. When the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established, both Eytan and Raday were in beleaguered Jerusalem, and they did not reach Tel Aviv until the end of June. The Ministry comprised six regional divisions: Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America (later renamed the United States Division), Latin America and British Commonwealth. The plan of the ministry also called for an African and Asian Division, but its establisment was postponed until the end of 1949, when an Asian Division was set up. During the period under discussion, the heads of the British Commonwealth and Latin American Divisions — Michael Comay and Moshe Toff — were attached to the Israeli Mission to the United Nations, and this caused a certain delay in the institution of regular work practices in these divisions. In addition, there was a Division of International Organizations, an Economic Department, a Political Division (whose functions comprised the gathering of information, intelligence and research) and a Consular Division.

Israeli Missions Abroad

In the months following the establishment of the state, diplomatic missions were set up in five of the countries that had recognized Israel: the United States, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, Israeli representatives were present in a number of capitals that had not yet accorded recognition — London, Paris and Rome. These representatives did not enjoy diplomatic status but were in practice recognized as representing Israel for purposes of contacts or negotiations.

The former offices of the Jewish Agency in Washington, New York, London, Paris and Rome, which had served as branches of its Political Department until 15 May, were transformed into missions of the state. The New York office became a Consulate-General and also served as the office of the Israeli Mission to the United Nations, headed by Aubrey Eban. The Consul-General, Arthur Lourie, also served in the role of administrator of the Mission's affairs.

Foreign Missions in Israel

The only countries that established diplomatic missions in Israel up to September 1948 were the United States and the Soviet Union. Other states were represented by consuls, most of whom had formerly represented their respective countries in Palestine before the termination of the Mandate. Most of the consuls resided in Jerusalem and a few in Tel Aviv. The British had two consuls, in Arab-held East Jerusalem and in Haifa. As Jerusalem was not recognized as part of the State of Israel, the status of the consuls residing there was somewhat ambivalent. The American consul, for example, continued to report directly to the State Department in Washington and was not subordinate to the Special Representative of the United States in Tel Aviv. Further duplication derived from the fact that the consuls of the United States, France and Belgium in Jerusalem were also members of the Security Council Truce Commission, whose functions to a certain extent paralleled those of the United Nations Mediator (see below).

UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN PALESTINE

The United Nations Organization was represented in Palestine by two bodies: the Mediator, his staff and the United Nations Truce Observation Organization, on the one hand, and the Security Council Truce Commission, on the other. At first there was no clear delineation of authority between the two. The Truce Commission, which was composed of the consuls of the United States, France and Belgium in Jerusalem, was appointed by the Security Council resolution of 23 April 1948;[31] three weeks later, on 14 May, the Special General Asembly resolved that a Mediator for Palestine be appointed. The resolution defined the Mediator's functions, stating, *inter alia*, that he was "to cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine."[32] As the members of the Commission all resided in besieged Jerusalem, its functions were in fact restricted from the start to Jerusalem and its environment. Even though the Security Council resolution of 29 May still called for the Mediator

31. See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, p. 671.
32. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 663-4.

to supervise the cease-fire "in concert with the Truce Commission",[33] in practice this task was entirely in his hands and was implemented by means of a staff of observers that he organized and controlled. The Security Council soon recognized the de facto situation and in a resolution of 15 July granted the Mediator full supervisory authority, while the Truce Commission was asked to aid in the implementation of the cease-fire in Jerusalem.[34] Thus the Mediator had two major duties: (1) the principal function assigned to him by the Special Assembly resolution: to promote a peaceful adjustment of the Palestinian conflict; and (2) the additional function that was engendered by the circumstances and received official authorization in a Security Council resolution: supervision of the cease-fire.

The Mediator established the observers' team immediately after the first cease-fire went into effect, and by the beginning of July, 93 military observers had been sent to Palestine (31 officers from each country represented in the Truce Commission). These observers were assisted by a few dozen "guards" supplied by the United Nations Secretariat. For the purposes of truce observation Palestine was divided into five areas and several observation posts were established, while from time to time observers were sent to the Arab countries for specific observation tasks. The truce supervision headquarters was first established in Cairo, but soon thereafter moved to Haifa. The Mediator established his own headquarters in Rhodes and was represented in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Amman and Cairo by staff members of the Secretariat.[35]

The Truce Commission was relegated to a marginal position, even though its members remained active and periodically transmitted reports and complaints to the Security Council. As mentioned above, the members of the Commission, in their capacities as consuls, also represented their countries in Jerusalem. They reported directly to their foreign ministries, and the dividing line between their two functions was not always clear.

YEHOSHUA FREUNDLICH

33. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.
34. See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70.
35. See *Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine*, pp. 32-3.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND MAIN SUBJECTS

ABBREVIATIONS

CZA	Central Zionist Archives
Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd.	Received
Tel.	Telegram

Note: References which do not include the name of the archives are to documents in possession of the Israel State Archives.

1948

1. 14 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Recd. 15 May; Outg. 93.03/126/7; Inc. 130.09/2337/5.
U.S. recognition of Israel.

2. 15 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1551.
Acceptance of 29 Nov. borders.

3. 15 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1551.
Acceptance of 29 Nov. borders; American arms embargo.

4. 15 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH20; Recd. 16 May; Outg. 130.09/2328/1;
Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
Request for arms from U.S.

5. 15 May **E. Epstein to the President of the Security Council.**
Copy. 93.03/94/5.
Notification of establishment of Israel and nomination of representative to U.N.

6. 15 May **M. Shertok to T. Lie.**
Tel. MH3; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Notification of the establishment of Israel, undertaking to respect 29 Nov. resolution and request for admission to U.N.

7. 15 May **M. Shertok to V. Molotov.**
Tel. MH3c; Outg. 130.09/2424/19.
Notification of the establishment of Israel; request for recognition.

8. 15 May **M. Fischer to G. Bidault.**
Copy. 93.02/183/2.
Notification of the establishment of Israel; request for recognition.

9. 15 May **M. Shertok to T. Lie.**
Tel.; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Nomination of A. Eban as representative to U.N.

10. 15 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Discussion in the Security Council.

11. 16 May **D. Ben-Gurion to President Truman.**
Tel. MH30; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Appreciation for U.S. recognition of Israel.

12. 16 May **M. Shertok to E. Bevin.**
Tel. MH39; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Notification of the establishment of Israel; request for recognition.

13. 17 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban and E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 7/81; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
British arms' supply to Arab Legion.

14. 17 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 9; Outg. Elath Papers; Inc. CZA S25/1559.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S.

15. 17 May **E. Epstein to R. Lovett.**
Copy. 93.08/364/10.
Egyptian hostility.

16. 17 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Request for U.S. initiative in Security Council; American embargo.

17. 17 May **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Tel.; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Negotiations in London.

18. 17 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 03; Outg. 93.03/94/5; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
American draft resolution in the Security Council — despatch of questionnaire.

19. 18 May **M. Shertok to J. Nieuwenhuys.**
Tel.; Recd. 19 May; Outg. CZA S25/1553.
Arab hostilities.

20. 18 May **M. Eliash to T. Lie.**
Copy. 93.03/128/14.
Attacks on Jewish Quarter in Old City of Jerusalem.

21. 18 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 9/79; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
Landing of Israel-bound Messerschmitt planes in Greece.

22. 18 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 99/42; Recd. 19 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/16; Inc. 130.09/2337/5.
Admission of Israel to U.N.

23. 18 May **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 1/61; Recd. 19 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/16; Inc. 130.09/2337/5.
Negotiations in London.

24. 18 May **V. Molotov to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. 130.02/2391/5.
U.S.S.R. recognition of Israel.

25. 18 May **Z. Modzelewski to M. Shertok.**
Translation from Polish; CZA S25/1553. (Hebrew).
Polish rcognition of Israel.

26. 18 May **C. Weizmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 100/69; Recd. 19 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/16; Inc. 130.09/2337/5.
Request for information; relations with U.K. and South Africa.

27. 18 May **A. Eban to B. Locker.**
Tel.; outg. 93.03/127/8.
French and Belgian support for American draft resolution in Security Council.

28. 18 May **M. Fischer to N. Goldmann.**
Coded Tel. 58/33; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
French attitude at Security Council.

29. 18 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Security Council's questionnaire to the Government of Israel.

30. 18 May **B. Locker to E. Bevin.**
Copy. CZA Z4/14829.
Arab Legion's invasion of Palestine.

31. 19 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

32. 19 May **J. Robinson to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 15; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Suggested answers to Security Council questionnaire.

33. 19 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH95; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

34. 19 May **M. Shertok to A. Lourie and A. Eban.**
Tel. MH96; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

35. 19 May **M. Fischer to N. Goldmann and A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 59/79; Recd. 20 May; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
Instructions to French representative to the Security Council; French recognition of Israel.

36. 19 May **M. Shertok to G. Marshall.**
Tel. MH98; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S.

37. 19 May **Meeting: O. Gass — B. Bell.**
Report. 93.08/365/1.
Loan from the Export-Import Bank.

38. 19 May **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Tel. MH102; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Negotiations in London.

39. 19 May **M. Comay to B. Gering.**
Tel.; outg. 93.03/126/3.
South African recognition of Israel.

40. 19 May **L. Kohn to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Tel.; Outg. CZA S25/9390. (Hebrew).
Meeting of U.N. representatives with King Abdallah.

41. 19 May **L. Kohn to J. Nieuwenhuys.**
Copy. 130.02/2397/5.
Israel's offer of cease-fire in Jewish Quarter of Old City of Jerusalem.

42. 20 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Discussion in Security Counil; Designation of Israel in Security Council.

43. 20 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 19/34; Recd. 24 May; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
U.S. pressure on U.K. and China to support its draft resolution in Security Council.

44. 20 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH116; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
Detention of Jewish passengers in Beirut.

45. 20 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 18/164; Recd. 22 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Shertok's visit to U.S.

46. 20 May **P. Ruegger to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Establishment of security zones; Red Cross activity in Israel.

47. 20 May **Meeting: S. Silverman, M. Rosetté—E. Bevin.**
Report. CZA Z4/20283.
Israeli-British relations.

48. 21 May **Report by C.V. Herzog.**
Report. 93.03/95/1.
Situation in Jerusalem following British evacuation.

49. 21 May **T. Lie to A. Eban.**
Orig. 93.03/130/3.
Appointment of Count Bernadotte as U.N. Mediator for Palestine.

50. 21 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 25/39; Recd. 22 May; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Status of Israeli delegation to U.N.; admission of Israel to U.N.

51. 21 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH123; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Admission of Israel to U.N.

52. 21 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH133; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
Detention of Jewish passengers in Beirut.

53. 21 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 17/194; Recd. 23 May; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Financial and military assistance from U.S.

54. 21 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 20/167; Recd. 24 May; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Anglo-American discussions on Palestine.

55. 21 May **B. Locker to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 1/82; Recd. 22 May; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Acceptance of 29 Nov. borders.

56. 21 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Memorandum. 130.02/2414/22.
Survey of situation in Security Council.

57. 22 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 2/102; Outg. 130.09/2308/1.
Request for arms from U.S. and U.S.S.R.

58. 22 May **J. Nieuwenhuys to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency.**
Copy. CZA S25/8176.
Cease-fire in Old City of Jerusalem.

59. 22 May **W. Eytan to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 686; Inc. 130.02/2451/4.
Suggested declaration on Jerusalem.

60. 22 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 27/75; Recd. 25 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Discussion in Security Council.

61. 22 May **A. Eban to T. Lie.**
Copy. 93.03/130/3.
Israel's reply to Security Council questionnaire.

62. 23 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Israel's conditions for cease-fire.

63. 23 May **A. Eban, E. Epstein, A. Lourie and J. Robinson to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 32; Outg. 93.03/95/1; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Discussion on cease-fire in Security Council.

64. 23 May **M. Shertok to C. Weizmann.**
Coded Tel. 17/82; Recd. 24 May; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
Anglo-Israeli relations.

65. 23 May **The Political Department of the Jewish Agency to P. Azcarate.**
Record of a telephone conversation; CZA S25/5634.
Medical and scientific institutions on Mount Scopus.

66. 24 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH149; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Cease-fire decision by Government of Israel.

67. 24 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/95/1.
Discussion on cease-fire in Security Council.

68. 24 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 31/83; Sent 25 May; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Meeting with A. Gromyko; recognition of Israel by Latin-American states; relations with Belgium and U.K.

69. 24 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 30/42; Recd. 25 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc.

130.09/2337/6.
Acceptance of 29 Nov. borders.

70. 24 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 61/49; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
Egyptian interference with shipping to Israel.

71. 24 May **M. Fischer to A. Eban.**
Tel.; Inc. 93.03/128/10.
French demand for immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem.

72. 24 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 28/60; Recd. 25 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
U.S. arms embargo.

73. 24 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH154; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.03/128/5.
Egyptian interference with shipping to Israel.

74. 24 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH155; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
Disruption of shipping to Israel.

75. 24 May **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Coded Tel. 29/83; Outg. 130.09/2318/1.
Instructions for discussions in U.K.

76. 24 May **J. Smuts to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. 130.02/2391/39.
South African recognition of Israel.

77. 25 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH168; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.03/95/1.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

78. 25 May **Members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive and Members of the Israeli Mission at the United Nations to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA S25/1553.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire.

79. 25 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 42/34; Sent 26 May; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Admission of Israel to U.N.

80. 25 May **A. Eban to M. Fischer.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/128/10.
Cease-fire in Jerusalem.

81. 25 May **J. Robinson to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/128/5.
Egyptian interference with shipping to Israel.

82. 25 May **C. Weizmann to President Truman.**
Memorandum. 93.08/375/15.
Financial and military assistance from U.S.

83. 25 May **O. Gass to E. Kaplan.**
Coded Tel. 21/67; Sent 26 May; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/24; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Loan from Export-Import Bank.

84. 25 May **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 8/140, 9/184; Sent 26 May; Recd. 27 May; Outg. Weizmann Archives; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Discussions in the U.K.

85. 26 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH176; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire.

86. 26 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH177; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire.

87. 26 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH181; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Disregard of instructions by Israeli delegation to U.N.

88. 26 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 4/81; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Israel's attitude on 29 Nov. borders.

89. 26 May **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 44/13; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/17; Inc. 130.09/2329/19,
Jewish boycott of British goods in U.S.

90. 26 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 45/92; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Talks on cease-fire with U.S. representatives at U.N.

91. 26 May **C. Weizmann to President Truman.**
Copy. 130.02/2414/26.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S.; recommendation for E. Epstein.

92. 26 May **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1580.
Meeting with Count Bernadotte.

93. 27 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 24/57; Recd. 28 May; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Differences of opinion on Palestine policy in British Cabinet.

94. 27 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 25/65; Recd. 28 May; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Weizmann's meeting with President Truman.

95. 27 May **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 6/31; Outg. 130.09/2308/1; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Weizmann's pledge to evacuate Acre and Jaffa.

96. 27 May **R. Lovett to E. Epstein.**
Copy. 130.02/2386/1.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S. — level of representation.

97. 27 May **E. Epstein to L. Henderson.**
Copy. 130.02/2386/1.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S. — level of representation.

98. 27 May **M. Fischer to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 65/33; Inc. 93.01/2180/15.
French recognition of Israel.

99. 27 May **M. Shertok to P. Ruegger.**
Tel. MH193; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Adherence to Geneva Convention.

100. 28 May **A. Eban and M. Eliash to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/95/1.
Cease-fire in Jerusalem.

101. 28 May **M. Fischer to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 66/222; Recd. 29 May; Inc., 93.01/2180/15.
French recognition; pressure for cease-fire.

102. 28 May **A. Stern to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2391/65. (Hebrew).
Italian recognition of Israel.

103. 29 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH226; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Cease-fire in Jerusalem.

104. 29 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 82; Outg. 93.03/95/1.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire.

105. 29 May **Israeli Mission at the United Nations to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 63/55; Recd. 31 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Possibility of Anglo-American collaboration with respect to territorial changes at Israel's expense.

106. 29 May **R. Lovett to E. Epstein.**
Orig. Elath Papers.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S. — level of representation.

107. 29 May **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 26/263, 27/242, 28/227; Sent 29/31 May; Recd. 30 May/1 June; Outg. Elath Papers; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S. — level of representation.

108. 29 May **E. Epstein and O. Gass to L. Henderson.**
Memoranda. 93.08/377/8.
Egyptian interference with shipping to Israel; detention of Jewish passengers in Beirut.

109. 29 May **G. Ruffer to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 59/167; Recd. 30 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Arab peace feelers in New York.

110. 29 May **B. Locker to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 15/97; Recd. 30 May; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Meetings in Belgium; discussions with Scandinavian ambassasdors in London.

111. 29 May **J. Charreyron to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2413/11.
Evacuation of French institutions by Israeli army.

112. 30 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH243; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.03/95/1.
Cease-fire conditions.

113. 30 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 86; Outg. 93.03/95/1.
Cease-fire conditions.

114. 30 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 65/262; Sent 31 May; Recd. 1 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

115. 31 May **A. Eban and G. Ruffer to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 66/48; Recd. 1 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/15; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Commencement of cease-fire.

116. 31 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 43/32, Inc. 93.01/2180/17.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire.

117. 31 May **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/95/1.
Cease-fire conditions.

118. 31 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH250; Outg. 130.09/2328/1.
Cease-fire conditions.

119. 31 May **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH251; Outg. 130.09/2328/1; Inc. 93.03/95/1.
Ban on importation of arms during cease-fire.

120. 31 May **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok**
Coded Tel. 21/132; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Anglo-American negotiations on cease-fire conditions.

121.?31 May **M. Fischer to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 76; Inc. 93.01/2180/17.
French recognition of Israel.

122. 31 May **M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Copy. 130.02/2413/11. (Hebrew).
Evacuation of French institutions by Israeli army.

123. 1 June **A. Eban to T. Lie.**
Copy. 93.03/95/2.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire and its conditions.

124. 1 June **D. Ben-Gurion to B. Locker.**
Coded Tel. 36/22; Outg. 130.09/2329/24.
Acceptance of 29 Nov. borders.

125. 1 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 31/139; Rcd. 2 June; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
Meeting with General Wedemeyer (U.S.)

155. 7 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 37/56; Recd. 8 June; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
President Truman's attitude towards Israel.

156. 8 June **Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok.**
Communication. 130.02/2424/20.
Commencement of cease-fire.

157. 8 June **J. Reedman to M. Shertok.**
Communications. 130.02/2424/20.
Immigration; Arab compliance with cease-fire.

158. 8 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 178; Outg. 93.03/95/2; Inc. CZA S25/1559.
Immigration.

159. 8 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 183; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Immigration.

160. 8 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH332; Outg. 130.09/2328/2; Inc. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

161. 8 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

162. 8 June **A. Eban to N. Goldmann.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA Z4/20291.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

163. 8 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 96/183; Sent 9 June; Recd. 10 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/17; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Meeting with H. Beeley, of British delegation to the U.N.

164. 8 June **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 33/38; Recd. 9 June; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

165. 8 June **M. Shertok to G. Marshall.**
Tel. MH334; Outg. 130.09/2328/2.
Loan from the Export-Import Bank.

166. 8 June **Note by W. Eytan.**
Memorandum. CZA S25/5634.
Relations with the Vatican.

167. 9 June **W. Burdett to L. Kohn.**
Copy. 130.02/2424/20.
Israel acceptance of cease-fire.

168. 9 June **M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte.**
Tel.; Outg. CZA S25/5176.
Israel's acceptance of cease-fire and its conditions.

169. 9 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 182; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Recognition of Israel.

170. 9 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 188; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Concil.

171. 9 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 40/219; Recd. 10 June; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Suggested guide-lines for a meeting at Department of State.

172. 9 June **M. Shertok to A. Lourie.**
Coded Tel. 66/25; Inc. 93.01/2180/17.
Jewish boycott of British goods in U.S. .

173. 9 June **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 10/57; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Despatch of mission to purchase arms and food at the U.S.S.R.

174. 9 June **M. Fischer to M. Shertok.**
Copy. 130.02/2382/12. (Hebrew).
Franco-Israeli relations.

175. 10 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH348; Outg. 130.09/2328/2; Inc. 93.03/95/2.
Instructions for Security Council meeting; acceptance of 29 Nov. borders; free access to Jerusalem.

176. 10 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 189; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Israel's conditions for cease-fire.

177. 10 June **A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 100/82; Recd. 11 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/17; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Jewish boycott of British goods in U.S.

178. 10 June **N. Goldmann to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 67/87; Inc. 93.01/2180/17.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

179. 11 June **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 39/168; Recd. 12 June; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Anglo-Israeli relations.

180. 13 June **M. Fischer to A. Eban.**
Orig. 93.03/64/3.
Franco-Israeli relations.

181. 13 June **Memorandum by A. Levavi.**
Memorandum. CZA S25/5634. (Hebrew).
Urgent tasks of the East European Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

182. 14 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 218; 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

183. 14 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 219; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Immigration.

184. 15 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH392; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.01/2180/17.
Meeting with H. Beeley (of the British delegation to the U.N.).

185. 15 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH397; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.03/95/2.
Immigration.

186. 15 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 235; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Immigration.

187. 15 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH400; Outg. 130.09/2328/4.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

188. 15 June **C. Weizmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 9/47; Inc. 130.09/2329/23.
Arms ship *Altalena*.

189. 15 June **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Copy. Ben-Gurion Archives 1580.
Military grounds for cease-fire; borders; Jerusalem; flight of Arab population.

190. 16 June **J. Robinson, A. Eban and A. Lourie to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

191. 16 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 9/335; Sent 17 June, Recd. 18 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/17; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Meeting with J. Ross (of U.S. delegation to the U.N.).

192. 16 June **A. Eban to S. Rosenman.**
Orig. Elath Papers.
U.S. policy towards Israel.

193. 16 June **O. Gass to E. Kaplan.**
Coded Tel. 45/119; Recd. 17 June; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Loan from Export-Import Bank.

194. 16 June **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 11/37; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Fuel purchase in Rumania.

195. 16 June **E. Epstein to L. Henderson.**
Copy. 130.02/2420/4.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

196. 16 June **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Coded Tel. 48/36; Outg. 130.09/2318/1.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

197. 16 June **D.B. Joseph to J. Nieuwenhuys.**
Copy. CZA S25/5176.
Supply convoys to Jerusalem.

198. 16 June **Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Copy. 130.02/2426/10. (Hebrew).
Convoys to Negev.

199. 17 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 248; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Oil blockade on Israel.

214. 21 June **M. Shertok to T. Bonde.**
Copy. CZA Z4/20017.
Evacuation of wounded from Kefar Darom; passage of convoys to Negev.

215. 21 June **M. Shertok to T. Bonde.**
Copy. 130.02/2426/9.
Arms ship *Altalena*.

216. 22 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH462; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

217. 22 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 306; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

218. 22 June **A. Eban to N. Goldmann.**
Copy. 93.03/95/2.
Survey of political situation in U.N. and the U.S.

219. 22 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 53/126; Recd. 23 June; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Truman's attitude towards Israel.

220. 22 June **R. Shiloah to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2424/20. (Hebrew).
Meetings with Mediator in Rhodes — arms ship *Altalena*, immigration from Cyprus, Negev convoys.

221. 23 June **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 16/54; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Supply of arms from the U.S.S.R.

222. 24 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 308; Outg. 93.03/128/6.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

223. 24 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH479; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.03/95/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

224. 24 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 58/118; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
U.S.—Israel relations.

225. 24 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 59/93; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Appointment of James McDonald as U.S. Special Representative in Israel.

226. 24/25 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 63/195, 64/211, 65/162; Recd. 25/26 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
U.S.—Israel relations.

227. 24 June **P. Cremona to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2426/9.
Arms ship *Altalena*.

228. 24 June **M. Shertok to L. Kohn and R. Shiloah.**
Copy. 130.02/2423/8. (Hebrew).
Arms ship *Altalena*; Kenya detainees; ban on immigration from Cyprus.

229. 24 June **D.B. Joseph to J. Nieuwenhuys.**
Copy. 93.03/95/2.
Supplies for Jerusalem during cease-fire.

230. 25 June **L. Kohn to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2424/20. (Hebrew).
Political talks in Rhodes.

231. 25 June **R. Shiloah to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02ı2424/20. (Hebrew).
Political talks in Rhodes.

232. 25 June **M. Shertok to I.J. Linton.**
Tel.; 72.9/687/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

233. 25 June **O. Gass to E. Kaplan.**
Tel. 125; Outg. 93.03/129/11; Inc. 130.02/2420/4.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

234. 26 June **M. Shertok to P. Cremona.**
Copy. 130.02/2426/9.
Arms ship *Altalena*; cease-fire violations.

235. 26 June **C. Weizmann to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2391/70.
Arms ship *Altalena*; nature of the Presidential office in Israel; acceptance of 29 Nov. borders; Franco-Israeli relations.

236. 27 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH506; Outg. 93.03/72/16; Inc. 130.09/2328/4.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

237. 27 June **I.J. Linton to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 61/117; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus; reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

238. 27 June **M. Fischer to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 17/92; Recd. 28 June; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Arms ship *Altalena*; Haifa oil refineries; occupation of French establishments by Israeli forces; French recognition of Israel.

239. 27 June **Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2424/20.
Suggestions for solution of the Palestine problem.

240. 28/29 June **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 68/66, 69/119, 70/134; Recd. 29/30 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
British and American attitudes.

241. 28 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 361; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

242. 28 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 360; Outg. 93.03/95/2.
Immigration.

243. 29 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH543; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.03/95/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

244. 29 June **I.J. Linton to M. Shertok.**
Tel. L101; Outg. 72.9/687/2.
Kenya detainees; ban on immigration from Cyprus.

245. 29 June **M. Shertok to J. Reedman.**
Copy. 130.02/2397/3.
Access to Wailing Wall during cease-fire.

246. 29 June **M. Shertok to I.J. Linton.**
Coded Tel. 58/33; Outg. 130.09/2318/1.
Mediator's suggestion for Arab rule in Jerusalem.

247. 29 June **M. Comay to W. Eytan.**
Copy. 93.03/126/3.
Recognition by British dominions and establishment of diplomatic relations.

248. 30 June **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 34/24; Recd. 1 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/6.
Arab reactions to Mediator's suggestions.

249. 30 June **A. Eban to J. Ross.**
Copy. 93.03/73/4.
Mediator suggestions for solution of Palestine problem.

250. 30 June **M. Shertok to J. Reedman.**
Copy. 130.02/2426/9.
Arms ship *Altalena*.

251. 30 June **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH556; Outg. 130.09/2328/4; Inc. 93.03/95/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

252. 1 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 95/164; Inc. 93.01/2180/21.
Israel's reaction to Mediator's suggestions.

253. 1 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH565; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Immigration.

254. 1 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 390; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Immigration.

255. 1 July **A. Eban to P. Jessup.**
Copy. 93.03/73/4.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

256. 2 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 37/49, Recd. 3 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Extension of cease-fire.

257. 2 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 38/56; Recd. 3 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Opposition of U.N. Secretariat to international control of Haifa port and refineries.

258. 2 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 39/126; Sent 3 July; Recd. 4 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/19.
Meeting with J. Ross of U.S. delegation to U.N.

259. 2 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 403; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

260. 2 July **A. Eban to T. Lie.**
Copy. 93.08/365/29.
Immigration.

261. 2 July **Meeting: W. Eytan—C. Marriott.**
Report. 93.03/94/9.
Relations between British Consulate in Haifa and the Israeli authorities.

262. 3 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH579; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/127/3.
Hebrew University and Hadassah institutions on Mount Scopus.

263. 3 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH578; Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
U.N. control of Haifa oil refineries.

264. 3 July **O. Gass to E. Kaplan.**
Copy. 93.08/365/1.
U.S. policy towards Israel.

265. 4 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH583; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/72/16.
Designation of Israel in Security Council.

266. 5 July **M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte.**
Copy. 93.08/377/8.
Israel's reaction to Mediator's suggestions.

267. 5 July **J. Reedman to M. Shertok.**
Copy. 130.02/2424/20.
Extension of cease-fire.

268. 5 July **Note by J. Reedman.**
Note. 130.02/2424/20.
Demilitarization of Jerusalem.

269. 5 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 98/23; Inc. 93.01/2180/21.
Extension of cease-fire.

270. 5 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH592; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Relaxation of restrictions on immigrants during the cease-fire.

285. 7 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH606; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Extension of cease-fire; demilitarization of Jerusalem and Haifa.

286. 7 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 1/63; Inc. 93.01/2180/21.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

287. 7 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH609; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Extension of cease-fire; water supply to Jerusalem.

288. 7 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 100/27; Inc. 93.01/2180/21.
Extension of cease-fire.

289. 7 July **Meeting: M. Shertok—Count Bernadotte.**
Report. 130.02/2426/5.
Extension of cease-fire; water supply to Jerusalem; demilitarization of Jerusalem and Haifa.

290. 7 July **I.J. Linton to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 75/73; Recd. 10 July; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

291. 8 July **M. Shertok to T. Lie.**
Tel. MH620; Outg. 130.02/2424/20.
Extension of cease-fire.

292. 8 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 439; Outg. 93.03/94/9; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Extension of cease-fire.

293. 8 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 438; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussions on cease-fire.

294. 8 July **M. Comay to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 448; Outg. 93.03/128/7.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

295. 8 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 2/51; Inc. 93.01/2180/26.
Military operations in Palestine.

296. 8 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH628; Inc. 93.08/364/10.
Extension of cease-fire.

297. 8 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 20/32; Recd. 9 July; Outg. 130.09/2308/1; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
American arms embargo.

298. 8/9 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 79/95, 80/196, 81/36; Recd. 9/10 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
Meeting with R. Lovett.

299. 8/9 July **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 77/177, 79/114, 80/74; Recd. 10/11 July; Inc.

130.09/2318/4.
Meeting with H. McNeil: Extension of cease-fire, Mediator's suggestions, Anglo-Israeli relations.

300. 9 July **L. Kohn to M. Shertok.**
Copy. 93.03/94/9.
Extension of cease-fire.

301. 9 July **J. Reedman to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2424/20.
Ten days' extension of cease-fire.

302. 9 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 457; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussions on extension of cease-fire.

303. 9 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 461; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Shertok's visit to U.S.

304. 9 July **A. Eban to T. Lie.**
Copy. 93.03/94/9.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

305. 9 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 55/118; Recd. 10 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
U.S. de jure recognition of Israel; American arms embargo.

306. 9 July **Y. Shimoni to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 3/279; Outg. 130.09/2329/20.
Inter-Arab relations.

307. 10 July **M. Shertok to J. Reedman.**
Copy. 130.02/2424/20.
Ten days' extension of cease-fire.

308. 10 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 82/78; Recd. 11 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
Security Council discussion on extension of cease-fire; U.S. de jure recognition of Israel; American arms embargo.

309. 10 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 56/65; Recd. 11 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Termination of Bernadotte's mission.

310. 10 July **A. Eban to C. Weizmann.**
Orig. Weizmann Archives.
Situation report.

311. 11 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 57/28; Recd. 12 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Extension of cease-fire.

312. 11 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 83/152; Recd. 12 July; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Israel plank in Democratic platform.

313. 11 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH646; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus; Shertok's visit to U.S.

314. 12 July **M. Comay to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X103; Recd. 13 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

315. 12 July **A. Eban to J. Ross.**
Copy. 93.03/73/4.
Extension of cease-fire; future of Bernadotte's mission.

316. 12 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 85/96; Sent 13 July; Recd. 14 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Security Council discussions on cease-fire.

317. 12 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 473; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussions on cease-fire.

318. 12 July **A. Eban to E. Najar.**
Coded Tel.; Outg. 93.03/127/9; Inc. 93.02/172/9.
French position in cease-fire discussions.

319. 13 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH670; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

320. 13 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X106; Recd. 14 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Security Council discussions on cease-fire.

321. 13 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 484; Outg. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussions on cease-fire.

322. 13 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 86/173; Sent 14 July, Recd. 15 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/21; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
Israel plank in Democratic platform.

323. 13 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 25/6; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Israel's need of planes.

324. 13 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH686; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Security Council discussion on cease-fire.

325. 14 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. 6/23; Inc. 93.01/2180/21.
Immigration.

326. 14 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH695; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/9.
Decisions of Israeli cabinet on cease-fire.

342. 18 July — **A. Eban to M. Fischer.**
Tel.; Recd. 19 July; Outg. 93.03/127/9; Inc. 93.02/172/9.
Submission of the Palestine problem to International Court of Justice.

343. 18 July — **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH750; Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/94/10.
Anti-Israel bias of Truce Commission.

344. 18 July — **M. Shertok to J. Charreyron.**
Copy. 130.02/2413/11.
Evacuation of French institutions by Israeli army.

345. 19 July — **M. Comay to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X115; Recd. 20 July; Inc., 130.02/2448/1.
Arab conditions for cease-fire.

346. 19 July — **N. Goldmann to A. Eban.**
Orig. 93.03/127/1.
British pressure on Arabs to accept cease-fire; Anglo-Israeli relations.

347. 20 July — **Meeting: L. Kohn—J. Reedman.**
Report. 130.02/2424/21. (Hebrew).
Mediator's suggestions for solution of Palestine problem.

348. 20 July — **Meetings: M. Comay—Members of the United States Delegation to the United Nations.**
Report. 93.03/94/10.
Jerusalem Truce Commission; Arrest of British employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation; Arab refugees.

349. 20 July — **M. Comay to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X122; Recd. 21 July; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Submission of the Palestine problem to International Court of Justice.

350. 20 July — **Memorandum by Count Bernadotte.**
Memorandum. 130.02/2424/21.
Cease-fire conditions.

351. 20 July — **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 92/80; Sent 21 July; Recd. 22 July; Outg. CZA Z4/14834; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Anglo-Israeli relations.

352. 20 July/ 22 Aug. — **M. Shertok to C. Weizmann.**
Copy. 130.02/2391/70.
Survey of situation in Israel.

353. 20 July — **M. Shertok to I.J. Linton.**
Tel. MH780; Inc. 72.9/687/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

354. 20 July — **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X120; Recd. 21 July; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
State Department appointments; Turkish-Israeli relations.

355. 21 July — **M. Shertok to M. Fischer.**
Copy. 130.02/2382/12. (Hebrew).
French recognition of Israel.

356. 22 July — **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 557; Outg. 93.03/72/16.
Admission of Israel to U.N.

357. 22 July **M. Shertok to M. Comay.**
Tel. MH814; Outg. 130.09/2329/20.
Israel's policy on Arab refugees.

358. 22 July **J. Reedman to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2443/1.
Suggestions for demilitarization of Jerusalem.

359. 22 July **L. Kohn to M. Shertok.**
Memorandum. 130.02/2424/21.
Formulation of policy in anticipation of meetings with Mediator.

360. 22 July **Count Bernadotte to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Inc. 130.02/2424/21.
Deployment of U.N. observers.

361. 22 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 94/130, 95/127, 96/192; Sent 23/24 July; Recd. 24/25 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/19; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Formulation of policies for forthcoming session of U.N. General Assembly.

362. 22 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded Tel. 28/42; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R.

363. 22 July **M. Fischer to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 24/31; Inc. 130.09/2329/23.
French and British recognition of Israel.

364. 23 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X126; Recd. 24 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Meeting with Y. Malik, of Soviet delegation to U.N.

365. 23 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 565; Outg. 93.03/126/1.
Importance of appointing a representative in Belgium.

366. 23 July (?) **Meeting: A. Lourie—James McDonald.**
Report. 93.03/70/18.
Meetings of Special Representative J. McDonald prior to his arrival in Israel.

367. 23 July **A. Eban to N. Goldmann.**
Copy. 93.03/127/1.
Survey of situation in U.N.

368. 23 July **A. Eban to I.J. Linton.**
Tel.; Inc. CZA Z4/14834.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

369. 23 July **M. Shertok to N. Goldmann.**
Coded Tel. 71/121; Outg. 130.09/2329/24.
Reopening of Haifa oil refineries.

370. 23 July **O. Gass to P. Bernstein.**
Tel. 196; Recd. 25 July; Outg. 93.08/365/24; Inc. 130.02/2420/1.
Purchase and refining of oil by Israel.

371. 23 July **M. Fischer to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 26/43; Recd. 24 July; Inc. 130.09/2329/23.
Submission of Palestine problem to International Court of Justice.

372. 23 July **A. Eban to M. Fischer.**
Tel.; Recd. 24 July; Inc. 93.02/172/9.
Meeting with A. Parodi, French representative at U.N.

373. 23 July **M. Comay to G. Ignatieff.**
Copy. 93.03/69/16.
Canada's recognition of Israel.

374. 23 July **Meeting: M. Namir—Ana Pauker.**
Report. 130.02/2457/19. (Hebrew).
Immigration from Rumania.

375. 24 July **M. Comay to P. Jessup.**
Copy. 93.08/377/8.
Israel's policy with regard to Arab refugees.

376. 25 July **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH834. Outg. 130.09/2329/1; Inc. 93.03/126/2.
Ban on immigration from Cyprus.

377. 25 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Coded. Tel. 31/57; Outg. 130.09/2329/22; Inc. 93.01/2207/1.
Instructions for meeting with President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall.

378. 25 July **M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte.**
Copy. 93.03/94/10.
Suggestion for solution of Palestine problem.

379. 25 July **M. Fischer to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2382/12.
French recognition of Israel; arms ship *Altalena*.

380. 26 July **Meeting: M. Shertok—Count Bernadotte and Assistants.**
Report. 93.03/94/10.
Demilitarization of Jerusalem; Arab refugees; immigration.

381. 27 July **L. Kohn: Note on W. Eytan's Memorandum.**
Note. 130.02/2424/21.
Israel's Arab policy.

382. 27 July **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
Tel. MH862; Inc. 93.01/2220/20.
Direct negotiations with Arabs; formulation of policy for forthcoming session of U.N. General Assembly.

383. 27 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded tel. 97/206; Recd. 28 July; Inc. 130.09/2329/21.
Meeting with Secretary of State Marshall.

384. 27 July **O. Gass to P. Bernstein.**
tel. 182; Outg. 93.03/129/11.
Purchase and refining of oil by Israel.

385. 27 July **O. Gass to R. Eakens.**
Copy. 93.03/129/11.
Purchase and refining of oil by Israel.

386. 28 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. 604; Outg. 93.03/128/8.
Immigration.

387. 28 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X135; Recd. 29 July; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Arrest of British employees of Jerusalem Electric Corporation.

388. 28 July **W. Eytan to M. Shertok.**
Memorandum. 130.02/2424/21. (Hebrew).
Urgency of political initiative by Israel.

389. 28 July **M. Shertok to J. Reedman.**
Stencilled Copy. 93.03/94/10.
Demilitarization of Jerusalem.

390. 28 July **J. Reedman to M. Shertok.**
Stencilled Copy. 93.03/94/10.
Arab refugees.

391. 29 July **A. Eban to the President of the Security Council.**
Copy. 93.03/94/6.
Arrest of British employees of Jerusalem Electric Corporation.

392. 29 July **A. Eban to M. Fischer.**
Tel. 618; Outg. 93.03/94/10; Inc. 93.02/172/9.
Occupation of French institutions by Israeli army; reopening of the Haifa oil refineries.

393. 29 July **M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Copy. 130.02/2426/8. (Hebrew).
Immigration.

394. 29 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 101/36; Recd. 30 July; Inc. 130.09/2308/6.
Loan from Eport-Import Bank.

395. 30 July **A. Eban to the President of the Security Council.**
Copy. 93.03/72/30.
Arrest of British employees of Jerusalem Electric Corporation.

396. 30 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
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397. 30 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
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398. 30 July **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
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Admission of Israel to U.N.

399. 30 July **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
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Meeting with President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall.

400. 30 July **M. Shertok to M. Fischer.**
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Israel's position on Jerusalem.

415. 3 Aug. **Meeting: M. Fischer—P. Quaroni.**
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416. 3 Aug. **E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni.**
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417. 4 Aug. **A. Eban to the President of the Security Council.**
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418. 4 Aug. **Meetings: I.J. Linton—James McDonald.**
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419. 4 Aug. **O. Gass to P. Bernstein.**
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Supply of oil to Israel.

420. 5 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. NI-3/154. Recd. 6 Aug.; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Demilitarization of Jerusalem; Count Bernadotte's mediation plans; admission of Israel to U.N.

421. 5 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. X143; Recd. 6 Aug.; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2337/7.
Admission of Israel to U.N.

422. 5 Aug. **A. Eban to the President of the Security Council.**
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Water supply to Jerusalem.

423. 5 Aug. **L. Kohn to M. Shertok.**
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424. 5 Aug. **Meeting: M. Shertok and Members of the Staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with Count Bernadotte and Assistants.**
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425. 5 Aug. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
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426. 5 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
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427. 5 Aug. **M. Toff to A. Eban.**
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428. 5 Aug. **M. Shertok to E. Sasson.**
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Instructions for negotiations with Transjordanian representatives.

429. 6 Aug. **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
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431. 6 Aug. **M. Shertok to Count Bernadotte.**
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Direct negotiations with Arabs.

432. 8 Aug. **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
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434. 8 Aug. **M. Shertok to J. Reedman.**
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437. 8 Aug. **E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni.**
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Meeting with T. Lie.

441. 10 Aug. **Meeting: M. Shertok—Count Bernadotte.**
Report. 93.03/94/11.
Mediator's meeting with Egyptian Prime Minister; cease-fire violations; Arab refugees.

457. 16 Aug. **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
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460. 17 Aug. **O. Gass to R. Eakens.**
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Guide-lines for discussions with Arab representatives, excluding Transjordanians.

463. 18 Aug. **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
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464. 18 Aug. **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
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465. 18 Aug. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
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Coded Tel. IN-10/60; Outg. 130.09/2329/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/22.
Vatican—Israel relations.

467. 19 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.03/94/11.
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470. 19 Aug. **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
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471. 20 Aug. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
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473. 20 Aug. **Meetings: I.J. Linton—B. Burrows, H. Beeley,**
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474. 21 Aug. **M. Fischer to W. Eytan.**
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475. 22 Aug. **M. Shertok to T. Lie.**
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476. 22 Aug. **A. Ladas to M. Shertok.**
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Demilitarization of Jerusalem.

477. 22 Aug. **Scheme for the Demilitarization of Jerusalem.**
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478. 22 Aug. **M. Fischer to M. Shertok.**
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482. 26 Aug. **O. Gass to E. Kaplan.**
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487. 21/30 Aug. **Meetings: A. Katznelson—Count Bernadotte, R. Bunche.**
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488. 30 Aug. **M. Shertok to E. Sasson.**
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Negotiations with Transjordan.

489. 31 Aug. **Meeting: A. Lourie—T. Lie, R. Bunche.**
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490. 31 Aug. **U. Heydt, D. Ginsburg and O. Gass to E. Epstein.**
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491. 31 Aug. **E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni.**
Copy. 93.03/64/14. (Hebrew).
Israel's Arab policy.

492. 2 Sept. **J. Robinson and G. Rafael to M. Shertok.**
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493. 6 Sept. **Statement Delivered by James McDonald at a Meeting with M. Shertok.**
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American suggestions for settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict.

494. [6] Sept. **C. Weizmann to President Truman.**
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495. 6 Sept. **M. Shertok to U. Heydt and O. Gass.**
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Immigration from Germany and Austria — communiqué of Washington Mission.

496. 7 Sept. **M. Fischer to W. Eytan.**
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Franco-Israeli relations.

497. 7 Sept. **G. Meyerson to M. Shertok.**
Tel. P2/40; Recd. 8 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew).
Meeting with V. Molotov.

498. 8 Sept. **N. Goldmann to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 13/95; Recd. 10 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2318/4.
Opening of office of Israeli representative in U.K.

499. 9 Sept. **M. Shertok to E. Sasson.**
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500. 9 Sept. **M. Fischer to W. Eytan.**
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Anglo-French contacts; Franco-Israeli relations.

501. 9 Sept. **Meeting: M. Weissman—P.H. Spaak.**
Report. 130.02/2384/16.
Belgian-Israeli relations.

502. 10 Sept. **M. Shertok to the Members of the Provisional Government.**
Copy. 130.02/2384/21. (Hebrew).
Instructions to Israeli delegation to U.N. General Assembly.

503. 10 Sept. **M. Shertok to A. Lourie.**
Coded Tel. IN-30/81; Recd. 11 Sept.; Outg. 130.09/2329/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/22.
Meeting with Mediator.

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Coded Tel. IN-27/280, IN-28/94, IN-29/164; Outg. 130.09/2329/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/30.
Reaction to American proposals.

505. 12 Sept. **U. Heydt to M. Shertok and E. Epstein.**
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J. Klein's meeting with President Truman.

506. 12 Sept. **S. Friedman to G. Meyerson.**
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507. 13 Sept. **L. Kohn to M. Shertok.**
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508. 13 Sept. **P. Bernstein to O. Gass.**
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Oil supplies for Israel.

509. 14 Sept. **I.J. Linton to M. Shertok.**
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Anglo-Israeli relations.

510. 14 Sept. **D.B. Joseph to M. Shertok.**
Copy. 42/287/704. (Hebrew).
Meeting with British consul in Jerusalem.

511. 15 Sept. **G. Meyerson to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. 17/71; Recd. 16 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew).
Meeting of G. Meyerson with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin.

512. 15 Sept. **W. Eytan to M. Fischer.**
Coded Tel. 33/61; Recd. 19 Sept.; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/186/3.
Vatican—Israel relations.

513. 16 Sept. **I. Barzilai to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.11/2492/20. (Hebrew).
Meeting with J. Katz-Suchy, of Polish delegation to U.N.

514. 16 Sept. **Meeting: M. Weissman—A. Lovink.**
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Netherlands—Israel relations.

515. 16 Sept. **Y. Shimoni to E. Sasson.**
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Israel's Arab policy.

516. 17 Sept. **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
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American de jure recognition of Israel; arms supply from Czechoslovakia; Lehi.

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Arms supply from Czechoslovakia.

518. 17 Sept. **M. Shertok to T. Lie.**
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Assassination of Count Bernadotte.

519. 17 Sept. **R. Bunche to M. Shertok.**
Copy. 93.03/130/4.
Assassination of Count Bernadotte.

520. 19 Sept. **M. Shertok to R. Bunche.**
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521. 19 Sept. **Y. Wolfsberg to M. Shertok.**
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Meeting with Swedish Foreign Minister.

522. 19 Sept. **M. Shertok to E. Sasson.**
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Negotiations with King Abdallah.

523. 20 Sept. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. U1/84; Recd. 21 Sept.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Israel's reaction to Count Bernadotte's proposals.

524. 20 Sept. **R. Bunche to M. Shertok.**
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Assassination of Count Bernadotte.

525. 20 Sept. **M. Shertok to E. Epstein.**
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American appeal to maintain cease-fire.

526. 21 Sept. **A. Eban to E. Epstein.**
Tel. UN55; Outg. 93.02/186/3; Inc. 93.01/2220/8.
U.S. support for the Mediator's proposals.

527. 21 Sept. **D.B. Joseph to M. Shertok.**
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Assassination of Count Bernadotte.

528. 21 Sept. **C. Hoffman to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 130.02/2426/8. (Hebrew).
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529. 21 Sept. **S. Friedman to G. Meyerson.**
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Meetings with the Soviet Minister in Israel.

530. 22 Sept. **M. Shertok to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Copy. 130.02/2425/2. (Hebrew).
Israel's reaction to Count Bernadotte's proposals.

531. 22 Sept. **Statement issued by the Israeli Delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly.**
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Israel's reaction to Count Bernadotte's proposals.

532. 22 Sept. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. UN58; Outg. 93.02/186/3; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Meeting with J. Ross, of U.S. delegation to U.N. — Mediator's proposals.

533. 22 Sept. **A. Eban to M. Shertok.**
Tel. UN59; Outg. 93.02/186/3.
Meeting with H. McNeil, of British delegation to U.N. — Mediator's proposals.

534. 22 Sept. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. W9T; Recd. 23 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
American attitude to Mediator's proposals.

535. 23 Sept. **M. Shertok to G. Meyerson.**
Coded Tel. IP6/12; Outg. 130.09/2325/3. (Hebrew).
Immigration from Eastern Europe.

536. 23 Sept. **Statement by the Spokesman of the Government of Israel.**
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Israel's reaction to Count Bernadotte's proposals.

537. 23 Sept. **Fourth Meeting of the Israeli Mission to the Session of the United Nations General Assembly.**
Report. 93.03/131/18.
Meetings and trends in U.N.

538. 23 Sept. **M. Shertok to G. Rafael.**
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539. 23 Sept. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. W10T/77; Recd. 24 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
American de jure recognition of Israel; loan from Export-Import Bank.

540. 23 Sept. **Meeting: M. Fischer—A. Parodi.**
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541. 23 Sept. **E. Sasson to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.**
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542. 23 Sept. **M. Shertok to E. Sasson.**
Coded Tel. 30/68; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Instructions for negotiations with Egyptians.

543. 24 Sept. **A. Eban to C. Weizmann.**
Orig. Weizmann Archives.
Inclusion of Negev in Israel.

544. 24 Sept. **G. Meyerson to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. PI13/186; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew).
Soviet-Israeli relations.

545. 26 Sept. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. W15T/223; Recd. 27 Sept.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Protection of British Consul in Haifa; Israel's reaction to Mediator's proposals.

546. 27 Sept. **M. Shertok to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. U48/27; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Israel's position on Jerusalem.

547. 27 Sept. **M. Comay to the Israeli Mission to the United Nations General Assembly Session in Paris**
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Maintenance of cease-fire; Conciliation Commission; modification of boundaries; Arab refugees; admission of Israel to U.N.

548. 27/28 Sept. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok.**
Coded Tel. NI-40/287, NI-42/100; Sent 27/28 Sept.; Recd. 28/29 Sept.
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American policy.

549. 27 Sept. **E. Avriel to M. Shertok.**
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550. 28 Sept. **Meeting: W. Eytan, E. Herlitz—James McDonald, C. Knox.**
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Israel's reaction to Mediator's proposals.

551. 28 Sept. **S. Friedman to G. Meyerson.**
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Shertok's meeting with Soviet Minister — Israel's attitude to Mediator's proposals.

552. 28 Sept. **E. Epstein to M. Shertok and A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. NP5; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Indian-Israeli relations.

553. 29 Sept. **A. Eban to A. Lourie**
Tel. UN107; Inc. 93.03/130/5.
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554. 29 Sept. **J. Herzog to M. Shertok.**
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Vatican—Israel relations.

555. 29 Sept. **Meeting: A. Eban—P. Federspiel.**
Report. 93.03/126/4.
Denmark's attitude to Mediator's proposals.

556. 30 Sept. **Note by A. Eban.**
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Postponement of discussion of Palestine problem in U.N.

557. 30 Sept. **R. Shiloah to M. Shertok.**
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Coordination of political and military activities.

558. 30 Sept. **S. Friedman to M. Shertok.**
Orig. 93.03/64/15. (Hebrew).
Immigration from Eastern Europe; Soviet Jewry.

APPENDICES

Appendix A	Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, 14 May 1948
Appendix B	United States draft resolution in the Security council, 17 May 1948
Appendix C	British amendment to United States draft resolution in the Security Council, 19 May 1948
Appendix D	Security Council resolution, 22 May 1948
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Appendix F	1) United States draft resolution in the Security Council, 13 July 1948 2) Security Council resolution, 15 July 1948
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    - 93.02 Paris
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    - 93.08 Washington

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    - 130.02 Offices of Minister and Director-General
    - 130.09 Coded telegrams
    - 130.10 West European Division
    - 130.11 East European Division
    - 130.15 Middle East Division
    - 130.20 United States Division

42. *Jerusalem Committee and Military Governor*

72.9 *Mordecai Eliash Papers*

Central Zionist Archives (Abbreviated reference: **C.Z.A.**)

S25 Political Department of the Jewish Agency

Z4 Central Office of the Jewish Agency, London

Ben-Gurion Archives

Weizmann Archives (Abbreviated reference: **W.A.**)

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Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotation

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GLOSSARY

Note: Because of the standardized transliteration used in the glossary, there are slight differences between the spelling of some of the Hebrew terms in the glossary and the original spelling in the text

Aliya	— Jewish immigration into Israel
Emeq	— Valley (of Yizre'el)
Gvulot	— Boundaries
Hahzara	— Return, repatriation
Ir Bira	— Capital City
Iriya	— Municipality
Ishemet	— President Truman
Iton Rishmi	— Official Gazette
Kehilla	— *see* Qehilla
Klapei hutz	— Externally
Lifnim mishurat hadin	— Not according to the strict letter of the law
Mamaz	— District Commander
Mazkir	— Secretary
Mazkir gadol	— Secretary of State (U.S.A.)
Mazkir klali	— (United Nations) Secretary-General
Medina	— State
Metavekh	— Mediator
Mishlahat	— Delegation (to the U.N.)
Moshel Tzeva'i	— Military Governor
Nasi	— President
Nasikh	— Prince, i.e., Count Bernadotte
Natzig	— Representative
Qehilla	— Jewish Community (of Jerusalem)
Shofet	— Judge
Shutaf	— Partner
Tetlamed	— Trigve Lie
Va'adat Yerushalaim	— Jerusalem Committee
Yishuv	— The Jewish Community of Palestine (Israel)

SUMMARIES OF HEBREW DOCUMENTS

References to English and French documents (e.g., "See No. 42") are to the Main Volume. All other references (to notes, editorial notes and summaries of Hebrew documents) are to the Companion Volume.

25. Z. Modzelewski (Warsaw) to M. Shertok. 18 May 1948

Acknowledges receipt of Shertok's telegram notifying him of the establishment of the State of Israel and requesting Poland's recognition. The Polish Government is pleased with the establishment of the provisional Government, which has undertaken to institute a regime based on political and social equality. Poland's position in matters pertaining to the Jewish people is well known in international forums, especially the U.N. Conveys in the name of his Government official recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel and expresses the hope that Poland will be able in future to support Israel's admission to the U.N.

40. L. Kohn [Jerusalem] to D. Ben-Gurion. 19 May 1948

Kohn met the Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem (Nieuwenhuys), who informed him of his and Azcarate's meeting with King Abdallah. They submitted to the King a warning from the Security Council. The King was in a stormy mood, pointed out that he had offered the Jews (whom he liked) a peace proposal, which had been refused, and that he therefore had no choice but to go to war. Azcarate informed the King that he had been appointed Deputy U.N. Commissioner for Jerusalem and that his first concern was to provide the city with food and water. The King reacted sharply and declared that he would not lift the siege.

Kohn transmitted to Nieuwenhuys a proposal, originating with the Jerusalem District Commander, that a cease-fire be arranged in Jerusalem, on condition that the Arabs did not disrupt the supply line that had been established between the New City and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City, and did not attack the Jews from the Arab quarters.

59. W. Eytan [Jerusalem] to M. Shertok. 22 May 1948

Proposes that the State of Israel make a public statement along the following lines:

Jerusalem is being subjected to ferocious and unjustified attacks by Arab forces operating under British command and using British arms. These forces have already destroyed many holy places and have made indiscriminate attacks against civilians. The Jews of Jerusalem are repelling these attacks; however, this does not mean that the Jewish people have any political or territorial ambitions with regard to Jerusalem. They have consented to the internationalization of Jerusalem and will abide by this decision. But if the attack does not cease within forty-eight hours, the Jews will fight even if Jerusalem is totally destroyed. Under such circumstances, they will regard the city as an integral part of the State of Israel and will no longer be bound by the decision to internationalize Jerusalem.

102. A. Stern (Rome) to M. Shertok. 28 May 1948

Advises to put increased pressure on the Italian Government to recognize the State of Israel, utilizing the recent impression made by American recognition. In the meantime, pending an official application, he is endeavouring to prepare the ground in government circles, in cooperation with Ada Sereni and other Jewish personalities in Italy. Italy's present position is that she cannot be the first West European country to recognize Israel. French recognition could be a helpful factor, although there is no certainty that Italian recognition will automatically follow recognition by France.

122. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 31 May 1948

Reminds Ben-Gurion of France's request for the evacuation of French institutions in Jerusalem [see No. 111]. In his opinion, an affirmative answer should be given, except for locations that are

absolutely essential on military grounds. This answer should be made conditional on the Arabs acting in similar fashion. The answer should be forwarded soon, without awaiting the outcome of the cease-fire discussions in the Security Council. It may be possible to reach a satisfactory arrangement through direct negotiations with the French Consul in Jerusalem, but the Israeli representatives there will require Cabinet authorization to conduct negotiations.

145. M. Fischer [Paris] to M. Shertok. 4 June 1948 (19.20)

Fischer was informed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the U.S. was in agreement with the Anglo-Arab view on the interpretation of the immigration clause of the cease-fire resolution. However, the French representative at the U.N., Parodi, will stick to the instructions he received from France following Fischer's intervention [see editorial note, p. 63 below], despite strong British pressure.

Public pressure for French recognition of Israel continues, although the (anticipated) cease-fire has strengthened the desire to postpone recognition. As official French manifestations of friendship towards Weizmann may offset the (negative) impression of non-recognition, he is advising Weizmann to adopt a lukewarm attitude.

174. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Shertok. 9 June 1948

Reports that Weizmann met with Foreign Minister Bidault against Fischer's advice and without having given him the opportunity of informing him beforehand about Bidault's attitude. [See also note 9, p. 77 below]. Bidault's position on recognition is hanging in the balance. He is being sharply attacked because of the concessions he has made to the British and the Americans on Germany and is not prepared to forgo the British support he is receiving in return for his position on Palestine. Although there is public pressure and overwhelming support in Parliament for

recognition, Bidault has at his disposal many procedural means for delaying recognition.

Léon Blum, who has shown great loyalty to the Israeli cause, recently held meetings in Paris with two British Labour leaders — Morgan Phillips and James Griffiths. He pointed out to them that the position of the British Labour Party on the Palestine issue was weakening the international Socialist movement.

181. Memorandum by A. Levavi, Jerusalem. 13 June 1948

The memorandum deals with the urgent tasks of the East European Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The first part analyses the basic factors involved. The countries of Eastern Europe are of great importance to Israel. The Eastern Bloc represents one of the world's major concentrations of power. The Soviet Union and other East European countries have recognized Israel and others may follow. Under certain circumstances Israel may require the assistance of the Eastern Bloc in the political, military and economic spheres. Eastern Europe still has a large Jewish population, many of whom are potential immigrants to Israel. In some East European countries Jews occupy key government positions and there are family, social and cultural ties between Jews in Israel and in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. It has not acquiesced in its exclusion from the region and has recently begun to support ethnic minorities in the Arab world. The persecuted Communist elements in Arab countries have good prospects of success in the foreseeable future, while the Israeli Communists are not likely to become a paramount factor except perhaps in case of a major emergency. Israel's general orientation is to maintain friendship with the U.S. without clashing with Soviet interests. Israel's aim, therefore, is to constitute a mitigating factor in the latent tension between the two powers on the Palestine issue.

The East European Division should help to organize Israel's diplomatic missions in the Eastern Bloc, to maintain daily contact with East European representatives, help send unofficial representatives to East European countries that have not yet recognized

Israel, in order to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations, publish material on Israel for distribution in Eastern Europe, and collect information on East European countries and formulate proposals with regard to Israel's relations with them.

198. Y. Yadin (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 16 June 1948

The Negev has been cut off for five days and the supply situation is grave. Advises informing the U.N. representatives, who have done nothing to solve the problem, that if the matter is not settled immediately, Israel will be forced to revert to the methods she had employed prior to the cease-fire.

202. A. Stern (Rome) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 17 June 1948

Following a request by the American and British embassies in Rome that "fighting personnel" be prevented from proceeding to Israel, the Italian Government has forbidden all men of military age to leave Italy for Israel. At a meeting held at the Italian Foreign Ministry Stern explained Israel's attitude, pointing out that Bernadotte's interpretation of the term "fighting personnel" was: "members of organized military units or persons bearing arms" [cf. No. 156, par. 6 (ii)]. He presented a memorandum which, it was agreed, would be used for the formulation of an amendment to the Italian instructions on emigration to Israel.

220. R. Shiloah (Rhodes) to M. Shertok. 22 June 1948

On arrival in Rhodes, Shiloah met Count Bernadotte and gave him a detailed report on the *Altalena* affair. Bernadotte praised the conduct of the Government of Israel, which had proved its trustworthiness. But at a later meeting, after Bernadotte had consulted members of the U.N. staff who had arrived from Tel Aviv, he was more censorious. He complained that the Israelis had not

permitted U.N. observers free access to the scene of fighting, despite a promise given by Shertok, and that in the course of the fighting hundreds of immigrants had reportedly managed to disembark without supervision. Shiloah explained that Colonel Bonde had turned down an offer that U.N. observers be allowed access on condition that they were escorted by Israeli representatives. When they subsequently appeared without escort they were nevertheless allowed access. A. Ladas complained that the observers had been refused permission to be present at the local Israeli headquarters. Shiloah explained that this was impossible because of security considerations. With regard to the immigrants who had reportedly entered the country, Shiloah declared that the main issue was the unloading of the arms; detailed information with regard to the immigrants could be obtained only after the fighting was over.

Shiloah discussed with Bernadotte the problems of the Cyprus detainees and of supplies to the Negev. With regard to the detainees, Bernadotte said that he could not deal with the matter unless asked to do so by the British Government. Shiloah replied that he saw no reason why Bernadotte should not approach the British or at least send observers to Cyprus. Bernadotte promised a reply on the following day. With regard to supplies to the Negev, Bernadotte stated that convoys would start to run within a few days and that he had given Egypt unequivocal notification of this decision. In order to compensate Israel for the period during which no supplies had been sent, the size of the convoys would be increased.

228. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to L. Kohn and R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 24 June 1948

Shertok refers to the complaints that U.N. observers were not afforded free access to the site of the clashes which took place following the arrival of the I.Z.L. ship *Altalena* and that many of its immigrants have infiltrated into the country. [See summary of No. 220, and No. 227]. Shertok confirms that he did at first comply with the request that observers be allowed to visit the

local headquarters; he has not foreseen the implications of such a visit and must accept the army's refusal. As far as the immigrants are concerned, the whole matter is of secondary importance. The foremost concern of the Government of Israel is to prevent unloading of the arms. It is a complicated task, demanding considerable military preparations and in the meantime the immigrants may well have managed to disembark and to disperse. Shertok suggests that the representatives at Rhodes do not deny that immigrants have infiltrated into the country, because the fact has been widely reported in the Israeli press. The Government of Israel, which has gone to such lengths with a view to honouring its international commitments, is entitled to immunity from protests about trivial matters.

Shertok points out that, though the cease-fire has been in effect for a fortnight, no liaison arrangements or clear-cut procedures have been established for communications between the U.N. observers' staff and the Government of Israel, nor has the scope of the observers' powers been determined. This constitutes a potential cause of misunderstandings and has been at the root of the controversy with regard to the visit of the observers to the site of the *Altalena* fighting. Shertok instructs Kohn and Shiloah to do everything in their power to avoid a rift with the Mediator and to prevent him from complaining to the Security Council.

With regard to the Kenya detainees [see No. 211, note 1], Shertok instructs Kohn and Shiloah to try to expedite an exchange of views between the Mediator and the British. If the Mediator raises the question of the detainees' loyalty to the state and their readiness to comply with the cease-fire, they are to point out that this is the exclusive concern and responsibility of the Israeli Government, which will decide whether they are to be imprisoned or merely required to give an undertaking of good behaviour. The detainees are citizens of Israel and no one has the right to detain them abroad.

As to immigration from Cyprus, no progress has been made. Shertok has requested the Israeli Mission in London to raise the matter with the British Government [see No. 223]. The *Pan York* and *Pan Crescent* [which were to transport immigrants from Cyprus], have been detained by the British at the port of Haifa. If

they are not freed, the U.N. representatives in Haifa will be asked to intervene.

230. L. Kohn (Rhodes) to M. Shertok. 25 June 1948

Substantial matters were discussed for the first time at a meeting between the Israeli representatives and a U.N. team headed by Ralph Bunche. Bunche declared that the purpose of the mediation was "to prepare suggestions aiming at a peaceful adjustment." He explained that their intention in inviting experts from both sides was to receive helpful information, not to make them party to the final proposals. In summing up the situation that had resulted from the developments of the past six months, Bunche used such vague terms than Kohn had to point out that they were not working in a vacuum. Bunche and Reedman agreed that the U.N. resolution of 29 November 1947 must constitute a basic factor in the Israeli, and therefore indirectly also in their own approach to the problem.

Kohn stated that there were two possible approaches to the problem: 1) to regard the U.N. resolution as a basis and to seek ways of inducing the Arabs to accept it, e.g. by Israeli participation in regional development schemes; 2) reopening of the entire question, which was unacceptable to Israel. Bunche said that a third approach was possible: to accept the partition resolution as a basis but to take into account facts that had emerged since its adoption, such as the outbreak of hostilities and the unwillingness of the U.N. to enforce the resolution. Their intention was to work for an arrangement which would satisfy Israel's vital requirements and would at the same time be acceptable to the Arabs. In reply, Kohn outlined the conditions regarded as essential by Israel: sufficient territory, so that all Jews wishing or forced to settle in Israel could do so; full sovereignty and control over the country's economic resources. Shiloah pointed out that from the Israeli point of view there had been several fundamental changes since the adoption of the U.N. resolution: the combined Arab attack, the impotence of the U.N. and the abandonment of the Jews of Jerusalem by the Christian world.

The U.N. officials requested information on three points: 1) The present status of the Jewish Agency. 2) The situation with regard to Israel's request to be admitted to the U.N. 3) Changes that had taken place in the number and condition of the Arabs of Palestine as a result of the war. A reply to the third question was given immediately; with regard to the others, information is being requested from Israel.

The Mediator met with the Israeli representatives on 25 June. He explained that he had not taken part in the previous talks because he did not wish the Israeli representatives to draw any conclusions with regard to the drift of his thoughts. Within a couple of days he would present tentative suggestions for a solution of the Palestine problem, aimed at clarifying whether there was a common basis for negotiations.

Three additional problems were discussed with the U.N. officials: 1) *Immigration.* The Israeli representatives emphasized the urgency of the problem, especially that of the Cyprus detainees. 2) *Oil.* Bunche raised questions as to the legal situation in view of the cease-fire and pointed out that if Israel wished to prevent the supply of oil from the Haifa refineries to Arab countries, oil would by implication come under the definition of "war materials" and its importation into Israel might also be prohibited. Bunche requested a memorandum on the subject, but in view of his above-mentioned remark, the Israeli representatives decided not to submit one. They pointed out that Israel was prepared to discuss the reopening of the refineries under U.N. supervision for the benefit of all parties. 3) *Negev convoys.* The Mediator said that the Egyptians had rejected his views on this issue [see No. 214], but he was insisting on acceptance of his interpretation of the truce conditions and had demanded that the Egyptians stop all interference with the convoys.

231. R. Shiloah (Rhodes) to M. Shertok. 25 June 1948

Shiloah conveys impressions he has gathered from private talks with U.N. officials, especially Reedman. Bernadotte seems to accept the fact of Israel's existence as a basic assumption and is

aware that Israel will have to insist on the fulfilment of its vital needs. His problem is to find a way that will enable the Arabs to accept the facts without losing face. The major difficulty stems from Arab disunity and the probability that some of the Arab states will reject any solution, even if acceptable to the others. The U.N. staff are still unable to explain the extremist attitude which the Egyptians have adopted since the outbreak of the war; in Reedman's opinion it is being caused by internal difficulties. The attitude of the Americans and the British to Bernadotte's proposals will be a major factor in determining the final outcome. Reedman denied that Bernadotte was acting on behalf of the British or the Americans. Reedman holds that without a split in the Arab League no solution will be possible. He tried to find out whether Israel had any contacts with certain sections of the League and inquired about Israel's readiness to cooperate with the Arab world. Shiloah is of the opinion that a definite plan for future cooperation will facilitate the progress of the talks.

332. D. Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv) to the Commander of the Etzioni Brigade. 15 July 1948

Warns against the danger of looting and desecration of holy places in the event that the Old City of Jerusalem is captured by Israeli forces. When the fall of the Old City becomes imminent, a special unit should be established which will prevent Israeli soldiers from entering the Old City. The mining of the approaches should also be considered.

339. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to M. Shertok. 16 July 1948

Reports on talks with S. Peterfy [Bentsur], who has been in Hungary, on a mission on behalf of Mapai (Israel Labour Party), since 1947.

The Hungarian Communists define their attitude to the Zionist movement as one of "tolerant suspicion", and try to restrain Zionist activities. On the other hand, Hungary has from the start

shown a sympathetic attitude towards the State of Israel, and Israel's failure to establish diplomatic relations is causing resentment. In order to advance practical matters it has been necessary to establish direct contact, on behalf of the "progressive Zionist movement", with Istvan Szirmai, the person actually in charge of Zionist affairs on behalf of the Communist Party. These contacts resulted in such achievements as the permission to conduct a fund-raising campaign for defence purposes, or permission to transfer $120,000 of the money thus collected at the official rate of exchange, permission to use local currency for the purchase of sugar for Israel and the agreement to issue exit visas to 1000 volunteers for the Israeli army.

According to Peterfy, the situation of the Zionist movement in Hungary is precarious. Prospects of advancement for Jewish youth are good and most Jews under the age of thirty have gone over to the Communists. He anticipates that only about 700 persons will volunteer for military service in Israel. In view of all this, Peterfy emphasizes that the official Israeli representative in Hungary should be a member of one of the labour parties. A member of the [moderate] Mapai will probably be acceptable. Levavi elicited from Peterfy that Szirmai had hinted that he — Peterfy — would be a good candidate.

347. Meeting: L. Kohn — J. Reedman (Tel Aviv, 13 July 1948. Document dated 20 July)

Reedman said that Israeli misgivings with regard to Count Bernadotte were not justified. The Mediator had intended to visit Cairo in order to effectuate a prolongation of the truce, at least in Jerusalem, but in view of the rift in the Arab camp he had decided to go to Lake Success with a view to arranging for the continuation of the truce throughout the country. Reedman opined that a truce ordered by the Security Council would actually enable the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Egyptian Prime Minister to get out of the impasse in which they found themselves.

Reedman stated that the Israelis must find a way to negotiate

with someone on the Arab side, preferably King Abdallah. In Reedman's opinion, the solution suggested by Brigadier Clayton (partition of the Arab part of Palestine between the Arab states) would only increase the tension.

Reedman said that he was the actual author of the Bernadotte proposals. With regard to the suggestions on Jewish immigration, he said that Arab fears of Israeli expansion must be allayed, though he admitted that these fears were unfounded. He conceded that the proposals implied a certain limitation on Israel's sovereignty, but argued that no one could really prevent Jewish immigration into Israel.

In reply to Kohn's statement that no one had ever before suggested the delivery of Jerusalem to the Arabs, Reedman said that all solutions proposed in the past had been designed to give the British a foothold in Palestine, but that now the problem had to be dealt with as such and that the fact that Jerusalem was surrounded on all sides by Arabs could not be disregarded. He argued that according to the Jews themselves their associations with Jerusalem were mainly spiritual, and he wondered why a solution safeguarding the Jews' spiritual rights and granting them municipal self-rule could not be accepted by Israel. Reedman added that in his opinion an international regime in Jerusalem would be an artificial creation, and he asked Kohn's opinion about the possibility of making Jerusalem the joint capital of a union between Israel and an Arab [Palestinian] state. Kohn replied that the idea seemed to him rather abstract, and inquired about Reedman's attitude to a possible partition of the city, with a corridor linking the Jewish part to Israel. Reedman replied that if Israel could agree with the Arabs on such a solution, the Mediator's staff would undoubtedly welcome it.

355. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 21 July 1948

Shertok suggests that in view of the fact that the truce has been extended without a time-limit, a renewed effort to attain French recognition may prove successful. He inquires whether there are

any indications in Paris of a weakening of British opposition reported by Goldmann [see No. 351]. Shertok instructs Fischer to explain that non-recognition by France and consequently by other Western countries "pushes Israel eastward." Such a process is prescribed by "the laws of political physics, which no ideological barriers can withstand."

374. Meeting: M. Namir — Ana Pauker (Bucharest, 23 July 1948)

Mme Pauker gave the following reply to requests made by Namir in the course of an earlier meeting, on 13 July: Rumania will permit the emigration of approximately 5000 persons a month to Israel; 70% of these will be men and women of military age, the rest — mainly members of their families; the emigrants will be regarded as repatriates returning to their homeland; the Government of Israel will be responsible for transportation and funding and will appoint M. Averbuch [Agami] to take care of all arrangements; the emigrants will, as far as possible, embark in non-Rumanian ports; the agreement will get as little publicity as possible.

Mme Pauker gave an affirmative reply to Namir's request that the Zionist training farms in Rumania should not be closed down and that those which had already been closed down be reopened. She asked Namir to convey to Shertok her good wishes for a victorious outcome of the war.

388. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Shertok. 28 July 1948

Eytan argues that in view of the probability that the Mediator will not achieve any concrete results during the coming months, the time has arrived for a major Israeli peace initiative. The matter is urgent for several reasons, three of which are enumerated: 1) the inability of Israel to maintain a large army on a wartime basis for a long period of time; 2) Israel would thus take the diplomatic initiative for the first time, probably with good results; 3) if nothing is done, there is a danger that the Israeli-Arab dis-

pute will not be settled for a long time. Eytan suggests that a peace campaign, accompanied by much publicity, be opened within the next fortnight. It should be directed primarily at: 1) the Arab League; 2) each of the Arab states; 3) Arab public opinion; 4) American opinion, especially the U.S. Government.

Eytan adds the following comments: 1) the proposed initiative would involve the adoption of an entirely new policy. Up to now Israel has successfully hidden behind the shelter of the U.N., but this method shows no prospects of leading to a regional settlement, 2) the proposed initiative would require that Israel define its war aims or its proposals for a settlement of the dispute (including frontiers), or both, 3) the diplomatic initiative can be undertaken concurrently with confidential contacts.

393. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 29 July 1948

Shertok has informed the Mediator that Israel accepted the two restrictions on immigration imposed by the Security Council resolution of 29 May: 1) no "fighting personnel" will be allowed to immigrate; 2) male immigrants of military age will not be conscripted and trained during the truce. Since Israel is determined to oppose any attempt by the Mediator to limit the number of immigrants of military age, special care must be taken to comply with the above-mentioned restrictions.

The Mediator has agreed to abolish the previous arrangement, whereby men of military age had been interned for the duration of the truce. Israel has however suggested suitable arrangements with a view to enabling the U.N. to supervise adherence to the restrictions imposed by the Security Council.

436. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to B.S. Shitreet. 8 August 1948

Proposes guidelines for a policy towards Arab circles and personalities in Israel and territories held by it:

1) Members of the League for National Liberation should be allowed to participate in institutions established by Israel, provided

their participation does not prevent other important circles from taking part in these institutions. They must not, however, be given exclusive control.

2) In making arrangements for Arab internal administration in occupied territories, reliance should be placed primarily on persons who have cooperated with the Jews in the past, with the exception of persons reputed to have acted as paid agents.

3) Israel should strive to reach an understanding with groups which have formerly opposed the Jews but are now prepared to cooperate on the basis of recognition of the State of Israel or with a view to the establishment of independent Arab rule in the Arab part of Palestine.

4) Although the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan cannot be ruled out, the establishment of an independent Arab state is preferable. Israel should make her attitude on this issue clear.

In conclusion, Shertok points out that policy on these matters is determined by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, unless the Government decides otherwise.

453. H. Beilin (Haifa) to W. Eytan. 13 August 1948

[First part of document not printed — see note 1 (p. 146 below)].

Reports on a conversation with C. Marriott, the British Consul in Haifa. Marriott said that he was in an intolerable position as a result of the mutual state of non-recognition between himself and the Government of Israel. He was making considerable efforts to find some sort of substitute for official recognition, which his Government was unwilling to accord. He had suggested to the Foreign Office that either he or H. Dow [the British Consul in Jerusalem] should be instructed to ask for a meeting at the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This would be regarded by Israel as a kind of recognition, while being less objectionable to the Arabs than official recognition.

483. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Paris). 26 August 1948

Referring to an untraced letter of Sasson to an Arab personality [of 16 August 1948], Shertok criticizes Sasson's way of simply denying allegations of Israeli expansionist intentions. Such arguments can best be refuted by showing that the alleged designs are contrary to Israel's own interests rather than by asking the other side to trust Israel's sincerity and high moral principles. Sasson should point out that Zionism aims at concentration and not at dispersal; that it has a vital interest in the development of economic relations with the Arab countries, which must be preceded by conciliation. For the same reason Israel has a stake in the strengthening of Arab independence and in the fostering of Arab economic development, which will enable Israel to sell industrial products to the Arab countries. Furthermore, an expansionist policy would produce international pressures which Israel would be unable to withstand; it would also endanger Jewish communities abroad.

Shertok agrees with Sasson's method of "inundating the Middle East with letters", but suggests that they ought to be shorter and more trenchant. He also criticizes Sasson's tendency to overemphasize the private nature of his approaches. He must not put himself in the position of "an outsider who under certain circumstances may be prepared to exert his personal influence in order to achieve the goal."

487. Meetings: A. Katznelson — F. Bernadotte, R. Bunche (Stockholm, 21 and 30 August 1948)

Katznelson met Bernadotte during the International Red Cross Conference, of which the latter was President. Bernadotte said that he would demand that the Egyptian and Syrian protests against the inclusion of Israel in the list of participants be rejected.

Bernadotte made the following comments on the situation in Palestine: 1) He is concerned at Israel's militant stance, as

reflected in Shertok's public pronouncements. Members of his staff arrive in Israel as friends and leave as opponents. 2) The incessant attacks against himself and his staff have a harmful effect. 3) He is convinced that the existence of Israel is an irreversible fact, but in his opinion the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state is impossible except through a merger with Transjordan. 4) He sees no prospects of direct negotiations between Israel and any of the Arab states. The Arabs will prefer a U.N. decision; though they will not accept it, they will not fight it. 5) The problem will therefore again come up for discussion at the U.N. General Assembly. Bernadotte has requested that it be placed as the first item on the agenda. 6) The boundaries delineated in the resolution of 29 November 1947 should be revised: Western Galilee and Jaffa to be included in Israel, while part of the Negev will go to the Arabs. 7) Bernadotte has withdrawn his suggestion that Jerusalem should come under Arab rule. The U.N. will probably decide in favour of internationalization, although he personally does not believe it to be practicable. 8) The question of an economic union between Israel and the Arab part of Palestine should be decided by the parties concerned; but in any case, a free port should be made available to the Arabs. 9) The truce will be in force until a final solution is found. The plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem has failed because of the inability of the U.N. to send the required security forces. Bernadotte agrees that the plan is no longer feasible. 10) Bernadotte would appreciate an Israeli gesture with regard to the Arab refugees but understands the difficulties involved.

Katznelson also met Bunche, who had returned from Lake Success. He reported that the Palestine question was not on the agenda of the General Assembly and for the time being no one wished to raise the issue; that the Americans were determined to prevent a renewal of the fighting; and that Berlin had replaced Palestine as the main international issue.

491. E. Sasson (Paris) to Y. Shimoni. 31 August 1948

[First part of document not printed].

Sasson criticizes what he describes as the over-involvement of the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in questions pertaining to the Arabs of Israel and Palestine. Responsibility for all these matters should rest with the Ministry of Minorities and the Foreign Ministry's Political Division. The Middle East Division should concentrate on external affairs. Once this shift is effected, it will come to regard questions such as those of the Arab refugees and the continuation of the war in a different light, in contradiction to prevalent attitudes. It will realize that the dispute with the Arab world cannot be terminated through military victories. Further victories will merely push the Arabs from one place to another but will not bring peace any nearer.

497. G. Meyerson (Moscow) to M. Shertok. 7 September 1948

G. Meyerson reports that she had a cordial discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov, who expressed his confidence in the ability of Israel and its Government to overcome all obstacles. In the course of the discussion, G. Meyerson mentioned the question of Israel's borders.

502. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to Members of the Provisional Government. 10 September 1948

Shertok will ask the Government, at its session on 12 September, to approve the following instructions for the delegation of Israel to the U.N. General Assembly:

1) The delegation will take part in discussions only if invited explicitly as the delegation of the State of Israel. An unequivocal attitude on this issue will foil any attempt to apply a wrong designation.

2) The delegation must be authorized to apply to the Security Council for the admission of Israel to the U.N. Shertok holds that

the application should be submitted even if there is no certainty of getting the required majority, though only after further consultations with the U.N. Secretary-General.

3) The delegation will strive to bring about the termination of the Mediator's mission and to induce the General Assembly to recommend direct negotiations between the Arab States and Israel.

4) The delegation will not raise the question of the borders. But should the issue be broached, the delegation will declare that Israel insists on the boundaries laid down in the resolution of 29 November 1947, with such rectifications as have become necessary in view of disproved assumptions, experience gained and facts created since the adoption of the resolution. In discussions with other delegations, the delegation of Israel will insist on the inclusion of the whole of Galilee, Jaffa and the Jerusalem corridor within Israel's borders.

5) Israel holds that it is entitled to renew the demand for the inclusion of the entire city of Jerusalem within its territory in view of the following facts: the inability of the U.N. to raise the military force required if an international regime is to be established; the abandonment of Jerusalem to its fate by the Christian world; the unaided rescue of Jerusalem from Arab domination by Jewish forces; actual Israeli control of the New City.

The delegation will therefore declare that a) Israel demands the inclusion of the New City of Jerusalem within its borders, unless there is conclusive proof for the practicability of an international regime which will guarantee the existence, security and development of Jewish Jerusalem and its bonds with the State of Israel, and will prevent Arab rule in any part of the city. b) Israel agrees to an international regime for the Old City of Jerusalem with the participation of the communities concerned. c) Israel agrees that the possible inclusion of a certain part of the New City within the territory of the Arab State will be discussed at the Arab-Israeli peace conference, on condition that for a number of years Jerusalem will not be the seat of government of either the Jewish or the Arab State.

6) On the question of the Arab refugees the official stand will continue to be: no return before the end of the war, except in a

few individual cases; a final solution to be reached as part of a general peace settlement. In unofficial talks, the delegation will argue that for everyone's good it is preferable to settle the refugees in the neighbouring countries rather than to repatriate them to Israel.

In other matters, such as the liquidation of the Arab invasion and freedom of immigration, the delegation will act without explicit instructions.

506. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 12 September 1948

Friedman reports that friendly relations have been established with the Soviet Legation. At a meeting with the Soviet Minister, Shertok expounded Israel's stand on the question of immigration during the truce, to which the Minister listened attentively. At another meeting — with Friedman — the Minister inquired about the future of the Arab part of Palestine. Friedman replied in conformity with the line agreed upon before Meyerson's departure.

The Soviet Minister has called on the Chairman of the Provisional Council of State and on the Minister of Labour, with whom he discussed development plans and the workers' social achievements. The Eastern European Division has made great efforts to help the Legation in technical matters — finding a provisional residence and establishing direct telegraphic communication with Moscow. Friedman also broached the questions of regular air communications between the two countries and shipping communications along the Danube.

510. D.B. Joseph [Jerusalem] to M. Shertok. 14 September 1948

Reports on a courtesy call by the British Consul in Jerusalem, R.A. Beaumont. The Consul said that Israel seemed to have effective control over the area allotted to it by the U.N. resolution of November 1947 and that realities must be recognized. In reply to Joseph's remark that the British Government still refused to

recognize realities, Beaumont said that it would do so eventually. He saw no reason why the Jewish people should be unable to establish friendly relations with the British people once normal conditions were restored. Joseph replied that the recognition of Israel by Great Britain would pave the way for understanding and normal relations. To Beaumont's remark that the British might help in establishing peaceful relations between Israel and its neighbours, Joseph replied that Israel and the Arabs should reach an understanding among themselves. Beaumont expressed his confidence that the Arabs did not want a continuation of the war, but added that he did not know how a peace settlement could be brought about. He said that none of the Arabs was prepared to state his real views openly and that every Arab state was afraid lest the others might win advantages denied to itself. Beaumont inquired about the prospects of demilitarizing Jerusalem, to which Joseph replied that Israel preferred to rely on itself, just as the British would do in a similar situation.

511. G. Meyerson (Moscow) to M. Shertok. 15 September 1948

At a meeting with G. Meyerson and M. Namir, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin promised to convey to his government and to the Soviet delegation to the U.N. General Assembly Israel's views on the question of borders, the Negev and Galilee, immigration, Arab refugees, Jerusalem and Haifa. Zorin declared that there would be no change in Soviet policy and that the Soviet Union would support all just claims put forward by Israel.

513. I. Barzilai (Paris) to M. Shertok. 16 September 1948

Barzilai reports on a meeting in Paris with Katz-Suchy, the Polish Representative at the U.N., whom he met while on his way to take up his post as Israeli Minister in Warsaw. Katz-Suchy holds that it is not in Israel's interest to raise the Palestine question at the U. N. General Assembly. At best, the Assembly will reconfirm the resolution of November 1947, which will still be opposed by

the Arabs with British backing. He doubts whether under present international conditions the U.N. will be able to give Israel decisive assistance. It seems that in Katz-Suchy's opinion, Israel should rather prepare for the resumption of fighting and at the same time strive for direct peace negotiations with the Arabs. Katz-Suchy is not in favour of the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan; failure to establish an independent Arab state may undermine the other parts of the November 1947 resolution, i.e., the establishment of a Jewish state and of an economic union. Israel must have the strength and patience to hold out and should try to attain the recognition of the individual states through direct contacts, though without making excessive political concessions. At the same time he showed understanding for Israel's economic and financial difficulties, which oblige it to seek the help of American Jewry, and for her need to obtain non-subjugating loans.

515. Y. Shimoni [Tel Aviv] to E. Sasson (Paris). 16 September 1948

Shimoni refers to Sasson's remarks with regard to differences of opinion between himself and his subordinates in the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [see summary of No. 491]. In Shimoni's opinion, there are no substantial differences, except perhaps on the question of the Arab refugees. The Government has instructed the delegation to the U.N. General Assembly that its official statements should accord with the accepted attitude, i.e., no repatriation before the end of the war and subsequent discussion of the problem in the course of peace negotiations. Another instruction — with regard to unofficial talks — has been issued by the Foreign Minister on his own responsibility (because a discussion by the Government would have occasioned undesirable party differences). It says that Israel will presumably be prepared to discuss partial repatriation as well as participation in other endeavours to solve the problem if the Arab states seriously undertake a settlement of refugees outside of

Israel. These instructions are in line with the views of the Middle East Division.

They agree with Sasson that military successes cannot be decisive. The only paths to a settlement which they envisage, in addition to Sasson's contacts in Paris, are: 1) enforcement of a favourable solution by the U.N. and the Great Powers; 2) a revolt in one of the Arab countries, which will divert the Arabs' attention from Palestine.

Shimoni disputes Sasson's contention that the Middle East Division has been too much involved in the affairs of the Arabs of Israel and that it views the Arab world from a Palestinian angle. The Division must and does advise and guide the Ministry of Minorities on questions of principle, in order to ensure coordination and uniformity of official policy. Furthermore, it is impossible to establish contacts with Arab statesmen abroad or form other contacts beyond the borders except through Israeli Arabs, and the same holds true with regard to the Druze and other minorities.

Shimoni emphasizes the importance of keeping a detailed record of activities, meetings etc., pointing out that written records no longer represent a security risk as they did under British rule.

Shimoni also rejects Sasson's complaint that the Division is doing too much paper work and too little field work. This is only true with regard to the Egyptian and Iraqi desks, which under present conditions can do little active work. On the other hand, collection of information is necessary, particularly in view of the inadequacy of the information supplied by the Political Department. Furthermore, it has been decided that the Political Department would be responsible for obtaining information through secret channels, while the Middle East Department would deal with information published in the press.

[End of letter not printed].

521. Y. Wolfsberg (Stockholm) to M. Shertok. 19 September 1948

Wolfsberg and E. Weissbord, who were on a mission to Scandinavia on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were received by the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs (B.O. Unden) on 17 September, shortly before the assassination of Count Bernadotte became known. Wolfsberg argued in favour of Swedish recognition of Israel. Unden replied that his government could not change its decision to shelve the issue until after the session of the U.N. General Assembly and the submission of Bernadotte's report. He pointed out that Sweden had made recognition conditional on the implementation of the November 1947 resolution. As neither the Arab state nor the economic union had been established, the General Assembly must reconsider the situation and define the conditions which would lead to a final settlement. Wolfsberg commented that Israel must not be the loser because the other side had refused to comply with the resolution.

In reply to Unden's query concerning borders, Wolfsberg said that Israel had accepted the borders fixed in the resolution on the assumption that its implementation would be peaceful, but experience had shown that Israel needed strategic frontiers and would therefore have to insist on rectifications.

527. D.B. Joseph (Jerusalem) to M. Shertok. 21 September 1948

Refers to Bunche's contention [see No. 519] that the Government of Israel was responsible for the security of the Mediator and his staff. Joseph reminds Shertok that he, Joseph, initially wished to provide armed escorts for the U.N. personnel, but his offer was refused in spite of his assurance that the observers would be free to go wherever they wished. Joseph adds that the U.N. people probably imputed to him a desire to watch their activities rather than to protect them. The Israeli authorities have therefore been unable to assume responsibility for the observers' safety.

528. C. Hoffmann (Munich) to M. Shertok. 21 September 1948

Hoffmann reports that the American military authorities in Germany and Austria have been instructed to prevent the emigration of fighting personnel to Israel. The procedure with regard to men of military age is as follows: lists of prospective immigrants have to be submitted to the military authorities for confirmation that they include no fighting personnel, but the emigrants will be permitted to leave only after approval of the list by the Mediator. Hoffmann requests instructions as to whether Israel is prepared to follow this procedure.

Actually, emigration is proceeding without hindrance. Conscripted groups are leaving without permission, while permits for families are granted on the strength of a declaration by the Jewish Agency representative that they do not include men of military age. The American commander, General Clay, has informed his adviser on Jewish affairs that he had to comply with State Department instructions, but that he did not intend to obstruct Jewish emigration. Hoffmann assumes that there will be no obstacles unless the Mediator complains of an excessive number of men of military age among immigrants from the American zone.

529. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 21 September 1948

The Soviet Minister called on Shertok at the latter's request and was informed of the conversation with the American Special Representative [see No. 504]. The Minister inquired whether the Israeli reply implied that Israel did not object to the return of the refugees, but received no further elucidation. The Minister also asked whether the American proposals had been presented as conditions for de jure recognition, for a loan or for the admission of Israel to the U.N. He was told that de jure recognition had not been discussed, the loan — only indirectly; and as to admission — a pledge of support had already been given by the American delegation to the U.N. In reply to further questions, the Minister was told that the American President favoured a loan and that the

Special Representative had recommended it; and that the Special Representative had not inquired about negotiations with the Arabs.

The Soviet Minister has continued his round of visits to various government ministries. At the Ministry of Justice he inquired about constitutional questions, the status of the President and the elections law. At the Ministry of Finance he was told, in reply to his inquiries, why the income tax law had aroused the opposition of well-to-do circles, why the military budget was being kept secret, and how responsibility for immigration was being divided between the Government and the Zionist Organization. The Soviet Minister expressed understanding for the financial burden involved in establishing the state, conducting the war and absorbing masses of immigrants. At the Ministry of Communications he inquired about air and telegraphic communications with the Soviet Union.

530. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 22 September 1948

Shertok disagrees with Ben-Gurion's view that for the present Israel should make no comment on the Mediator's Report. Both Britain and the U.S. have reacted favourably, while the Arabs have rejected the Mediator's proposals. Israeli silence will be interpreted as implying consent and efforts will be made immediately to find a compromise between the Report and the Arab position. Shertok therefore urges publication of an initial reaction, admitting some positive aspects but emphasizing the negative ones.

535. M. Shertok (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 23 September 1948

Shertok is worried by [Ilya Ehrenburg's] article in *Pravda* against immigration to Israel from Eastern Europe. He requests Meyerson's opinion.

541. E. Sasson (Paris) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 23 September 1948

Reports on a four-hour conversation with a representative of the Egyptian Court, who has been sent in pursuance of a special directive from King Faruq in order to explore the possibility of a separate settlement between Israel and Egypt. According to the Egyptian representative, Sasson's letter to the Chief of the Royal Cabinet has made an impact, and the basic differences between Egypt and Transjordan [see below] have persuaded the King and his supporters that Egypt ought to pursue an independent foreign policy.

The representative was instructed to inquire about: a) Israeli proposals for peace with the Arab world or, alternatively, with Egypt alone; b) Israeli guarantees against future territorial expansion and a possible alignment of Israel with the Communists.

The representative has learned from members of the Egyptian delegation to the U.N. (who are ignorant of his mission) that the British and Egyptian delegations are trying to reach a preliminary agreement with regard to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute; in this connection, the British desire to obtain Egyptian consent for the annexation of the Negev by Transjordan.

The Egyptian representative was extremely critical of British policies and activities in the Middle East. He maintained that the British controlled most of the Arab press and used it to incite the Arabs against the Jews. They were encouraging expansionist ambitions of the leaders of Syria and Transjordan and had "opened the British Treasury" to Azzam Pasha and others.

He told Sasson that at the last session of the Arab League's Political Committee Iraq and Transjordan demanded the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan, while Egypt, Syria and Lebanon insisted on the establishment of an independent Arab state, which would eventually annex the Jewish part of the country. None of the participants, except Jamal al-Husseini and his associates, supported a resumption of the war, but all Arab representatives at the U.N. would certainly continue to object to the partition of Palestine and to the recognition of Israel.

The Egyptian representative said that Egypt supported the Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, because of its fear that Transjordan, with its efficient army, might endanger Egyptian independence if it succeeded in annexing the Arab part of Palestine and the Negev.

He said that if Israel wanted a separate peace settlement with Egypt, it should submit draft proposals. Sasson therefore formulated the appended document, which is based on Shertok's general instructions. [See Appendix to No. 541, Main Volume, pp. 634-6].

544. G. Meyerson (Moscow) to M. Shertok. 24 September 1948

Despite official Soviet assurances of support for Israel and displays of friendliness towards its Legation, the following facts should be noted: 1) Remarks made by Soviet officials implying that there was no cause for Jewish emigration to Israel from the Soviet bloc, that Israel would hardly be able to receive the expected masses of immigrants from other countries and that consequently Jews everywhere ought to take part in the struggle for Socialism. 2) The press explains Soviet support for Israel by arguing that it is fighting for real independence against imperialistic opponents. 3) Ehrenburg's article in *Pravda* [see No. 535, note 1]. The Jewish anti-Fascist Committee has not yet approached the Legation. 4) Indications that the Polish Government is inclined to stop emigration to Israel. 5) Discussions with Foreign Ministry officials and with the Polish Minister in Moscow indicate that in their view Israel can be relied upon to persist in its anti-British policy but will probably not be able to avoid dependence on the U.S. Meyerson inquires whether she should raise the question of Transjordan's admission to the U.N.

549. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Shertok. 27 September 1948

Avriel reports on a visit to Bucharest, where he dealt mainly with the problem of Jewish emigration to Israel. Following a protracted dispute between the Communist-controlled Jewish Demo-

cratic Committee and the Zionist Organization, the Rumanian Government authorized the Union of Jewish Communities, which is represented in most places by Communists, to select and register the emigrants.

When still in Prague, Avriel had instructed the Zionists to discontinue the discussion with the Jewish Democratic Committee. This message was misunderstood to imply a request for complete Zionist inactivity with regard to emigration, and consequently only few Zionists registered. The Jewish Democratic Committee subsequently accused the Zionists of obstructing emigration to Israel, disobedience to official authorities, and hostility towards the regime.

Avriel and M. Agami (the latter had just arrived in Rumania as representative of Israel) submitted three demands to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1) The list of emigrants will be determined by the representative of Israel in consultation with the Jewish bodies concerned (i.e., the Jewish Democratic Committee and the Zionist Organization). 2) Priority will be given to persons of military age, members of Hechalutz [Zionist pioneers' organization] and persons who had been members of political organizations for at least one year. 3) Close cooperation between the representatives of Israel and the Rumanian authorities with regard to the final approval of candidates for immigration. The Rumanian Ministry of the Interior will naturally have the right to prevent the emigration of individuals on lawful grounds. Avriel and Agami expresed concern lest organization of emigration by the Union of Jewish Communities might engender hostile propaganda in Britain and the U.S.

At a subsequent meeting, with the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ana Toma, Avriel and Agami dropped the demand for registration of the emigrants in the presence of an Israeli representative and endeavoured to reach an agreement providing for the emigration of members of the Zionist Organization.

The Rumanian reply stated: 1) The Rumanian Government reserves the exclusive right to select the candidates for emigration. 2) The representative of Israel will have the right to appeal against the selection of individual candidates.

Agami holds that the Rumanian proposals should be rejected even though this may impel the Rumanians to stop emigration altogether. In Avriel's opinion, the emigrants' list submitted by the Union of Jewish Communities must not be rejected, though amendments can be proposed. He feels that rejection will spell the end of Rumanian emigration to Israel for a long time to come.

Finally, Avriel inquires about the new division of responsibilities between the Government of Israel and the Zionist Organization with regard to immigration [see note 5, p. 170].

550. Meeting: W. Eytan, E. Herlitz — J.G. McDonald, C. Knox (Tel Aviv, 28 September 1948)

The meeting was held at McDonald's request. McDonald read out a note received from the State Department, containing Secretary of State Marshall's declaration with regard to the Mediator's proposals [see No. 530, note 1] and inquired about Israel's attitude to them. He was referred to the statement made by the Spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [*ibid.,* note 3]. The question of the Negev was discussed in some detail. Eytan and Herlitz emphasized the size of the territory which the Mediator proposed to transfer to the Arabs, pointing out that the original partition boundaries accorded with the American wish for a "just partition." They explained that all of the twenty-five Jewish settlements in the Negev were situated in the area in question. They also argued that the retention of the Negev by Israel might serve as a guarantee to the Arabs against Israeli expansion.

McDonald and Knox inquired what part of the Negev was vital to Israel (the reply was in conformity with the instructions issued to the Israeli delegation to the U.N. — see summary of No. 502, par. 4), and requested information on the Gulf of Elath and the southern part of the Dead Sea and on access to these areas.

With regard to Jerusalem, the Americans were told that Israel preferred Arab rule in a small part of the New City to an international regime. It agreed to an international regime only for the Old City. Israel would insist on a corridor linking Jewish Jerusalem with the coast.

551. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 28 September 1948

At a meeting held on 27 September between the Soviet Minister and Shertok, the latter explained Israel's attitude to the Mediator's proposals and told the Minister about contacts with American and British representatives relating to the proposals. To the Minister's question whether the British were threatening sanctions in case of refusal to accept the proposals, Shertok replied in the negative. To the Minister's query whether the Government was unanimous in rejecting a cession of the Negev, Shertok replied that a few cabinet members had expressed doubts as to Israel's ability to defend the entire Negev, but the majority insisted on its retention. Shertok explained the importance of Galilee to Israel; the area was held by Israeli forces and Israel was unwilling to have its fate linked with that of the Negev. Israel would insist on the retention of Jaffa in the light of bitter experience. Shertok also informed the Minister of Israel's attitude to the question of Jerusalem [see summary of No. 550].

The Soviet Minister then inquired about Israel's attitude to the Arab Palestinian Government in Gaza and about the impact of inter-Arab disputes on the military situation. To the first question Shertok replied that Israel could not acknowledge the hostile Gaza Government, but that open opposition might be interpreted as support for the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan. Israel was in principle in favour of an independent Arab state, but the situation was complicated and required further clarification. This would be undertaken in the course of the session of the U.N. General Assembly, and Soviet representatives would be consulted. In reply to the Minister's second question, Shertok said that the information available to him on the alignment of forces in the Arab world was inadequate. He mentioned the conflicting interests of Egypt and Great Britain with regard to the possible establishment of British bases in the Negev, declaring that Israel was opposed to such an eventuality.

554. J. Herzog (Rome) to M. Shertok (Paris). 29 September 1948

Herzog reports on talks with representatives of the Vatican Secretariat of State, one of whom — P. Sigismondi — will maintain permanent contacts with the Israeli representatives on condition that they be kept secret. Sigismondi said that the reports recently received from A. Vergani [General Vicar of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for Galilee] contradicted the hostile reports of G. Testa [Apostolic Delegate to Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus]; according to Vergani, there is no cause for complaints against Israel. The Vatican press has been instructed not to publish articles hostile to Israel. Sigismondi revealed that the recognition of Israel by the Vatican was under discussion, but that no decision would be taken pending a clarification of the situation.

558. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Shertok (Paris). 30 September 1948

Reports on a conversation with M. Moukhine, Counsellor at the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv. Moukhine mentioned Erhenburg's article in *Pravda* [see No. 535, note 1]; maintaining that it should not be taken amiss in Israel, he repeated Ehrenburg's argument that Israel would not be able to solve the Jewish problem and would eventually be destroyed by the forces of reaction unless a worldwide campaign was waged against them. He argued that Zionism was mainly motivated by a negative factor — anti-Semitism — which had already disappeared in the Soviet Union and would be eradicated in other democratic countries. In reply, Friedman emphasized the failure of attempts to solve the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union and pointed out that Israel could not survive without immigration and Zionism, while the Jews in the Diaspora were too weak to play a decisive role in the struggle against reaction in the countries in which they resided.

NOTES

The internal references (e.g., "See No. 42") direct the reader to the serial numbers of the documents in the main volume. References to Hebrew documents also indicate the location of the English summaries in the companion volume.
Notes to Hebrew documents are included in this translation.

No. 1

(1) Clark McAdams Clifford, Special Counsel to the President. (2) Benjamin (Ben) V. Cohen, formerly (1945-47) Counsellor to the Department of State. In 1919-21 he had been closely associated as counsellor to the Zionists with the negotiations concerning the drafting of the Palestine Mandate. (3) Charles David Ginsburg, lawyer, special advisor to the Department of State, 1947. (4) Letter to Secretary of State in file 93.08/364/10; letter to President in file 93.03/126/7. (5) Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.

No. 2

(1) See No. 1.

No. 3

(1) Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State. (2) See No. 2. (3) See No. 16.

No. 4

(1) The telegram, dated 15 May 1948 (93.03/128/5), is not printed here, but see contents in No. 15. (2) See No. 16.

No. 5

(1) Written before receipt of Shertok's telegram authorizing Eban to act as Permanent Representative at the U.N. (See Shertok to Epstein, 15 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1). Eliash represented the Jewish Agency at the Security Council meeting on 15 May 1948. See Nos. 9, 10.

No. 6

(1) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 799-800. (2) *Ibid,* pp. 802-806.

No. 7

(1) See also No. 12, note 1. A request for Soviet recognition was also directed to A. Gromyko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. at the U.N. (See Epstein to Gromyko, 15 May 1948, 93.03/72/16). For Molotov's reply see No. 24.

No. 8

(1) Maurice Fischer, formerly Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency office in Paris, had just been appointed Representative of Israel in France. (2) Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. (3) A request for recognition was also cabled directly from Shertok to Bidault (15 May 1948, 93.03/72/16).

No. 9

(1) No. 6. (2) See No. 5, note 1; Shertok to Silver, 15 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1.

No. 10

(1) Eliash drew the attention of the Security Council to the Jewish Agency's telegram regarding the invasion of Palestine by Arab armies. (See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 459). He requested the Security Council to determine that the invasion constituted a breach of international peace and an act of aggression, and urged the Council to call on the Arabs to desist immediately from any act of aggression. Issah Nakhleh, representative of the Arab Higher Committee, asserted that on termination of the British Mandate, Palestine became an independent state, that the Jews were a rebellious minority, and that the Arab armies had been invited by the Arab Higher Committee to help it to maintain law and order in the country. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 292nd Meeting, 15 May 1948). (2) Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Representative of Great Britain at the U.N. (3) Shertok's telegram of 13 May 1948, addressed to the Jewish Agency in New York for transmission to the Security Council and the British representative at the U.N., demanding immediate action to stop the Arab Legion's attack, especially against the Etzion settlements. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 292nd Meeting, 15 May 1948, p.2; *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, Nos. 507, 508).
(4) A telegram from the Egyptian Government, addressed to the Security Council, giving reasons for the invasion of Palestine by the Egyptian army. (U.N. document S/743). (5) The criticism was voiced by the representatives of Peru and Canada. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 292nd Meeting, 15 May 1948, pp. 11-12).
(6) The representative of Argentina suggested that the Security Council should not adopt a resolution or take action pending clarification of the juridical status of Palestine. (*Ibid,* pp. 20-22). (7) Tingfu Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China at the U.N. (8) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 292nd Meeting, 15 May 1948, p. 15. (9) Mahmud Fawzi, Egyptian Representative at the U.N. (10) Warren R. Austin, Representative of the U.S. at the U.N. (11) The Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel. (12) Request for U.S. recognition — see No. 1. (13) See No. 9.

No. 12

(1) During May and June, Israel addressed requests for recognition to the following states: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia. (See files 130.02/2424/19, 20).

No. 13

(1) Mistake in original ("Arab Legion"). (2) A similar telegram was sent to B. Locker, member of the Jewish Agency Executive in London (16 May 1948, 130.09/2318/1).

No. 14

(1) Untraced. (2) See No. 36.

No. 15

(1) See Shertok to Eban and Lourie, 15 May 1948, 93.03/128/5. (2) Shertok's telegram (see note 1 above) reads: "Nirim". The error is repeated here. (3) See No. 10, note 4

No. 16

(1) See No. 15. (2) Reference is presumably to Shertok's telegram to Eban and Lourie (see No. 15, note 1) and to No. 13. (3) See No. 4.

No. 17

(1) Untraced, but see Shertok's telegram to Goldmann, urging him to proceed to London for negotiations with the British Government (16 May 1948, 130/09/2328/1). (2) See No. 12. (3) See No. 23.

Editorial Note before No. 18 (Main Volume, p. 17)

At the 293rd meeting of the Security Council, on 17 May 1948, the American representative (Austin) stated that there was adequate information about the situation in Palestine to indicate that there was a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. He therefore submitted a draft resolution ordering all governments and authorities to stop hostilities within thirty-six hours. (See Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 664). Austin also proposed that the Security Council send a questionnaire to the parties involved in the dispute in order to obtain the necessary information before a decision was taken. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 293rd Meeting, 17 May 1948, pp. 2-4).

No. 18

(1) The Security Council discussed the questionnaire on 18 May 1948. Several amendments were introduced. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 294th and 295th Meetings, 18 May 1948). For the final text of the questionnaire addressed to the Government of Israel see No. 29.

No. 19

(1) Jean Nieuwenhuys, Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem and Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commission.
(2) Transmitted by Leo Kohn, of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. (3) The failure of the

Truce Commission to keep the Security Council informed about developments in Palestine was criticized by members of the Council. (See, e.g., the remarks of the representative of Colombia, *SCOR, Third Year,* 293rd Meeting, 17 May 1948, pp. 9-10.) See also Lourie's telegram to Shertok, 17 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/1559. (4) Colonel A. Roscher Lund, personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Palestine. Former military expert of the Advance Party of the U.N. Palestine Commission, March-April 1948. (5) The Truce Commission rejected this idea on the ground that the proposed mission was beyond its competence. (See Herzog to Zaslani, 20 May 1948, 130.02/2443/1).

No. 20

(1) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 434 and note 1 there. (2) See No. 48. (3) Pablo Azcarate, formerly head of the Advance Party of the Palestine Commission, was appointed representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Palestine late in April and Deputy U.N. Commissioner for Jerusalem in mid-May. (4) See No. 40. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 3 above). (5) The text of the telegram was also transmitted to the Department of State. (See Epstein to Lovett, 18 May 1948, 93.08/364/10).

No. 21

(1) Epstein replied that he did not expect help from the State Department; he had applied to the Greek Ambassador, who promised to assist. (See Epstein to Shertok, 13 June 1948, 130.02/2308/6). Eventually the planes were dismantled and transported by air.

No. 22

(1) No. 6. (2) Article 4 of the U.N. Charter states that "membership in the United Nations is open to all other peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and. . . are able and willing to carry out these obligations." (3) Jacob Robinson, Legal Counsel to the Israeli Mission at the U.N. (4) See No. 51.

No. 23

(1) No. 17. (2) See No. 12, also Goldmann's telegrams of 17 May 1948, pointing out the impossibility of accrediting a group of people to represent Israel in London, especially one composed of members of the Jewish Agency Executive. He referred to McNeil's warning that in future the British would not negotiate with British Zionists or with the Jewish Agency. (See Goldmann's telegrams in C.Z.A. S25/1559. For McNeil's statement see *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* p. 781). (3) See No. 26. (4) S.Z. Shragai, member of the Jewish Agency Executive in London. In a speech delivered in early May he accused Britain of desiring to destroy the nascent Jewish State and of standing by while Jews were being killed in Palestine. (See *Jewish Chronicle,* 14 May 1948).

No. 24

(1) Translated from Russian. For Russian text see file 93.03/72/16. (2) No. 7. (3) Shertok thanked Molotov for the Soviet Union's recognition of Israel and requested the U.S.S.R. to agree to an exchange of representatives with the rank of minister or chargé d'affaires. (See his telegram to Molotov, 23 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1). The U.S.S.R. accepted the proposal, but the telegram conveying this information had not yet been received in Tel Aviv. (Wireless communications between Moscow and Tel Aviv were maintained by way of London and Cairo); Tel Aviv first learned of Moscow's decision through press reports. (See Shertok to Epstein, 16 June 1948, 130.09/2308/1).

No. 25 (Hebrew)

(1) Translated from Polish at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For Polish text see file 93.03/72/16. (2) See Shertok to Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 1948, *ibid.*

No. 26

(1) At Shertok's request, Weizmann approached Jan Smuts, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of South Africa, and urged him to expedite an affirmative reply to Israel's request for recognition. Smuts' reply was transmitted through the South African Embassy in Washington. (See Shertok to Weizmann, 15 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1; Weizmann to Smuts, 16 May 1948, W.A.; Smuts to Weizmann, 17 May 1948, W.A.).

No. 27

(1) See editorial note, p. 41 (2) See Eban to Fischer, 18 May 1948, 93.03/128/10.

No. 28

(1) Alexandre Parodi, French Permanent Representative at the U.N. (2) See No. 27. (3) Fischer subsequently cabled that he had learned that the Belgian delegation at the U.N. had been instructed to support the American resolution. (See Fischer to Goldmann and Eban, 20 May 1948, 93.01/2180/15).

No. 29

(1) See also No. 18. The letter of A. Sobolev, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, is in file 93.03/94/5. (2) See No. 31.

No. 30

(1) Emanuel Shinwell, British Secretary of State for War.
(2) Telegram untraced. On the Arab Legion's entry into Palestine see No. 10. (3) Untraced.

No. 31

(1) Rule 39 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure authorizes the Council to invite persons whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence. (2) Article 32 of the U.N. Charter provides that if a state which is not a member of the United Nations or of the Security Council is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council, it shall be invited to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute. Article 35 provides that any state, whether a member of the U.N. or not, may bring to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party as long as such a dispute is within the competence of the Council or the Assembly. Rule 14 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure deals with the procedure to be followed in the submission of credentials by representatives of states not members of the Security Council who are invited to attend meetings of the Council. (3) See No. 29. (4) No.22. (5) Rules 58 and 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council relate to the procedure for the admission of new members to the U.N.

No. 32

(1) See No. 29. (2) Mistake in original ("regulation").

No. 33

(1) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 294th Meeting, 18 May 1948, pp. 6, 15.
(2) See No. 29.

No. 34

(1) See No. 29. (2) Later in the day, Shertok cabled that he was reconsidering the matter. (See his telegram to Lourie and Eban, 130.09/2328/1). Eventually, the Government replied to the questionnaire, emphasizing that it was doing so as the Provisional Government of Israel — see No. 61.

No. 35

(1) See No. 27. (2) In a paraphrase of this telegram, prepared in New York, the last sentence was formulated as follows: "Nevertheless, we have been assured that there should be recognition within a week."

No. 37

(1) Oscar Gass, Economic Adviser to the Mission of Israel in Washington. (2) For Jewish Agency's application to the Export-Import Bank, in December 1947, see *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 62 and notes there. See also No. 130.

No. 38

(1) See No. 23. (2) See No. 13 and note 2 there. (3) Cf. Goldmann-McNeil conversation on 11 May 1948 — *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 496. (4) Reference is, apparently, to Goldmann's telegram to Shertok of 18 May 1948 (C.Z.A. S25/1559), reporting that he had been asked by his friends in Belgium and Sweden to visit these countries in order to prepare the ground for the recognition of Israel. (5) Menachem Kahany was a senior official of the Jewish Agency Mission at the League of Nations and later the U.N. offices in Geneva. Since 1946 he had been attached to the Agency's delegation at the

U.N. in New York. Shertok instructed Kahany to return to Geneva in order to represent the Provisional Government at the U.N. offices there and to explore the possibility of Swiss recognition. (See Shertok to Kahany, 19 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1).

No. 39

(1) Bernard Gering, Chairman of the South African Zionist Federation. (2) See No. 26 and note 1 there. (3) Leopold Greenberg, member of the Supreme Court of South Africa. President of the South African Friends of the Hebrew University. (4) Jan Smuts.

No. 40 (Hebrew)

(1) Jean Nieuwenhuys, Consul-General of Belgium in Jerusalem and Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commision.
(2) Reference is presumably to a telegram despatched to Abdallah by the Security Council Truce Commision on 28 April 1948, urging him to abstain from any military decisions or acts as long as the General Assembly and the Security Council were discussing the Palestine question. (See Security Council Truce Commission to the President of the Security Council, 29 April 1948, 93.03/125/15). (3) See No. 20 and note 3 there. (4) See also No. 48. (5) No. 19. (6) *Ibid.* (7) Jerusalem District Commander, David Shaltiel. (8) No. 41.

No. 41

(1) See No. 40 (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 3 above). For events preceding the dispatch of this letter see No. 48, p. 49.

Editorial Note before No. 42 (Main Volume, p. 35)

At the meeting of the Security Council, on 19 May 1948, the British representative (Cadogan) stated that his government sympathized with the objects of the American draft resolution but had reservations with regard to its form. Cadogan argued against the invocation of Article 39 of the Charter, which in his opinion, was meant to cover only threats to and breaches of the *international* peace. He also maintained that it was difficult to define "aggression" in the context of the Palestinian dispute and that there were grave doubts as to the legality of the establishment of the Jewish State, which had not been effected in conformity with the provisions of the U.N. resolution. He therefore submitted an amended draft resolution — see Appendix C, Main Volume, p. 665. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 296th Meeting, 19 May 1948, pp. 2-6).

No. 42

(1) See editorial note, p. 41. (2) See Nos. 29, 34.
(3) The American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive.

No. 43

(1) See editorial note, p. 41.

No. 45

(1) Gromyko was about to leave his post as U.S.S.R. Representative at the U.N. He was succeeded by Yakov Malik. (2) In the incoming text of the telegram G. Ruffer is mistakenly recorded as its author.

No. 46

(1) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* No. 466 and note 1 there. (2) Shertok replied that Israel would honour all security zones that had been established by the Red Cross as well as those that would be established in future. He asked for guarantees that these zones would not be used as bases of attack on Israel. (See Shertok to Ruegger, 25 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1). (3) On 12 March 1948, the International Committee of the Red Cross requested the belligerents in Palestine to declare their intention to honour the Geneva Convention with regard to prisoners of war and the treatment of sick and wounded. The Jewish Agency did so in a letter of 4 April 1948. (See correspondence in C.Z.A. S25/5702).

Editorial Note before No. 47 (Main Volume, p. 39)

In the course of the debate held at the annual conference of the British Labour Party in Scarborough (17—21 May), Maurice Rosetté criticized the policy of the Labour Government with regard to Palestine, putting special emphasis on the role played by the Arab Legion in the attack on the Jewish State, in view of the fact that the Legion was financed by the British and led by British officers. Herbert Morrison, replying on behalf of the Party Executive, declared that Labour would continue to support the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He appealed to the delegates not to concern themselves with past events, and promised that the Government would endeavour to prevent bloodshed in Palestine.

No. 47

(1) Sydney Silverman, a Jewish Labour M.P. (2) Maurice Rosetté (Rosetti), Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Labour Party Poalei Zion in England. (3) Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons. (4) See editorial note, p. 48. (5) Article

39 deals with the duty of the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of the peace and to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace. Article 6 deals with the circumstances under which a member may be expelled from the U.N. Article 41 deals with the measures, short of the use of armed force, that the Security Council may take to give effect to its decisions. (6) Hector McNeil, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. (7) According to the U.N. Partition boundaries, Jaffa was to be an Arab enclave within the Jewish State. Jaffa had been encircled by I.Z.L. and Haganah forces late in April 1948 and capitulated on 13 May 1948. (8) Following the I.Z.L. attack on Jaffa in April, British troops, partly drawn from Cyprus, were sent to reinforce the town. Acre, which was situated within the area of the Arab State according to the partition resolution, was occupied by Israeli troops on 17-18 May 1948.

No. 48

(1) Chaim Vivian Herzog, liaison officer for security affairs with the U.N. representatives in Jerusalem. (2) The report was apparently copied in Tel Aviv. See note at end of document.
(3) Walter Eytan, senior official of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. Subsequently appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(4) Name applied by Jews to British Security Zone 1 in the centre of Jerusalem, location of most Government offices. In the summer of 1946 the area was cleard of civilians and fenced in by barbed wire. (5) Lieutenant-Colonel Norman, intelligence officer, British Army Headquarters in Palestine. (6) Eliezer Kaplan, until 15 May 1948 Treasurer of the Jewish Agency and representative of its Executive in the negotiations for a cease-fire in Jerusalem. From 15 May, Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government. (7) See minutes of meeting of E. Kaplan and C.V. Herzog with G.O.C. British Troops in Palestine, 26 April 1948, C.Z.A. S25/5634. (8) Haim Berman (Raday), Secretary of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in

Jerusalem. From July 1948 — Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (9) See Eytan to Chairman, Security Council Truce Commission, 14 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/5176. The appendices are not enclosed; see note at end of document. (10) Izzat Tannous, Arab Palestinian leader; member of the Arab Higher Committee. (11) Jacques de Reynier, head of the Red Cross delegation to Palestine. (12) For details see *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* Nos. 466, 475. (13) Joseph McCabe, of the U.N. staff in Palestine. See below p. 47. (14) Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League. (15) See "Articles of a draft truce agreement for Jerusalem and the residential supply lines leading to that city", 15 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/5176. (16) J.G.T. Sheringham, British Consul in Jerusalem. (17) Roland Marti, Chief of the Medical Section of the International Red Cross in Geneva; member of the Red Cross delegation to Palestine. (18) Head of the Franciscan Order in Palestine, Father Alberto Gori. (19) See No. 41. (20) Thomas Wasson, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem. Wasson was killed on 23 May 1948. (21) Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan. (22) See No. 40. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 3 above).

No. 49

(1) See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 663-4.

No. 50

(1) See No. 49. (2) No. 9 (3) Shertok explained that he meant advice and help of procedural nature, such as how and to whom to address the Provisional Government's communications. (See his telegram to Lourie, 27 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1).

No. 51

(1) No. 22. (2) No. 6. (3) Trygve Lie.

No. 52

(1) See No. 44.

No. 53

(1) See No. 37.

No. 54

(1) Sir John Balfour, Minister at the British Embassy in Washington and at that time — Chargé d'affaires. (2) Cf. Lovett's report on this conversation, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1019-20. (3) Last part of sentence should possibly read: "For co-operation in Security Council." Cf. No. 56, p. 56. (4) See No. 44.

No. 55

(1) Harold MacMillan, Conservative M.P. (2) Details unknown. (3) Gregory Farber, Israeli businessman. He negotiated a number of oil purchases for Israel, including the first purchase of refined products from the U.S.S.R. (4) Peretz Bernstein, Minister of Trade and Industry in the Provisional Government.

No. 56

(1) See No. 43. (2) See editorial note p. 41. (3) The U.S. delegation to the U.N. (4) In August 1947, the Security Council decided to enable representatives of the Republic of Indonesia to take part in the discussion on the Dutch-Indonesian dispute although Indonesia was not at that time a member of the U.N. Supporters of Indonesia's claim for a hearing emphasized that its acceptance did not imply recognition of Indonesia. (See

Yearbook of the United Nations 1947/48, p. 365). (5) Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the U.N. Formerly Republican Senator. (6) See No. 33. (7) Security Council questionnaire — see No. 18. Transjordan was the only Arab state not to answer the questionnaire. In its communication to the Security Council Transjordan noted that the U.S., which had initiated the questionnaire, and the Security Council had not yet recognised the Transjordanian Government and had not recommended it for membership in the U.N. (See U.N. document S/760). (8) Andrei Gromyko. (9) Alfonso Lopez, Representative of Colombia at the U.N. (10) Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon in the U.S. and Representative at the U.N. (11) See Reston's article in the *New York Times* of 20 May 1948. According to Reston, State Department circles feared that a rift in Anglo-American relations over Palestine might facilitate Soviet penetration into the Middle East. (12) Weizmann was elected President of the Provisional Council of State on 16 May 1948.

No. 57

(1) Sent following the Provisional Government's session of 20 May 1948, in which Mapam (United Workers' Party) Ministers Bentov and Zisling demanded that an urgent request for arms be addressed to all states and especially to the U.S.S.R. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 20 May 1948). (2) No application of Epstein to the State Department or to the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been found, but the matter was raised at the Weizmann — Truman meeting of 25 May 1948. (See No. 82). American policy on arms supplies to the Middle East had recently been defined in a State Department memorandum addressed to the President recommending that the U.S. reconsider its embargo policy only if the Security Council failed to bring about a cease-fire or to impose a general arms embargo. (See *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1027-8).

No. 58

(1) See No. 41. (2) Richard A. Beaumont, British Consul in Jerusalem.

Editorial Note before No. 60 (Main Volume, p. 61)

On 22 May 1948, the Security Council voted on the American draft resolution and the amended resolution submitted by the British representative. (See Appendices B and C, Main Volume, pp. 664, 665). The Council approved the British draft with the exception of the first paragraph and with a number of amendments in the third paragraph. The resolution called upon the governments and authorities concerned to issue a cease-fire order, which was to become effective thirty-six hours after midnight, New York standard time, 22 May 1948. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 302nd Meeting, 22 May 1948; Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 666).

No. 60

(1) John Ross, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
(2) See No. 31 and note 2 there.

No. 61

(1) See No. 29 (2) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* No. 14. (3) *Ibid,* No. 506

No. 62

(1) Sent via London office of the Palcor news agency.
(2) Golda Meyerson was sent to the United States in order to conduct political negotiations and to help in fund raising.
(3) See second paragraph in Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 666.

No. 63

(1) It was assumed that the Israeli and Arab responses to the cease-fire resolution would be submitted to the Security Council at these meetings. (2) Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter deals with measures which the U.N. may take with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

No. 64

(1) In reply to No. 26, Shertok telegraphed Weizmann a précis of his application for British recognition (No. 12). (See telegram, 23 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1). (2) The Woodhead Commission recommended in 1938 that the proposed Jewish State be limited to a narrow strip along the central coastal plain of Palestine.

No. 65

(1) King Abdallah suggested that the staff and patients of the Hadassah hospital on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem be evacuated under Red Cross protection, provided that the Jewish garrison would also leave. He promised to take care of the premises and equipment. (See American Consulate telegram to Hadassah headquarters in the United States, 23 May 1948, 93.03/127/4).
(2) No reply was received from Tel Aviv. Eventually, officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem were empowered to negotiate the fate of the Jewish institutions on Mount Scopus. They suggested that the garrison should be restricted to passive defence of the area, under the supervision of a neutral force. (See American Consulate telegram to Hadassah headquarters in the United States, 1 June 1948, *ibid.*; memorandum by Leo Kohn, 2 June 1948, C.Z.A. S25/5634).

No. 66

(1) No. 63. (2) Shertok subsequently telegraphed that the cease-fire had actually been fixed for 9 p.m. (See Shertok to Eban, 24 May 1948, 130.09/2328/1). (3) Reference is actually to Lourie's telegram of 22 May 1948 (93.03/94/5), conveying the contents of a telegram by Parodi, in his capacity as President of the Security Council. Parodi maintained that Israel had not co-operated with the Truce Commission and asked for the nomination of liaison officers with the Commission. (4) Shertok asked Eban to inform Parodi that the Provisional Government of Israel had been and still was in close touch with the Truce Commission, in spite of the danger involved. He suggested, however, that liaison with the Truce Commission or with any other U.N. organ be established in Tel Aviv since communications with Jerusalem were precarious and the seat of Government was in Tel Aviv. (See Shertok to Eban, 24 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/1553; Eban to Parodi, 25 May 1948, 93.03/94/5).

No. 67

(1) 26 May 1948. (2) A brief conference of the Arab League was held in Amman on 25 May 1948. On 26 May, the Iraqi representative in the Security Council, speaking on behalf of the Arab states, rejected the cease-fire resolution on the ground that it did not guarantee the termination of Zionist aggression. He nevertheless declared that the Arab states were ready to comply with the Security Council truce resolution of 17 April 1948 and to consider any other measure contemplated by the Council. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 305th Meeting, 26 May 1948, pp. 47-9).

No. 68

(1) See No. 56. (2) Moshe A. Toff, in charge of Latin America affairs at the Israel Mission to the U.N. (3) Argentina and Colombia. They recognized Israel only in February 1949. (4) Chaim Weizmann. (5) Cf. No. 64.

No. 69

(1) The Declaration of Independence refers to the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 but does not explicitly define the state's boundaries. (2) Eban subsequently withdrew his suggestion, telegraphing to Shertok: "Statement not opportune until neighbours agree respect [boundaries]. Until then, strongest bargaining position probably advisable." Shertok endorsed Eban's conclusion. (See Eban to Shertok, 25 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/1559; Shertok to Eban, 27 May 1948, 93.01/2180/17).

No. 70

(1) Sent through the Israeli Mission in Paris.

No. 71

(1) See No. 100.

No. 72

(1) Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

No. 76

(1) Shertok to Smuts (15 May 1948, 130.02/2424/19) — a request for South African recognition. (2) In reply, Shertok thanked Smuts for South Africa's recognition. With reference to the boundaries and the status of the Arab state, Shertok pointed out that the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 "makes specific provisions for the future of parts of Palestine not included in Jewish State", adding that "any attempt to alter these arrangements opens way for their revision in more than one direction." (See Shertok to Smuts, 25 May 1948, 130.02/2391/39).

No. 77

(1) See No. 67. (2) Transmission of the contents of this telegram was delayed by the Israeli Mission in New York — see No. 78.

No. 78

(1) See No. 77. (2) Subsequently endorsed by Weizmann. (See Eban to Shertok, 25 May 1948, 93.03/128/5).

No. 79

(1) See No. 38.

No. 80

(1) See Israel's reply to the Security Council questionnaire — No. 61, question g. (2) Reference is to the provisional records of the Security Council. For Israel's reply see *SCOR, Third Year,* 301st Meeting, 22 May 1948, pp. 8-11.

No. 81

(1) See No. 73.

No. 82

(1) Weizmann was received by President Truman on 25 May 1948 as an official guest of the White House. The Memorandum was delivered after the meeting. (2) See No. 53. (3) See No. 94.

No. 83

(1) See No. 82 and note 1 there. (2) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* No. 69 and notes there.

No. 84

(1) Robert G.A. Jackson, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and for General Coordination. (2) Aneurin Bevan, British Minister of Health. (3) Richard Crossman, Labour M.P., formerly member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (1946). (4) I.Z.L. and Lehi ("Stern Group"). (5) R. Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer. (6) The marked passage is missing in the incoming version. (7) Hector McNeil. (8) Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Charteris, formerly Chief of Army Intelligence in Palestine, 1946; in charge of Palestine affairs in the Ministry of War, 1947-1948. (9) Advertisements published in New York newspapers called for a boycott on British goods. See, e.g., advertisement in the *New York Post* of 2 June 1948: "Every dollar we contribute to Great Britain helps to spill Jewish blood." See also No. 89.

No. 85

(1) See No. 78. (2) See *New York Times,* 26 May 1948. (3) The Provisional Government reconsidered the cease-fire resolution on 26 May 1948. Ben-Gurion reported on his meeting with the army chiefs, who had recommended acceptance of the cease-fire, provided Jerusalem did not fall. It was resolved to order Israeli forces to cease fire at 8 p.m., on condition that the Arabs did the same, and to notify the Security Council. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 26 May 1948).

No. 86

(1) No. 85.

No. 87

(1) No. 85.

No. 88

(1) See Nos. 2, 69. (2) The General Assembly's partition resolution of 29 November 1947.

No. 89

(1) See No. 84 and note 9 there.

No. 90

(1) See No. 56 and note 7 there. (2) Trygve Lie. (3) George Marshall. (4) Means to induce the Arabs to accept the cease-fire resolution, including the possibility of economic sanctions, were reported to have been discussed at a business luncheon between members of the U.N. Secretariat and the American delegation to the U.N. on 25 May. (See *New York Times,* 26 May 1948).

No. 91

(1) No. 82. (2) No reply had yet been received to the Israeli proposal for an exchange of ministers with the U.S. — see No. 36. (See Shertok to Epstein, 25 May 1948, 130.09/2329/22).

No. 92

(1) Ralph J. Bunche, Director, Division of Trusteeship, U.N. Secretariat; Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in

Palestine. (2) Reference to unofficial talks held at Geneva in the summer of 1947 with members of UNSCOP and its secretariat. (3) The Arabs made their acceptance of the cease-fire conditional on the suspension of immigration of men of military age. (4) Untraced.

No. 93

(1) Reference is to talks held on 25 May 1948 at Bevin's private residence. Cf. American Ambassador's report in *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1046-50; No. 120.

No. 94

(1) See No. 82. (2) See No. 91. (3) Original reads: "Envoy *of* Israel"; corrected in conformity with No. 91.
(4) Shertok suggested that a decision on this matter be deferred until contact with officials of the Jewish Agency's Political Department in Jerusalem was resumed. (See Shertok to Epstein, 3 June 1948, 130.09/2328/1).

No. 95

(1) Weizmann made this statement in a press interview shortly after his meeting with President Truman. (See *New York Times*, 26 May 1948).

No. 96

(1) No. 36.

No. 97

(1) See No. 96. (2) See No. 14. (3) No. 36.
(4) See No. 24 and note 3 there.

No. 98

(1) See No. 35.

No. 99

(1) Ruegger to Shertok, 24 May 1948 (C.Z.A. S25/1559) — a request that Israel abide by the Geneva Convention regarding prisoners of war. (2) Ruegger promised to bring the views of the Provisional Government to the knowledge of the Arabs in order to ensure their adherence to the Geneva Convention. (See his telegram, 28 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/1559). (3) Robert Gouy. (4) Jacques de Reynier.

No. 100

(1) Parodi argued in support of his resolution that the U.N. had a working body in Jerusalem — the Security Council Truce Commission; that the resolution could not be considered as giving an advantage to one party over the other and that a cessation of hostilities in Jerusalem would strengthen the authority of the U.N. and facilitate the establishment of a cease-fire throughout Palestine. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 308th Meeting, 28 May 1948, pp. 37-46). Following the adoption of the general cease-fire resolution (see editorial note, p. 63), the French representative withdrew his resolution. (2) See No. 103.

No. 101

(1) The rest of the telegram is garbled and is not printed here. It includes information, deriving from French sources, on developments in the Arab countries.

No. 102 (Hebrew)

(1) A. Stern (Oron), Director of Jewish Agency Office in Rome; from August 1948 — Consul of Israel there. (2) Israel did

not submit an official request for Italian recognition. Cautious enquiries had been made, but it was subsequently decided to await French recognition. (3) Ada Sereni headed the Mosad le-Aliya (Haganah immigration organization) activities in Italy.

No. 103

(1) See No. 100.

Editorial Note before No. 104 (Main Volume, p. 92)

In view of the Arab rejection of the cease-fire resolution and continued fighting in Palestine, the question was again discussed by the Security Council. Two draft resolutions were submitted: 1) By the U.S.S.R., ordering the parties involved to secure a cessation of military operations within thirty-six hours after the adoption of the resolution, and implying a threat of sanctions in case of disobedience. (See U.N. document S/794/Rev. 2). 2) By the U.K., calling upon the parties to cease all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks and to refrain from introducing fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine during the cease-fire. (See U.N. document S/795/Rev. 2). At its 310th meeting, on 29 May 1948, the Security Council adopted the British draft with several amendments, the most important of which, proposed by the French representative, permitted the introduction of men of military age into the countries or territories concerned on condition that they must not be mobilized or submitted to military training during the cease-fire. The parties to the dispute were invited to communicate their acceptance of the resolution to the Security Council not later than 6 p.m. New York Standard Time, 1 June 1948. (See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7).

No. 106

(1) No. 36. See also Nos. 96, 97.

No. 107

(1) Untraced. Reference is presumably to a telegram from Epstein to Shertok, conveying the contents of Lovett's letter (No. 106). (2) No. 96. (3) See No. 14. (4) Marshall made this statement at the State Department's weekly press conference in Washington. (See *Journal American,* 26 May 1948). (5) No. 96. (6) No. 97. (7) No. 106. (8) Shertok endorsed Epstein's proposal. A letter drafted in accordance with his suggestion was sent to the State Department. (See Shertok to Epstein, 6 June 1948, 130.09/2328/2; Epstein to Marshall, 7 June 1948, 93.08/364/10).

No. 108

(1) These *aide-mémoires* were presented following a meeting of Gass and Epstein with Loy Henderson of the State Department. (See their telegram to Shertok, 29 May 1948, C.Z.A. S25/1559). (2) See Nos. 73, 74. (3) See No. 44. (4) The State Department replied that it had protested to the Lebanese Government and would "continue to extend diplomatic protection to its nationals where action on the part of a foreign state is in disregard of the established principles of international law." (See Gross to Epstein, 22 June 1948, 93.03/73/4).

No. 109

(1) Beshara al-Khuri, President of Lebanon. (2) Charles Malik. (3) Fares al-Khuri, Syrian Representative at the U.N. (4) Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League. (5) Kettaneh telegraphed at the beginning of July that he had conveyed Ruffer's message to Cairo and Beirut and that the matter was under consideration. (See Ruffer to Shertok, 6 July 1948, 130.09/2337/7). (6) Bayard Dodge, President of the American University of Beirut.

No. 110

(1) Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. (2) Untraced. (3) Max Buset, Chairman of the Belgian Socialist Party. (4) Edouard Anseele, Vice Chairman of the Belgian Socialist Party.

No. 112

(1) See editorial note, p. 63; Appendix E, Main Volume, pp.666-7

No. 113

(1) No. 112.

No. 114

(1) See editorial note, p. 63; Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7. (2) Refers to the talks between Foreign Secretary Bevin and the American Ambassador Lewis Douglas — see No. 120. (3) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pars 3, 4, pp. 666-7. The amendments to those paragraphs were proposed by the French representative. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 310th Meeting, 29 May 1948, pp. 40-52). (4) *Ibid.,* pp. 55-61. (5) The original version referred only to arms imports into Palestine. (See U.N. document S/795/Rev. 2). For the amended version, see Appendix E, Main Volume, par. 5, p. 667. (6) See Charles Malik's speech in the Security Council, in which he urged the Council to put an end to the acrimonious debates and accusations and to concentrate on conciliation between the two parties in Palestine. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 308th Meeting, 28 May 1948, pp. 31-35). (7) Eban and Ruffer proposed that the Mediator be confronted with factual demonstrations of Israel's sovereignty and of its separation from the Arab part of Palestine. They sug-

gested that new Israeli passports be issued to replace the old Mandatory ones and that District Commissioners be appointed for the entire area of Israel. (See telegram of 30 May 1948, 130.09/2337/6). (8) See No. 104. (9) The draft of the telegram contains an additional sentence: "Perhaps worth bearing in mind existence alternatives between acceptance and rejection by acceptance readiness."

No. 115

(1) See No. 114. (2) On 2 June, the Security Council agreed to the Mediator's request that he be empowered to fix the exact time at which the cease-fire would take effect, after consultations with the parties and the deployment of his staff and observers. (See No. 129; *SCOR, Third Year,* 311th Meeting, 2 June 1948). (3) No. 114. (4) As a result of a delay in the delivery of this telegram, the Provisional Government, meeting on 1 June, was under the wrong impression that the date fixed by the Security Council referred to the actual coming into force of the cease-fire. After a discussion it was resolved to order a cease-fire at the appointed hour and to notify the Security Council. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 1 June 1948). See also Nos. 123, 128.

No. 116

(1) See No. 115 and note 4 there.

No. 117

(1) No. 112. (2) No. 113. (3) I.e., A. Parodi, Representative of France. (4) See No. 100 and note 1 there. (5) To the Security Council's cease-fire resolution.

No. 118

(1) King Abdallah. (2) Jerusalem. (3) Bernadotte made this statement in the course of his first meeting with Ben-Gurion and Shertok. (See report on meeting in Provisional Government, Minutes, 1 June 1948).

No. 119

(1) Eban replied that the British representative, Cadogan, had made an explicit promise in this regard at the Security Council meeting of 2 June. (See Eban to Shertok, 3 June 1948, 93.03/128/6).

No. 120

(1) See No. 93 and note 1 there. (2) See also Goldmann to Shertok, 1 June 1948, Ben-Gurion Archives, file 1580. (3) On the meeting with McNeil — see No. 126.

No. 121

(1) Pietro Quaroni. (2) Jefferson Caffery.

No. 122 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 111. (2) At the Government meeting Ben-Gurion suggested that no reply should be made to the French Consul's letter because it had been addressed to the "Jewish Authorities" and not to the Provisional Government. The suggestion was rejected. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 30 May 1948). (3) W. Eytan and H. Berman were authorized to negotiate with the French Consul-General about the fate of the

French institutions held by the Israeli army in Jerusalem. They were instructed to impress upon the Consul that the evacuation of the Notre Dame Hospice was out of the question. (See message of Shertok to Eytan, 1 June 1948, 130.02/2413/11). The occupation of Notre Dame Hospice and the alleged conduct of the Israeli soldiers there were the chief objects of French complaints.

No. 123

(1) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7 (2) See No. 115 and note 4 there.

No. 124

(1) No. 55.

No. 125

(1) One word missing and two words garbled in original.

No. 126

(1) Hector McNeil. (2) A letter to this effect was sent on the following day. (See Goldmann to McNeil, 2 June 1948, C.Z.A. Z4/20288). The Foreign Office did not reply.
(3) Christopher Mayhew, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (4) From August 1946 onwards, the British had transferred Jewish "illegal" immigrants, intercepted on their way to Palestine, to detention camps in Cyprus. Following the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948 and until the adoption of the Security Council cease-fire resolution on 29 May 1948, the British placed no obstacles on the departure of the Cyprus detainees. But subsequently the British authorities interpreted the immigration clause in the resolution as prohibiting

the immigration of all men of military age and refused to release detainees included in that category. (5) The R.A.F. airfield at Gaza was occupied by the Egyptian army although it was British property and the Israeli authorities had been requested by the British to refrain from damaging it after their withdrawal. The Gaza airfield was used by the Egyptian airforce in its raids against Tel Aviv. (See Eytan to the British Consul in Jerusalem, 19 May 1948, 130.02/2391/1; Goldmann to McNeil, 2 June 1948, C.Z.A. Z4/20288).

No. 127

(1) See No. 115 and note 4 there. (2) Probably Reuter's telegram of 1 June 1948 from New York reporting Arab acceptance of the cease-fire. (3) Eban transmitted the contents of the message to the Security Council on 2 June. He pointed out that Israel had been justified in interpreting the Council's resolution as ordering an immediate cease-fire and had acted accordingly. Eban asked the Council to fix an immediate deadline for the implementation of the cease-fire. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 311th Meeting, 2 June 1948, pp. 6-14).

No. 128

(1) No. 115. (2) See No. 127.

No. 129

(1) Shertok instructed Eban not to protest. (See his telegram of 4 June 1948, 130.09/2328/1). See also No. 141.

No. 130

(1) Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. (2) William M. Martin, President and Chairman of

the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank. (3) See also No. 83.

No. 131

(1) On 7 June, Fischer reported a statement made by Bidault to the effect that the French Government "will choose day and boundary to recognize situation which hardly situation de facto." *(Sic).* (See telegram to Shertok in file 130.09/2344/4).

No. 132

(1) See Nos. 56, 68. (2) See No. 56, note 4. (3) See No. 114 and note 7 there. (4) The American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive. (5) In a further telegram Eban pointed out that both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would support a correct designation of the Provisional Government in the Security Council. (See telegram to Shertok, 4 June 1948, 93.03/72/16).

No. 133

(1) The Syrian Representative (Fares al-Khuri) was President of the Security Council for the month of June. See also Eban to Lie, 3 June 1948, 93.03/94/5. (2) After consulting his colleagues, Eban decided not to present the letter of protest. (See Eban to Shertok, 3 June 1948, 93.01/2180/17).

No. 134

(1) John N. Reedman, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Palestine. (2) Godfrey Collins, Commissioner for the Jewish Immigrant Camps in Cyprus. (3) The Security Council cease-fire resolution, see Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.

No. 135

(1) See No. 134. (2) Repeated to Eban in New York (3 June 1948, 93.03/95/2) with the instruction to protest vigorously in the Security Council. See also No. 144.

No. 136

(1) See No. 134; No. 135 and note 2 there. (2) Jamal al-Husseini, Vice-President of the Arab Higher Committee and its spokesman at the Security Council. (3) 7 June.
(4) Eban to Shertok, 3 June 1948, 130.09/2337/6. Eban advised Shertok to maintain close contact with and make strong representations to the Mediator.

No. 138

(1) The plan (1946) provided for the establishment of autonomous Arab and Jewish districts in part of Palestine — see *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* No. 163, note 2 (Companion Volume, p. 76). (2) David Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President, in charge of relations with Jews and other minorities.

No. 139

(1) Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 140

(1) See No. 134. (2) Subsequently, the U.N. representatives claimed that the proposals were of a tentative nature only — see No. 151, note 5. (3) D.B. Joseph was appointed liaison officer with the Mediator and his staff in Jerusalem.
(4) See No. 141.

No. 141

(1) Presumably MH290 — No. 140. (2) 3 June. (3) See No. 140. (4) 7 June. (5) The so-called "Burma Road".

No. 142

(1) See No. 134.

No. 143

(1) The British delegation to the U.N. See Eban's statement in the Security Council on 3 June, *SCOR, Third Year,* 313th Meeting, 3 June 1948, pp. 26-7.

No. 144

(1) See Nos. 135, 143. (2) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7. (3) See also No. 164.

No. 145 (Hebrew)

(1) See editorial note, p. 63. (2) Riyad al-Sulh, Prime Minister of Lebanon. (3) Weizmann arrived in Paris on 2 June for a private visit.

No. 146

(1) The American presidential elections were due in early November. The third session of the U.N. General Assembly was scheduled for September—December 1948. (2) See No. 143.

No. 147

(1) No. 89.

No. 148

(1) Fraser Wilkins, of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. (2) No. 108. (3) Following this intervention, the *Marine Carp* changed course and sailed directly to Haifa. (See Epstein to Henderson, 7 June 1948, 93.08/377/4).

No. 149

(1) See No. 76. At the beginning of June, the National Party replaced the United party as the ruling party in South Africa. D.F. Malan succeeded J.C. Smuts as Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. (2) Malan replied that his government was considering the request for an exchange of diplomatic representatives with Israel, but that provisionally he considered that the time for such an exchange had not yet arrived. (See Malan to Shertok, 8 June 1948, 93.03/72/20). South Africa and Israel exchanged Ministers in the Summer of 1949.

No. 150

(1) See Bernadotte to U.N. Secretary-General, 4 June 1948, U.N. document S/823. (2) The reply was given by Fares al-Khuri in his capacity as President of the Security Council. He stated that the meaning of the Security Council's resolution was that no military advantage should accrue to either side as a result of the truce. (See Fares al-Khuri to Bernadotte, 5 June 1948, 130.02/2424/20; *SCOR, Third Year,* 314th Meeting, 7 June 1948, pp. 1-2). (3) No. 140.

No. 151

(1) See No. 140. (2) See No. 150 and note 2 there. (3) See "Statement of Count Bernadotte communicated to Mr. Shertok at their meeting in Haifa on 6 June 1948" in file 93.03/95/2. (4) No. 140 and a further telegram from Shertok to Eban of 6 June 1948 (93.03/95/2), complementing and explaining this telegram. (5) Eban informed the Secretary-General of the arrangement supposedly agreed upon between the Mediator and the Provisional Government (No. 140). Shertok telegraphed Eban on 8 June (130.09/2328/2) that the publication of the arrangement contravened his instructions of 6 June 1948 (No. 151) and was liable to aggravate the relations with the Mediator. See also Eban's explanation in his telegram to Shertok of 8 June 1948 (93.03/95/2); No. 156 and note 3 there.

No. 152

(1) See No. 151.

No. 153

(1) Rose Halprin, Member of the Jewish Agency Executive; President of Hadassah, U.S.A.

No. 154

(1) Israeli forces launched a third attack against the Latrun salient on the morning of 9 June. It failed to attain its objectives and was broken off when the truce went into force on 11 June.

No. 155

(1) According to reports in the American press on the presentation of credentials by Sir Oliver Franks, Palestine was not mentioned in the course of his talk with President Truman. (See for instance *New York Herald Tribune,* 4 June 1948).

No. 156

(1) Published also as U.N. document S/829, dated 7 June 1948. (2) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7. (3) It was later agreed that the date and hour for the effective commencement of the cease-fire would be published simultaneously by all parties at 8 a.m. on 9 June 1948. (See Lie to President of the Security Council, 9 June 1948, U.N. document S/830). Actually the date and hour were made public in an advance announcement issued by the U.N. in Cairo and New York. It was claimed that this step had been made necessary owing to Eban's inaccurate communication to the Secretary-General concerning the agreement regarding immigration — see No. 151, note 5. (See Reedman to Shertok. 10 June 1948, 130.02/2424/20). (4) The original typescript reads "from the", but was corrected by hand to read "or" (thus in the official version published by the U.N. Secretariat). See also No. 168, par. 6.

No. 157

(1) No. 152.

No. 158

(1) In a paraphrase of this telegram, probably prepared in Tel Aviv, the following sentence was added: "U.S. hopes that parties will accept cease-fire on this basis." (C.Z.A. S25/1559).

No. 159

(1) Telegram untraced. It apparently concerned the attitude of the American and other governments to the immigration clause in the cease-fire resolution. (2) See No. 140. (3) The Mediator.

No. 160

(1) See No. 132.

No. 161

(1) Shertok to Eban, 8 June 1948 (130.09/2328/2). Shertok reported that the Government had discussed the correct designation of Israel in the Security Council and that he had telegraphed instructions — See No. 160.

No. 162

(1) See No. 160. (2) Count Bernadotte. (3) See No. 56 and note 4 there. (4) Harold Beeley, member of the British delegation to the U.N. (5) Mistake in original ("fifteenth"). (6) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 294th Meeting, 18 May 1948, p. 7. (7) A similar telegram was sent to Fischer in Paris, asking him to make representations at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (See Eban to Fischer, 9 June 1948, 93.03/127/9).

No. 164

(1) No. 144.

No. 165

(1) See No. 130.

No. 166

(1) Chaim Vardi, expert on the Christian communities in Palestine; subsequently adviser in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. (2) Alludes to press reports about the alleged intention of the Franciscan Order to send a voluntary militia to defend the Holy Places in Palestine. The reports were denied by the Vatican. (See *New York Herald Tribune,* 5 June 1948; *Ha'aretz,* 6 June 1948).

No. 167

(1) No. 156.

No. 168

(1) No. 156. (2) No. 152. (3) See No. 140. (4) See No. 156 and note 4 there.

No. 170

(1) No. 160. Mistake in original ("MH322"). (2) See No. 9.

No. 172

(1) See Nos. 89, 147.

No. 173

(1) Mordecai Namir, Member of the Executive Committee of the General Federation of Jewish Labour in Israel. From September 1948 — Counsellor in the Israeli Legation in Moscow.
(2) Itzhak Ben-Aharon, Secretary of Mapam (United Workers' Party). (3) Eliezer Perlson (Peri), Deputy Mayor of Tel Aviv; Food Controller in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
(4) The mission did not materialize. Namir alone visited Rumania in July 1948 to discuss oil supplies for Israel and immigration from Rumania. (See M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* pp. 28-35).

No. 174 (Hebrew)

(1) Letter untraced. (2) See No. 145. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 5 above). (3) Léon Denivelle, chemist and industrialist, Secretary-General of the Commissariat à l'énergie atomique in France, 1945-48. (4) See No. 131. The large parties were: the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (M.R.P.), the Communists, the Socialists and the Radicals. (5) The original reads: "Morgan and Phillips", but reference is presumably to a meeting with Morgan Phillips, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, and James Griffiths, Minister of National Insurance and Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party. The latter came to Paris to sign an Anglo-French social insurance convention.
(6) The International Socialist Conference, which convened in Vienna at the beginning of June, devoted much of its time to the problems of and internal conflicts within the French and Italian Socialist parties. (7) The arms were found in the courtyard of the Collège St. Joseph in Jaffa. A spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that the Ministry was convinced that the nuns of the college were not implicated in the hiding of the arms but suspected members of the Arab staff. (See Foreign Ministry Press Release, 1 June 1948, 130.02/2397/7). (8) Emile Najar, Press Counsellor in the Israeli Mission in Paris.

(9) The subject of the Holy Places was raised in the course of Weizmann's meeting with Bidault. According to Fischer, Weizmann had declined to be briefed by the Israeli Mission in Paris and was therefore unable to answer Bidault's arguments. (See Fischer to Shertok, 7 June 1948, 130.09/2329/23). Subsequently, Weizmann stated at a press conference that Jewish forces were taking great care to safeguard the Holy Places in Jerusalem, although they were being used by the Arabs for military purposes, including the shelling of the Jewish part of the city. (10) Neuville thanked Fischer for his greetings and asked him to prevail upon the authorities in Israel to be less intransigent in their relations with the French Consulate. (See Neuville to Fischer, 6 June 1948, 93.02/179/5).

No. 175

(1) Shertok to Eban, 9 June 1948 (93.03/95/2), conveys the text of the Provisional Government's reply to the Mediator — see No. 168. (2) In his statement and in reply to questions, Shertok declared that Israel would insist on changes in the U.N. partition boundaries if the General Assembly's partition resolution was not implemented in its entirety, i.e., the establishment of Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, internationalization of Jerusalem and economic union between the two states. (3) Eban proposed to speak in the Security Council against the provision in the Mediator's cease-fire arrangements (No. 156, par. 6 viii) imposing limitations on the supply of food to Jerusalem. (See Eban to Shertok, 8 June 1948, 93.03/95/2).

No. 176

(1) No. 175.

No. 177

(1) Zeev Wolf Gold, member of the Jewish Agency Executive and of the Provisional Council of State; he had been a member of the Agency's delegation to the U.N. in 1946. (2) No. 172.

No. 178

(1) Sent via the Jewish Agency's office in New York.
(2) The British-managed Haifa oil refineries were due to be closed down on 15 June, shortly before the evacuation of the last British forces from Haifa. The British arranged for alternative sources of refined oil products to Transjordan. (See Shertok to Lourie, for Goldmann in London, 8 June 1948, 130.09/2328/2).

No. 179

(1) See No. 126. (2) Hector McNeil. (3) See No. 162. (4) See No. 163. (5) Reference is to the resumption of crude oil deliveries from Iraq to the Haifa refineries — see No. 178. (6) Christopher Mayhew.

No. 180

(1) Letter in file 93.02/172/9. Eban wrote that the text of Bidault's declaration (see No. 131 and note 1 there) was much milder than the version published in the American press; it came as "a special blow" in view of the sympathy and co-operation of the French representative at the U.N. — A. Parodi. Recently, for example, Parodi had consulted the Israeli delegation about the proposed participation of French naval units in the supervision of the cease-fire. (2) See No. 174 and note 9 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 5 above). (3) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 506. (4) See No. 162 and note 7 there.

No. 181 (Hebrew)

(1) Rumania recognized the State of Israel on 11 June. (See Ana Pauker to Shertok, 11 June 1948, 130.02/2391/9). Evidently Levavi was still unaware of the fact.

No. 182

(1) See, for instance, letter from J. Reedman (of the Mediator's staff) to Shertok, of 10 June, addressed to the "Foreign Minister, State of Israel." (Letter in file 130.02/2424/20). (2) See Eban to D. Protitch, Director of Security Council Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, 8 September 1948, 93.03/94/5. Eban complained that his letters, sent on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, were being published by the U.N. as if sent by the Jewish Agency. (3) See Eban's letter to the Secretary-General, dated 10 June 1948, conveying Shertok's reservations with regard to the cease-fire arrangements — No. 168. The letter was published as U.N. document S/834. (4) No. 170.

No. 183

(1) Apparently refers to a previous version of the Mediator's telegram, U.N. document S/840, mentioned in No. 186. (See editorial note, p. 82). This version was not published by the U.N. Secretariat. (2) See No. 186.

No. 184

(1) No. 163. (2) Ras al-Naqura, on the Israeli-Lebanese border. (3) Intersection of the inner Negev road with the Majdal-Faluja road, south of Negba. The intersection was occupied by the Egyptians early on 11 June. See also No. 198. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 7 above). (4) Last part of sentence not printed.

No. 185

(1) No. 183. (2) No. 156. (3) It was published in the Israeli press on 16 June 1948.

Editorial Note before No. 186 (Main Volume, p. 159)

On 15 June 1948, the Security Council discussed several communications received from the Mediator. The Mediator requested that all the communications from interested parties with regard to the cease-fire and truce agreement be submitted through him. In another communication the Mediator requested the President of the Security Council to draw the attention of states from which substantial immigration might emanate, to the conditions governing immigration under the truce arrangements. (See U.N. documents S/873 and S/840; *SCOR, Third Year,* 320th Meeting, 15 June 1948).

No. 186

(1) For previous version see No. 183. (2) Actually par. 6 of the cease-fire arrangements fixed by the Mediator — see No. 156. (3) Reference is possibly to the assumptions and reservations of the Provisional Government with regard to the cease-fire conditions, transmitted to the Security Council under date of 1 June. 2 June is probably the date of receipt by the Security Council.

No. 187

(1) No. 170. (2) The Jewish Agency Executive. (3) The Jewish Agency Executive convened only on 26 June — see No. 216.

Editorial Note before No. 188 (Main Volume, p. 161).

Late on 11 June 1948, a few hours after the cease-fire in Palestine had become effective, the I.Z.L. ship *Altalena* left Port de Bouc in the south of France and sailed for Israel with approximately 900 immigrants and a large quantity of munitions on board. The immigrants — mostly people of military age — had been organized and trained in Europe by the I.Z.L. The munitions had been mostly supplied by French authorities following contacts between I.Z.L. representatives and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A belated attempt by the I.Z.L. to detain the ship or to divert it to another European port failed because of communication difficulties.

When it became known that the *Altalena* would definitely arrive in Israel, negotiations were started between representatives of the Provisional Government and the I.Z.L. with regard to the location of the immigrants' disembarkation and the disposal of the arms. The representatives of the I.Z.L. wanted the arms to be delivered to the I.Z.L. units which had been drafted or were about to be drafted into the army (in accordance with an agreement signed on 1 June 1948) and to the I.Z.L. units in Jerusalem, where the organization continued to maintain separate military formations. The government representatives insisted that the arms be delivered to the army directly and unconditionally, though they agreed to the allocation of one fifth of the quantity "to Jerusalem". No agreement was reached.

During the night of 20/21 June, the *Altalena* anchored off Kefar Vitkin, where most of the passengers disembarked and some of the munitions were unloaded. At this stage the I.Z.L. rejected a government ultimatum for surrender of the boat and its cargo. Following an exchange of fire, the ship then continued in a southerly direction, anchoring off Tel Aviv in the early hours of 22 June. An attempt to unload the rest of the munitions led to fighting between members of the I.Z.L. and units of the army, in the course of which the *Altalena* was hit by gun-fire and went up in flames.

The *Altalena* affair gave rise to a bitter controversy in Israel and to a protracted argumentation as to the true facts, the action

taken by the government and the intentions of the I.Z.L. (See U. Brenner, *Altalena — A Political and Military Study,* Tel Aviv 1978; S. Nakdimon, *Altalena,* Jerusalem 1978. Both books are in Hebrew).

No. 188

(1) See editorial note above.

No. 189

(1) A western suburb of Jerusalem. (2) Nos. 163, 184.
(3) The rest of the letter (not printed here) deals with the establishment of the Israeli Mission in London and with rumours concerning Goldmann's contacts with the British authorities.

No. 190

(1) No. 187. (2) See No. 182. (3) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 127. (4) The questionnaire addressed to the "Jewish Authorities" — No. 29. (5) The resolutions on a cease-fire in Palestine — Appendices D and E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.
(6) The headquarters of Count Bernadotte and his staff since 16 June — see No. 189.

No. 191

(1) These rumours, mainly concerning an alleged Anglo-American agreement on an exchange of the Negev for Western Galilee, had circulated in London and New York since the beginning of the truce. (See *Ha'aretz,* 11 June 1948; Eban to Shertok, 10 June 1948, 93.03/95/2). (2) The establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East, under the U.N. Eco-

nomic and Social Council, was then under consideration. It was assumed that the Council would adopt the proposal at its seventh session, due to convene in July, but the discussion was eventually postponed to a later date. See also No. 208. (3) See No. 163.

No. 192

(1) In April 1948, General Hilldring was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Palestine Affairs with the task of policy coordination between the White House and the State Department. A month later Hilldring announced that he was withdrawing his acceptance on grounds of ill health. (See *FRUS*, 1948, V, p. 879).

No. 193

(1) See Nos. 130, 165. (2) William Martin.

No. 194

(1) See No. 173, note 4.

No. 195

(1) Gass reported to Kaplan on 17 June that Moline welcomed the idea of American governmental initiative through the oil companies and diplomatic channels, subject to Henderson's authorization. But the latter's attitude was non-committal. (Telegram in file 130.09/2329/21).

No. 196

(1) See No. 179.

No. 197

(1) D.B. Joseph was appointed to represent the Provisional Government in contacts with Count Bernadotte in Jerusalem — see No. 140. (2) Colonel Frank Begley, Chief Security Officer of U.N. headquarters in New York, arrived in Israel at the beginning of June to join the U.N. truce observers staff.
(3) The first convoy reached Jerusalem on 18 June. After that convoys went regularly.

No. 198 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 184 and note 3 there.

No. 199

(1) See No. 186.

No. 200

(1) At the request of the French delegation, the item "Present state of the question of the statute for the City of Jerusalem" was included in the agenda of the third session of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. (See *TCOR, Third Year,* 1st Meeting, 16 June 1948, pp. 1-10). (2) Evidently refers to part III of the General Assembly's resolution on the partition of Palestine, according to which the Trusteeship Council was to elaborate and approve a detailed statute for the city of Jerusalem. The resolution goes on to give general directions and guidelines for this statute.
(3) The question of the Jerusalem statute came up for discussion in the Trusteeship Council at the end of July 1948. At the suggestion of the Belgian representative, who maintained that discussion of the statute might impede and even endanger the mediation effort in Palestine, it was resolved to adjourn the discussion *sine die.* (See *TCOR, Third Year,* 35th Meeting, 29 July 1948, pp. 469-75).

No. 201

(1) See No. 190, note 6. R. Shiloah and L. Kohn were subsequently appointed Israeli representatives. See also No. 205. (2) Golda Meyerson was about to take up her post as Israeli Minister in Moscow. (3) Shertok replied that he was telegraphing directly to Golda Meyerson. (See telegram to Eban, 20 June 1948, 93.03/128/6).

No. 202 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 242. (2) Untraced.

No. 203

(1) Gershon Hirsch (Avner), of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem.

No. 205

(1) The report was prepared by Walter Eytan. (2) Cf. Goldmann's report on this meeting — No. 92. (3) In pursuance of this agreement, the U.N. assumed control for the duration of the truce of all camps and installations which "would improve the relative military strength of the Israeli Military Forces." (See agreement, 16 June 1948, 130.02/2424/20).

No. 206

(1) Name only in incoming text. (2) Questionnaires untraced. (3) William Stoneman, American journalist, Special Adviser to the U.N. Secretary-General. He accompanied the Mediator on his visit to Palestine.

No. 207

(1) No. 170 and Nos. 182, 187, 190. (2) Of the Security Council. (3) See No. 160. (4) Dmitry Manuilsky, Ukrainian representative on the Security Council. Eban and Robinson met Manuilsky on 24 June. He told them that he was prepared to give a ruling in accordance with their wish, provided no majority of seven was available to overrule him. Eban and Robinson gave the required assurance on the strength of their previous meetings with members of the Security Council. (See Eban to Shertok, 25 June 1948, 93.01/2180/21).

No. 208

(1) See No. 191 and note 2 there. For Committee's report see U.N. document E/AC.26/16.

No. 209

(1) See Goldmann to Shertok, 16 June 1948, 130.02/2382/8. (2) No. 189. (3) See No. 191 and note 1 there. (4) Lippmann called upon the U.S. and Great Britain to use their influence with Israel and Transjordan in order to put an end to hostilities, with a view to the conclusion of an alliance between the two countries under the aegis of the United Nations. He pointed out that the West would be unable to safeguard its vital interests in the Middle East unless it strengthened its influence in these two countries. (See *New York Herald Tribune,* 10 June 1948). (5) At the end of June, King Abdallah visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. His meetings, especially that with King Ibn Saud — the first after a long interval — roused considerable interest and occasioned rumours about a change of alignment in the Arab world. *Inter alia,* it was reported that King Abdallah sought the consent of the Arab rulers to the annexation of those parts of Palestine held by the Arab

Legion. (6) Leopold Amery, formerly Secretary of State for the Colonies (1924-29) and for India and Burma (1940-45). (7) For a report on this meeting, which took place on 15 June, see file 130.13/2583/4. (8) Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1942-45. (9) The 5th Marquess of Salisbury, formerly Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (1940-42, 1943-45) and for the Colonies (1942). (10) See No. 179. (11) See No. 196. (12) *Sic*; should read: 80,000-90,000. (13) Hector McNeil. (14) This and other information relating to British endeavours to ensure oil supplies to the Arabs while withholding them from Israel, were published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (See "Memorandum on oil", 16 June 1948, 93.08/365/6). (15) Shertok telegraphed to Goldmann detailed information on the fuel stocks in Israel, requesting him to apply to the British for the purchase of the oil stocks available in Haifa; payment was to be made from the blocked sterling balances of Palestine. Shertok also suggested that the Haifa oil refineries resume operations; the distribution of refined products to all interested parties was to be guaranteed. (See telegram of 22 June 1948, 130.02/2329/24). (16) One paragraph, concerning a personal matter, not printed here. (17) Goldmann suggested that the offices of the Zionist Organization be separated from those of the Israeli Mission in London. (See his telegram, 18 June 1948, 130.09/2318/4). (18) Ivor J. Linton, Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency in London and later Counsellor in the Israeli Mission there. (19) Michael Lubin (Naamani), Jewish businessman in England. Formerly Secretary of the Political Department of the Zionist Executive in Palestine. (20) The Foreign Office subsequently informed Linton that there was no government directive against the sailing of ships to Israel. (See Linton's report, 6 July 1948, 93.03/127/8). (21) For the session of the World Jewish Congress at the end of June. (22) See No. 211.

No. 210

(1) No. 199. (2) The matter was raised at a meeting of the Mediator and his staff with the Israeli representatives L. Kohn and R. Shiloah, in Rhodes — see No. 230. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 10 above).

No. 211

(1) Two hundred and fifty Palestinian Jews, mostly members of the I.Z.L., had been deported to Kenya because of underground activities against the British. Some of them had been kept in detention since the end of World War II. The British authorities had promised to repatriate them before the termination of the Mandate but put off their release under various pretexts. (See Even-Zohar to Shertok, 15 June 1948, 130.02/2398/12).
(2) Bernadotte ruled that the cease-fire resolution did not preclude the repatriation of the deportees but that they would not be permitted to do military service. (See LeAssirenu [prisoners aid society] telegram, [?28] June 1948, *ibid.*). The deportees arrived in Israel on 12 June 1948. (3) See No. 210. (4) See No. 209. (5) *Ibid.* (6) Relates to the correct designation of the Provisional Government in the Security Council — see No. 179. (7) *Sic.* The correct reference is to Rule 39 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, empowering the Council to summon anyone whom it considers competent to give it information or other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

No. 212

(1) This section states that when the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State has become effective, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations.

No. 214

(1) Colonel Thord Bonde, Chief of Staff of U.N. observers in Palestine. (2) Reference is to an Israeli column which brought supplies and reinforcements to Kefar Darom, in the Negev, after the commencement of the cease-fire. (3) The agreement with the U.N. was not implemented; the Israeli column slipped away from Kefar Darom with some of the wounded shortly before the termination of the cease-fire. The settlement was evacuated on 8 July 1948. (4) See No. 184 and note 3 there; No. 198. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 7 above). (5) An Israeli supply convoy, which set out on 25 June accompanied by U.N. observers, was attacked by Egyptian forces. Following the Mediator's intervention, the Egyptians agreed to the passage of convoys on condition that they be notified in advance of the date, nature of supplies and exact destination of each convoy. (See Bunche to Bonde, 29 June 1948, 130.02/2426/10). The first convoy left for the Negev on 2 June and thereafter convoys proceeded regularly.

No. 215

(1) See editorial note, pp. 83-4.

No. 216

(1) The I.Z.L. ship *Altalena* — see editorial note, pp. 83-4. (2) No. 207. (3) See No. 217.

No. 217

(1) No. 216. (2) See No. 207. (3) No. 207. (4) U.N. document S/846. On the Haifa camps see No. 205 and note 3 there.

No. 218

(1) No. 191. (2) See Nos. 163, 184. (3) Trygve Lie — see No. 206. (4) See No. 114 and note 3 there. (5) See No. 92. (6) Of the Security Council — see No. 133. (7) See No. 217 and note 4 there. (8) See No. 211 and note 7 there. (9) The Israeli plank adopted by the Republican Party's Resolutions Committee in Philadelphia on 22 June pledged to Israel "full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations and aid in developing its economy." (10) Edward Jacobson, formerly business partner of President Truman — see No. 219. (11) Judge Samuel Rosenman.

No. 219

(1) See No. 218 and note 10 there. (2) See No. 192 and note 1 there.

No. 220 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 215. (2) Alexis Ladas, of the U.N. observers staff in Palestine. (3) Lieutenant-Colonel Baruch Baruch (Komarov), Chief Liaison Officer with the U.N. observers. (4) See No. 211. (5) See No. 186. (6) See No. 214 and note 5 there. (7) Irene Broza, secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 221

(1) David Hacohen was on a mission to the U.S. on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal. (2) See No. 173.

No. 222

(1) See No. 210. (2) See No. 211 and note 1 there.
(3) News agency. Statement untraced.

No. 223

(1) See No. 222.

No. 224

(1) See No. 218 and note 9 there. (2) On 22 June, President Truman announced the exchange of representatives between the U.S. and Israel. James G. McDonald, who had served as member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine in 1946, was appointed American Special Representative in Israel. (3) James Forrestal, U.S. Secretary of Defence.
(4) See No. 219.

No. 225

(1) See No. 224.

No. 226

(1) See No. 218 and note 9 there. (2) See No. 225.
(3) See No. 148.

No. 227

(1) Paul Cremona, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Palestine. (2) No. 215. (3) The so-called "Burma Road". (4) Presumably the village of Deir Muhei-

sin, five kilometres west of Latrun. (5) Place unidentified. (6) Presumably the village of Imwas, two kilometres north-east of Latrun.

No. 228 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 220. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. above). (2) No. 227. (3) Untraced. See No. 223. (4) Telegraphic address of the Jewish Agency office in London. (5) No. 223. (6) The immigrant ships, *Pan York* and *Pan Crescent,* which had been detained in Cyprus since January 1948, reached Haifa on 16 June for repairs and refuelling. The British authorities of the Haifa enclave refused to allow the ships into the port and detained one of the captains.

No. 229

(1) See No. 156. (2) The water supply to Jerusalem from the Ras el-Ein source was not resumed during the cease-fire — see No. 287. Limited quantities of water reached the city from other sources by means of an improvised pipe, laid alongside the "Burma Road".

No. 230 (Hebrew)

(1) Untraced. (2) No. 228. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 8 above). (3) See No. 214. (4) No. 227. (5) The Mediator informed Israeli representatives that he disapproved of the tone of Cremona's letter. He had authorized only a verbal communication appreciating the measures taken by the Provisional Government and requesting further details. (See Kohn to Shertok, 25 June 1948, 130.09/2329/25). (6) Reference is to the *Altalena* affair. (7) Kohn telegraphed later on same day that the British had given contradictory information; the Mediator had asked for clarification, intimating his readiness

to send observers to Cyprus. (See Kohn to Shertok, 25 June 1948, 130.02/2426/10). (8) The last sentence was added by hand.

No. 231 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 230. (2) Arthur Creech Jones, British Secretary of State for the Colonies. (3) See No. 230 and note 7 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 10 above).

No. 232

(1) No. 211. (2) See No. 228 and note 6 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 8 above). (3) On fuel stocks in Israel see No. 209 and note 15 there.

No. 234

(1) No. 227. (2) See Shertok's message to Bernadotte, 15 June 1948, 93.03/95/2.

No. 235

(1) Of 20 June 1948 (130.02/2391/70). Shertok attempted to convey to Weizmann something of the hectic atmosphere prevailing in Israel, especially in view of the *Altalena* affair. Writing about the Presidency, he told Weizmann that its exact character had not yet been fixed, but the tendency was to follow the French model rather than the American one. (2) Under the impact of Rabbi M. Berlin's criticism of the Provisional Government for its handling the *Altalena* affair, the Mizrahi Ministers Fishman and Shapira resigned from the Government. They subsequently withdrew their resignation. (3) Ben-Gurion. On 25 June, Weizmann telegraphed to Ben-Gurion, stating that Rabbi Berlin's action was undermining the State's authority, and inquiring what

Ben-Gurion was going to do about it. (Telegram in file 130.02/2329/23). (4) No. 189. (5) André Blumel, French Zionist leader. (6) I.e., allocation of positions in the civil service in proportion to the relative strength of the various political parties. (7) Samuel Spanien, French (Jewish) jurist. Member of the Committee for the Recognition of the State of Israel in France.

No. 236

(1) Eban to Shertok, 23 June 1948, 93.03/72/16. Eban suggested a formulation for a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding the correct designation of Israeli representatives by the Security Council. (2) See No. 9. (3) A letter to the Secretary-General was prepared on the basis of these instructions (Eban to Lie, 28 June 1948, 93.03/72/16), but it is not clear whether it was actually sent — see No. 259.

No. 237

(1) No. 232. (2) John Miller Martin, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. (3) See No. 209 and note 15 there.

No. 238

(1) No previous intervention by Fischer with regard to the *Altalena* is recorded in the files. For French assistance in the procurement of the arms in France see S. Nakdimon, *Altalena* (Hebrew), pp. 84-108; No. 328. (2) I.e., the Africa-Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) Neuville suggested that French officers be stationed in the French institutions in Jerusalem after their evacuation by the Israeli forces. The Israeli representatives expressed doubts as to the efficacy of this arrangement, but said they would bring it to the notice of the

Jerusalem District Commander. (See Eytan's report on meeting with Neuville, 5 June 1948, C.Z.A. S25/6595).

No. 240

(1) Cf. Marshall's telegram to Douglas, 22 June 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1133-4. (2) Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, signatories of the Brussels Treaty of economic and social co-operation and collective military aid, signed in March 1948. (3) On 4 June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, after making a 25 per cent cut in the amount requested by the Administration. In the debate, members criticized the alleged waste and lavishness of foreign aid.

No. 241

(1) Shertok to Lourie, 28 June 1948, 130.09/2328/4. Shertok asked Lourie to telephone Linton in London and inform him that the commissioner for the immigrant detention camps in Cyprus refused to authorize the evacuation of the detainees, including women and children, without explicit instructions from London. Linton was to request the Foreign Office to send immediate instructions to the Commissioner to restart evacuation of the detainees, excluding men of military age. The latter category would be left to the Mediator's adjudication.

No. 242

(1) See No. 202. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 7 above). (2) Reference is presumably to the replies of the various governments to the Mediator's telegram concerning immigration into Israel during the cease-fire — U.N. document S/855. See also No. 186. (3) See Nos. 253, 260.

No. 243

(1) No. 241. (2) No. 230 and note 7 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 10 above).

No. 244

(1) Untraced. Apparently related to the Kenya and Cyprus detainees. (2) The Kenya detainees — see No. 211 and notes 1, 2 there. (3) The Cyprus detainees. (4) The British Consul at Haifa approached the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 30 June 1948 with regard to arrangements for evacuation of the Cyprus detainees. (See Marriott to Beilin, 30 June 1948, 130.02/2398/10). The *Pan* ships sailed for Cyprus on 2 July 1948 and the evacuation started immediately. By August, only 11,000 people (men of military age and relations who refused to depart without them) were left in Cyprus.

No. 245

(1) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7. (2) William Burdett. On Burdett's unfriendly attitude see Shertok to Epstein, 27 June 1948, 130.09/2329/22. (3) No. 156. (4) See also Joseph's letter to the Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commission, 24 June 1948, 130.02/2397/3.

No. 246

(1) See No. 239.

No. 247

(1) Arthur Lourie was summoned to Israel for consultations. (2) William L. Mackenzie King. (3) See

Comay's memorandum "Canada's recognition of Israel", of 21 June 1948 (93.03/69/16); the argumentation is similar to that of No. 204. (4) See Comay to Mackenzie King, 28 June 1948, 93.03/69/16. (5) Original reads erroneously: "provisional". (6) John Hood, Representative of Australia at the U.N. (7) Sir Carl Berendsen, Representative of New Zealand at the U.N. (8) No. 204. (See Comay to Berendsen, 18 June 1948, 93.03/72/5; Comay to Hood, 18 June 1948, 93.03/125/17). (9) Herbert Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs. (10) Malan was Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs. (11) See No. 149 and note 2 there.

No. 249

(1) See Shertok to Eban, 30 June 1948, 93.03/73/4. The telegram enumerates the main points of the Mediator's proposals — see No. 239. (2) *Sic,* should read: central Council (see No. 239, p. 233). The term [Joint] Economic Board is taken from the partition plan of 29 November 1947. (3) Allusion to the Mediator's suggestion that the oil refineries be included in the proposed free port at Haifa. (See No. 239, p. 233).

No. 250

(1) The questions were apparently transmitted orally; see also No. 227. (2) No. 234. (3) In his reply, Bonde took exception to each of Shertok's replies. With regard to the suggested meeting to discuss arrangements for the U.N. observers' freedom of movement and right of access to military areas, he stated that these had been decided by the Mediator and he was therefore unable to discuss them. (See Bonde to Shertok, 5 July 1948, 130.02/2426/9).

No. 251

(1) See No. 244.

No. 252

(1) See No. 239. (2) Two decoding errors in this telegram have been corrected in square brackets in conformity with the text of a similar telegram to London (1 July 1948, 130.09/2318/1).

No. 253

(1) No. 242.

No. 254

(1) No. 253. (2) The governments' replies to the Mediator's telegram relating to restrictions on immigration, see also No. 260. (3) Kollek was on a mission to the U.S. on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. (4) No. 260.

No. 255

(1) Allusion is to the agreement between the Mediator and the Provisional Government about former British army camps near Haifa — see No. 205 and note 3 there. (2) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 295th Meeting, 18 May 1948, p. 38. (3) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 294th Meeting, 18 May 1948, p. 18.

No. 256

(1) See No. 252.

No. 258

(1) For Bernadotte's Suggestions — see No. 239. (2) No. 252. (3) Cf. Ross' report of this conversation — *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1191-2.

No. 259

(1) Eban to Shertok, 25 June 1948, reporting on a meeting with the Ukrainian delegation concerning Israel's designation in the Security Council. (Telegram in file 93.03/2180/21). (2) See No. 236. (3) On 7 August 1947, the Security Council rejected the request of the Philippines to be allowed to attend the debate on the Indonesian question. This decision was rescinded a week later and the Philippines were invited to take part in the discussion. (See *SCOR, Second Year,* 178th Meeting, 7 August 1947; 184th Meeting, 14 August 1947). (4) See No. 265.

No. 260

(1) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7. (2) No. 156. (3) The quotation is from the provisional records of the Security Council (S/P.V.310, p. 81). For the amended version in the definitive records see *SCOR, Third Year,* 310th Meeting, 29 May 1948, p. 41. (4) *Sic.* Should read: S/829; see also No. 156 par. 6(ii).

No. 261

(1) Cyril Marriott, British Consul-General at Haifa. (2) Harry Beilin, representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Haifa. (3) See No. 244.

No. 262

(1) See No. 65.

No. 263

(1) No. 233. (2) Untraced, but see No. 286. (3) Eban asked Shertok whether the Government was opposed to the idea

of a free port as such or only to the inclusion of the oil refineries. Shertok replied that the Government was opposed to a free port because it constituted an infringement of sovereignty, but was ready to assign Transjordan a free zone in Haifa as part of a comprehensive agreement. (See telegrams: Eban to Shertok and Shertok to Eban, both 7 July 1948, 93.03/94/9).

No. 264

(1) Thomas Dewey, Republican presidential candidate.
(2) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until February 1948; President of Columbia University from summer 1948. (3) John Foster Dulles, member of the U.S. delegation to the second and third sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 265

(1) No. 259. (2) Dmitry Manuilsky, Ukrainian Representative on the Security Council and President of the Council for the month of July. For the first meeting with Manuilsky see No. 207 and note 4 there.

No. 266

(1) The letter was transmitted to the Mediator on 6 July — see No. 281. (2) No. 239.

No. 267

(1) See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.

No. 268

(1) Originally appended to No. 267. (2) For details see No. 281.

No. 269

(1) No. 270.

No. 270

(1) No. 269.

No. 271

(1) No. 265. (2) In a telegram to Najar in Paris, Eban stated that "All we want from France is silence and abstention." Najar reported that the French attitude was favourable but absolute discretion was required. (See Eban-Najar exchange of telegrams, 1-3 July 1948, 93.03/127/9). (3) President of the Security Council.

No. 272

(1) John Martin of the Colonial Office. (2) Linton was in the U.S. at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's session in the autumn of 1947, and again from January to May 1948.
(3) I.e., that part of the coast of the gulf of Aqaba which was within the international boundaries of Palestine. (4) See No. 235. (5) George Lewis Jones, of the U.S. Embassy in London. (6) Reference is possibly to their meeting on 5 January 1948. (See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, No. 101). This sentence is not mentioned in the minutes of the meeting.

(7) The *Altalena* affair. (8) See No. 235 and note 8 there. (9) According to the recommendations of the Peel Commission (1937), the proposed Jewish state was to include the whole of Galilee and the coastal plain as far south as Isdud, while Samaria, Judea, the southern part of the coastal plain and the Negev were assigned to the Arab state.

No. 273

(1) See also No. 261.

No. 274

(1) J. Voet, Secretary of the Zionist Federation of Holland.
(2) Following the elections, a new government was formed in August 1948. D.U. Stikker replaced van Boetzelaer as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 275

(1) President Truman. (2) The Democratic Party convention, due to open on 12 July 1948.

No. 276

(1) Name in incoming copy only. (2) Shertok replied that the Mediator's original proposal referred only to the establishment of a free port at Haifa, including the oil refineries, and not to internationalization (see No. 239). Nevertheless, the Provisional Government had rejected the proposal because it involved a derogation of its sovereignty, especially as in the context of the Mediator's proposal it implied a joint Arab-Jewish administration, reminiscent of the "Economic Union" of the November 1947 resolution. Shertok added that in his reply to the Mediator (No.

266) he had contented himself with a categorical rejection of any limitation of sovereignty. (See Shertok to Eban, 9 July 1948, 93.03/94/9).

No. 277

(1) See No. 271 and note 2 there. (2) The incumbent President of the Security Council, the Ukrainian representative, was due to be succeeded by the Soviet representative on 1 August, to be followed by the British representative on 1 September.

No. 278

(1) See No. 283.

No. 279

(1) The *Altalena* affair. (2) Presumably King Abdallah's visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq — see No. 209 and note 5 there.

No. 280

(1) I.e., after expiration of the four weeks' truce.

No. 281

(1) No. 239. (2) No. 266. (3) The Provisional Government's reply was discussed by the Provisional Council of State in closed session on 5 July. After voting down a number of amendments, the Council approved the reply by a large majority. See Provisional Council of State, *Record of Discussions,* Vol. I, 8th Session, 5 July 1948, (4) See No. 268. (5) See No.

229. (6) See No. 242. (7) In accordance with the truce conditions — see No. 156, par. 6 (ii). (8) No. 282. (9) See No. 245.

No. 282

(1) No. 266. The Mediator's Suggestions — see No. 239.
(2) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* editorial note, pp. 786-7.

No. 283

(1) No. 278. (2) Dov Bernard Joseph, Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee (see *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 473, note 2) and representative of the Provisional Government in negotiations with the Mediator and the Security Council Truce Commission in Jerusalem. (3) Daniel Auster, Mayor of Jewish Jerusalem. (4) Va'ad ha-Qehila (Jewish Community Committee) dealt mainly with religious matters and services and with relations between the various Jewish communities in Jerusalem. (5) Jerusalem District Commander — David Shaltiel.

No. 284

(1) The invitation of the President of the Security Council was worded as follows: "I now ask the representatives of the following states and interested parties to take their places at the Security Council table: the representatives of the State of Israel, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon; and, if I am not mistaken, the representative of the Arab Higher Committee." (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 330th Meeting, 7 July 1948, p. 2).

No. 285

(1) No. 286.

No. 286

(1) No. 285. (2) According to information received by Shertok, the British intended to suggest that the oil flow to the Haifa refineries be resumed on condition that none of the products be sold to either Jews or Arabs. (See Shertok to Linton, 8 July 1948, 130.09/2318/1).

No. 287

(1) Early on 8 July, the Arab states announced that they rejected the Mediator's proposal for a prolongation of the truce but were ready, in principle, to agree to the demilitarization of the old city of Jerusalem. (2) No. 285. (3) Reference is presumably to the official announcement of the Provisional Government with regard to the prolongation of the truce. It was published in New York on 8 July 1948 (file 93.03/94/9). (4) See No. 289; Bernadotte to the U.N. Secretary-General, 7 July 1948, U.N. document S/869. (5) See Nos. 283, 285 and No. 263, note 3. The other telegrams mentioned here (MH604, MH605) conveyed the contents of the Mediator's letter (see No. 282) and a report of the meeting between him and Shertok (see No. 281). (6) No. 286.

No. 288

(1) After meeting with the (head of?) the Soviet delegation, Eban reported (on 7 July 1948, 93.01/2180/21) that there was complete harmony between the two delegations. The Soviets favoured a prolongation of the truce but had reservations with regard to some of its clauses.

No. 289

(1) See No. 281. (2) This sentence was added by hand. (3) This sentence was added by hand. The agreed statement, dated 9 July 1948, is in the same file.

No. 290

(1) See No. 211. (2) *Ibid.,* par. 5.

Editorial Note before No. 291 (Main Volume, p. 298)

At its 330th and 331st meetings, on 7 July, the Security Council discussed the Mediator's request for a prolongation of the truce. The Council addressed "an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator." (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 331st Meeting, 7 July 1948, p. 35).

No. 291

(1) Conveying the Security Council's appeal for a prolongation of the truce (in file 130.02/2424/20).

No. 292

(1) The telegram (dated 8 July 1948, in file 130.09/2829/1), conveyed the contents of Shertok's telegram to Lie — No. 291.

No. 293

(1) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 331st Meeting, 7 July 1948, pp. 40-41.

No. 294

(1) Of the Security Council on 8 July. (2) The Mediator stated that he had not yet received the full text of the Arab reply, but his representative in Cairo had reported that the Arabs were not prepared to accept a prolongation of the truce under the former conditions "in view of their experience of the past four weeks." (See "Statement of the Mediator on the Arab and Jewish replies", 8 July 1948, 93.03/94/9).

No. 296

(1) See Beilin to Shertok, 8 July 1948, 130.02/2414/26.

No. 298

(1) See No. 218 and note 9 there. (2) See No. 107.
(3) Cf. the report on this meeting in *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1198-9. (4) See No. 312.

No. 299

(1) Brigadier Norman Lash. British officer serving with the Arab Legion, Commander of Legion's First Division. (2) See No. 261.

No. 300

(1) See No. 294 and note 2 there.

No. 301

(1) See editorial note, p. 108.

No. 302

(1) See No. 300.

No. 303

(1) See No. 301.

No. 304

(1) No. 260. (2) *Ibid.*, note 3.

No. 305

(1) Samuel Rosenman. (2) See No. 298. (3) See No. 107. (4) The Security Council's cease-fire resolution, which called upon Arabs and Jews to refrain from the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials and from bringing armed personnel into Palestine — see *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 127, and Main Volume, p. 632. (5) The memorandum, appended to Eban's letter to Rosenman of 9 July 1948 (W.A.), maintained that the resolution of 17 April had been designed merely to affect the period which remained until the termination of the Mandate. The only valid resolution of the Security Council on Palestine was that of 29 May (Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7), prohibiting the importation of arms during the cease-fire. Hence the termination of the cease-fire meant that the U.S. Government was free to export war materials to any state at its discretion.

No. 306

(1) Yaacov Shimoni, Deputy Director of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) See No. 209

and note 5 there. (3) Riyad al Sulh, Prime Minister of Lebanon. (4) Shukri al-Quwwatli, President of Syria.

No. 307

(1) No. 301.

No. 308

(1) See No. 298.

No. 309

(1) See No. 277, note 2. (2) Shertok replied that he fully concurred with Eban's views but doubted whether the Security Council could remove the Mediator, who was responsible to the General Assembly. (See Shertok to Eban, 12 July 1948, 93.01/2180/21).

No. 310

(1) The letter, dated 1 July 1948, is in file 93.08/375/17. Its contents are approximately the same as those of No. 226. (2) See No. 305 and note 5 there. (3) *Sic.* (4) See No. 305. (5) See No. 218 and note 9 there. (6) See No. 299. (7) In a message to the 51st Annual Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, which convened in Pittsburgh at the beginning of July, the President declared that "Israel should find its rightful place in the United Nations." (8) Sumner Welles, formerly (1937-43) U.S. Under Secretary of State. Vice-Chairman of the American Christian Palestine Committee. (9) The Statute of Westminster (1931) established the status of the British dominions as equal and independent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. (10) The Israeli delega-

tion was disappointed by the Canadian attitude in the designation debate. (See No. 284). In spite of prior indications that Canada would abstain, her representative cast a negative vote and was the only delegate to argue with some vehemence against the desired designation. (See Comay to Shertok, 8 July 1948, 93.03/128/7). (11) Canada, Australia and New Zealand. South Africa recognized Israel on 24 May 1948. (12) See No. 284. (13) Isaiah Berlin, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University. In 1942-45 he had been on the staff of the British Embassy in Washington. (14) No. 235. (15) The last paragraph was added by hand.

No. 312

(1) See No. 298.

No. 313

(1) See No. 304. Eban raised the matter in the Security Council on 13 July, in the course of the discussion following the Mediator's oral report. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 333rd Meeting, 13 July 1948, pp.13-14). (2) No. 303. (3) Untraced.

No. 315

(1) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 332nd Meeting, 8 July 1948, p.8. (2) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 307th meeting, 28 May 1948, p. 22. (3) Original reads, erroneously, "June".

No. 316

(1) Dean Rusk, Director of Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State. (2) See No. 314.

No. 317

(1) See No. 319.

No. 318

(1) Fischer replied on 14 July (93.03/127/9) that there had been no change in the attitude of France.

No. 319

(1) No. 317.

Editorial Note before No. 320 (Main Volume, p. 326)

Following the receipt of the Mediator's report, the Security Council discussed the Palestine situation during three consecutive days (13-15 July). [See "Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the Security Council", 12 July 1948, U.N. document S/888]. The Mediator also delivered an oral report and replied to questions of members of the Council. The American representative submitted a resolution determining that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace, ordering a cease-fire and extending the truce for an indefinite period. In case of non-compliance, the Security Council was to consider further action under Chapter VII of the Charter. (See Appendix F, part I, Main Volume, pp. 669-70). The British representative agreed to this formulation but proposed that the explicit reference to the Government of Israel be omitted. (The amendment was rejected). Another British amendment — the addition of the words "since 11 June 1948" in par. 7 — was adopted. The words "pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter" were omitted from the fourth paragraph. Furthermore, in the course of the discussions paragraphs 9 and 11 were added. Par. 9 was a compromise on a Chinese amendment, supported by the Arab representatives, calling on both parties to seek a solution "through mutual concessions both in regard to the

political organization of Palestine and in regard to immigration." (See Appendix F, part II).

No. 320

(1) Date as in incoming text. Outgoing text gives 14 July — presumably an error. (2) Eban to Shertok, 13 July 1948 (93.03/128/7). Eban transmitted the main points of the American resolution. (3) The last six words are missing in the outgoing but are included in the incoming text.

No. 321

(1) See No. 324.

No. 322

(1) Emanuel Celler, Congressman for the State of New York. (2) Scott W. Lucas, U.S. Senator for the State of Illinois. (3) Francis J. Myers, U.S. Senator for the State of Pennsylvania. (4) Philip B. Perlman.

No. 324

(1) No. 321. (2) See Nos. 325, 326. (3) The statement appeared in the Mediator's report to the Security Council of 12 July 1948 (U.N. document S/888, par. 30) and was repeated in his oral report on 13 July. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 333rd Meeting, 13 July 1948, p. 8). (4) Moshe Pearlman, Chief Army Spokesman and Commander of Press Liaison Unit, IDF. Director, Press Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (5) A statement to that effect was made by Eban in the Security Council. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 336th Meeting, 14 July 1948, p. 21).

No. 325

(1) See No. 324.

No. 326

(1) No. 324. (2) "Cease-fire" as distinguished from "truce". (3) The prohibition on the importation of war materials — see No. 324.

No. 327

(1) On 6 July 1948, members of the I.Z.L. entered the Jerusalem power station and detained five British employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation, including the acting manager, Thomas Bryant. The five, who were accused of cooperation with the enemy, were subsequently handed over to the Israeli authorities, who undertook to investigate the charges. (2) Untraced.

No. 328

(1) General Alphonse Juin, Governor-General of Morocco. (2) See No. 318. (3) Pierre Landy, the French Consul in Haifa. (4) One sentence not printed here. (5) See editorial note, pp. 83-4. (6) The third session of the General Conference of UNESCO was due to convene in Beirut in October 1948. (7) Untraced. (8) The French U.N. observer, Major Labrriere, was killed when his car struck a mine on the road between Lubiya and Sejera. (9) Last part of letter not printed here.

No. 329

(1) Eban to Shertok, 12 July 1948 (93.01/2180/21). Eban reported that Bunche considered the American draft resolution insufficiently strong to secure Arab acceptance.

No. 330

(1) Joseph Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee. (2) Shertok requested Proskauer to use his influence to secure a review of the American arms embargo and to urge the U.S. Government to give its full support to proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem. (See note from Lourie's secretary to Proskauer, 12 July 1948, 93.03/87/5). (3) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70.

No. 331

(1) The session of the Zionist General Council was postponed to the second week of August. (2) Alice Goldmann, wife of Nahum Goldmann. (3) Goldmann to Shertok, 16 July 1948, 130.09/2318/4. (4) See No. 126. (5) See No. 327. (6) Oliver Stanley, former Secretary of State for the Colonies, said in Parliament, that "the inability, or possibly the unwillingness, of the Jewish authorities to enforce any control over this terrorist organization raises serious doubts in the minds of people who up to now have kept open minds as to any claim they have for a separate state." (See *453 H.C. Deb.* 5s, Col. 1183). (7) Thomas M. Bryant, Acting General Manager of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation. (8) Avraham Reifenberg, Professor of Soil Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

No. 333

(1) See Lie to Shertok, 15 July 1948, 130.02/2424/21. For text of resolution see Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. (2) Israel's conditions for an extension of the truce were transmitted to the Mediator at a meeting which took place on 7 July and were made public on the following day. (See announcement of the Government of Israel about its reply to the Mediator's proposal, 8 July 1948, 130.02/2424/20). (3) The truce took

effect on Sunday, 18 July 1948, at 3 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time, 7 p.m. Israel summer time.

No. 334

(1) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. (2) See No. 333. (3) Belgium, France and the United States, whose consuls in Jerusalem constituted the Security Council Truce Commission.

No. 335

(1) Untraced. (2) See No. 338. (3) A copy of the letter was sent to Linton in London. (4) Sentence added by hand. (5) No addition to this letter has been traced.

No. 336

(1) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. See also editorial note, pp. 668-70.

No. 337

(1) No. 334. (2) See editorial note, pp. 113-4. (3) See No. 333, note 3. (4) No. 338.

No. 338

(1) A summary of the conversation was transmitted by telegram on the same day. (See Comay to Shertok, 16 July 1948, 93.01/2180/21).

No. 339 (Hebrew)

(1) At the beginning of June, Hungary informed Israel through the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington of its decision to recognize Israel. A formal request for Hungarian recognition was transmitted only on 9 June. (See Epstein to Shertok, 3 June 1948, 93.03/72/16; Shertok to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 June 1948, 130.02/2424/20). (2) Zionist Labour Party. (3) The following appointments were made in January 1949: Ehud Avriel — the Minister in Czechoslovakia — was also appointed (non-resident) Minister in Hungary. Shmuel Bentsur (Peterfy) — Consul and First Secretary.

No. 340

(1) Dated 17 July 1948 (93.01/2180/21). Eban requested clarification with regard to the last sentence in the reply of the Israeli Government to the Security Council's cease-fire resolution — see No. 333. (2) No. 334.

No. 341

(1) See Bernadotte to Shertok, 16 July 1948, 130. 02/2424/21. (2) Shertok to Eban, 18 July 1948, 130.09/2329/1. Shertok transmitted the text of his reply to the Mediator's telegram: "We agree cease-fire at time fixed by you and shall issue orders this effect soon as hear from you that other side has also agreed."

No. 342

(1) In the course of the cease-fire discussion in the Security Council, the Syrian representative proposed that the International Court of Justice be asked to give an advisory opinion on the international status of Palestine after the termination of the British Mandate. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 334th Meeting, 13 July

1948, pp. 52-4). (2) In November 1947, the U.N. General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine rejected by 21 votes against 20 a proposal to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion with regard to the United Nations' competence to enforce partition. See also *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, No. 51 and note 4 there. (3) Actually, the International Court of Justice at The Hague is one of the Principal Organs of the U.N. (4) See No. 371.

No. 343

(1) The Chairman of the Truce Commission in Jerusalem, Jean Nieuwenhuys, sent several sharp-worded messages to the President of the Security Council concerning the arrest of the five employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation (see No. 327, note 1) and the seizure of King David Hotel by Israeli forces. (The hotel was situated in the Red Cross security zone and during the truce had been used by the U.N. observers. After its evacuation by the observers on the expiration of the truce, the Truce Commission wished to establish its headquarters there). [See U.N. documents S/891, S/898, S/900 and S/905]. (2) See statement of spokesman of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 15 July 1948, 130.02/2444/18. (3) Telegram of 12 July 1948 (130.09/2329/22), in which Shertok described what were in his opinion the underlying reasons for the desire of members of the Truce Commission to establish their headquarters in the King David Hotel. (4) Members of the Israeli mission to the U.N. advised against initiating a discussion of the matter in the Security Council because the Council was likely to defend its commission and the delegations of the countries involved (Belgium, France and the U.S., whose consuls were members of the Truce Commission) were likely to defend their consuls. They suggested that consultations with the three delegations should precede a public protest to the Security Council or to the press, preferably the latter. (See Comay to Shertok, 19 July 1948, 93.01/2180/21). Shertok replied that he had not intended to raise the question in the Security Council but to submit a written communication. (See

Shertok to Comay, 21 July 1948, 93.03/94/10). The protest was transmitted in the form of a letter from Eban to the President of the Security Council, of 19 July 1948 (published as U.N. document S/922 of 27 July 1948). For a slightly different version of this letter, dated 22 July ("for release Sunday, 25 July"), see file 93.08/377/8.

No. 344

(1) Count Charreyron notified the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Transjordanian Government had agreed to evacuate the French institutions occupied by its forces provided the Israeli forces acted likewise. (Note in file 130.02/2413/11). See also No. 111; No. 122. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 4 above).

No. 345

(1) See Secretary-General of the Arab League to the President of the Security Council, 18 July 1948, U.N. document S/908.
(2) Mistake in original: reference is to the policy outlined by Eliahu Sasson in an interview given on 20 June. (See Comay to Shertok, 21 July 1948, 93.03/94/10). The principal points were: a) No Arab refugees will be allowed to return to Jewish-held territory until permanent peace treaties are signed. b) Payment of compensation for abandoned Arab property will be conditional on Arab agreement to pay adequate reparations for Jewish property losses. c) Returning Arabs will be screened by the Israeli authorities and will have to signify their willingness to abide by Israel's laws and to acknowledge its authority. d) Arabs remaining in Israel will be allowed to leave if they wish. (See *New York Herald Tribune,* 21 June 1948). (3) See No. 357.

No. 346

(1) No. 218. (2) At the session of the World Jewish Congress, at the end of June. (3) See No. 327, note 1.

(4) See Goldmann to Shertok, 21 July 1948, 130.09/2318/4.
(5) Shertok rejected Goldmann's arguments. He maintained that there was no doubt as to the guilt of some of the detainees, though there might not be sufficient evidence to secure a conviction or even to bring charges against them. He told Goldmann that "the less fuss made your end publicly the better." (See telegram of 23 July 1948, 130.09/2318/1). (6) Last sentence added by hand.

No. 347 (Hebrew)

(1) The Security Council. (2) Mahmud Nuqrashi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt. (3) Brigadier I.N. Clayton, Minister at the British Embassy in Cairo, in charge of relations with the Arab League.

No. 348

(1) See No. 343 and note 4 there. (2) John MacDonald, U.S. Consul-General in Jerusalem. (3) Replying to a question in Parliament on 14 July, McNeil ascribed responsibility for the abduction to "a terrorist organization." (See *453 H.C. Deb.* 5s, col. 1183). (4) Henry Clinton Reed, Advisor in U.S. delegation to U.N. (5) See Nos. 345, 357.

No. 349

(1) See No. 342 and note 1 there.

No. 352

(1) Untraced. (2) For text of the Arab states' replies see note from Reedman to Shertok, 19 July 1948 (93.03/94/10).
(3) Shaul Meirov (Avigur), Shertok's brother-in-law.

(4) Kibbutz Hatzerim. (5) The villages were occupied in the course of operation *Shoter,* at the end of July. (6) See No. 350. (7) Resourcefulness, deftness (Russian). (8) David Horowitz, Director-General of the Ministry of Finance. (9) Joseph Schwartz, European Director of the Joint Distribution Committee. (10) Mordecai Namir, see No. 374. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 15 above). (11) Letter dated 30 June 1932. It was first published in *Davar* on 30 June 1948. See also H. Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary,* pp.331-42.

No. 354

(1) As Director of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. (2) Selim Sarper, Permanent Representative of Turkey at the U.N. (3) Ahmet Sükrü Esmer, Turkish journalist, Director of Turkish Information Office, New York. (4) Turkish daily, organ of the Republican People's Party.

No. 355

(1) No. 328. (2) André Philip, prominent member of the pro-Zionist group in the French National Assembly. Held economic and financial posts in several French Cabinets after the Second World War. (3) See No. 351. (4) Last section of document not printed here. It concerns the possible appointment of Marc Jarblum, President of the French Zionist Federation, as adviser to the Israeli Mission in Paris.

No. 357

(1) Comay to Shertok, 21 July 1948, 93.03/94/10. Comay sent clarifications with regard to his telegram of 19 July (No. 345; see also note 2 there).

No. 358

(1) Draft dated "Rhodes, 13.7.48." (2) On the same day, Shertok cabled to Eban a summary of the Mediator's suggestions, noting that in his opinion they did not constitute a basis for discussion, particularly in view of paragraphs 13, 14 and 16 "and general enthroning of [Truce] Commission as supreme authority." He added that the whole issue now appeared in a different context in view of the truce. (See telegram of 22 July 1948 in file 130.09/2329/1). The Government discussed the Mediator's suggestions on 25 July — and decided to reject them. It also decided to extend the authority of the State of Israel and the application of its laws to Jerusalem and to appoint a Military Governor for the city. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 25 July 1948).

No. 359

(1) See No 239. (2) See No. 358. (3) No. 378.
(4) Thus in original (two paragraphs "3"). (5) See No. 347. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 13 above).
(6) Sir Frederick Maurice, British military historian.
(7) See No. 282, par. 6. (8) In the course of the Security Council's discussions on the American draft resolution (see editorial note, pp. 113-4), the representative of the U.S.S.R. said, *inter alia*, that the formulation of two paragraphs in the draft was inconsistent with the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 and paved the way for the reconsideration of the whole Palestine problem. Following the rejection of a Soviet amendment, the Soviet representative abstained in the voting on several paragraphs and on the resolution as a whole. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 336th Meeting, 14 July 1948, pp. 26-34; 338th Meeting, 15 July 1948). (9) Joseph Zevi Dushinsky, Rabbi of the Ashkenazic Jewish (ultra orthodox) community in Jerusalem.
(10) See No. 64, note 2.

No. 360

(1) Message concerning the coming into effect of the cease-fire (130.02/2424/21). (2) Shertok wrote in the margin of this document: "Does this require an answer? If so, what should I say with regard to the last paragraph? I don't want to express readiness to negotiate or even the hope to meet him soon because experience has shown that he makes use of such civilities for political purposes. It is therefore preferable not to reply at all if this will not be regarded as a discourtesy. Please consider. M[oshe] Sh[ertok], 22.VII." Leo Kohn replied on the same day: "I think that courtesy demands that you should reply to this telegram. On the other hand, I consider that for the reasons you indicate your reply should not react to the last paragraph. I therefore suggest that your reply should read as follows: 'Have honour acknowledge receipt your telegram twenty-second. Observers and their staff will be accorded every facility and assistance by Israeli authorities in discharge their responsibilities.'" Walter Eytan added: "I agree to this formulation."

No. 361

(1) One sentence not printed here. (2) Hafez Afifi Pasha, Egyptian economist. Chairman of Banque Misr. Formerly (1946) member of the Egyptian mission at the U.N.

No. 362

(1) Golda Meyerson was injured in a road accident while on a visit to the U.S.

No. 363

(1) He had attended a meeting of the Consultative Council of the Western Union.

No. 364

(1) Yakov Malik, Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. at the U.N. (2) See No. 362 and note 1 there.

No. 365

(1) David Ferdman, businessman, active in Jewish and Zionist affairs in Belgium. (2) Fernand van Langenhove, Permanent Representative of Belgium at the U.N.

No. 366

(1) Charles Knox, appointed Counsellor in U.S. Mission in Israel. (2) Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. (3) The letter was subsequently published in McDonald's book, *My Mission to Israel,* pp. 16-17. (4) See No. 192 and note 1 there. (5) Herbert Cummings, official in U.S. Department of Commerce. Name missing in original.

No. 367

(1) No. 346. (2) See editorial note, pp. 113-4. (3) The Mediator made a statement to this effect in reply to Eban's question in the course of the Security Council's discussion of the Mediator's report. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 333rd Meeting, 13 July 1948, pp. 13-14). (4) See No. 372. (5) Fischer to Eban, 22 July 1948, 93.01/2180/21 (identical with No. 363). (6) See No. 365.

No. 368

(1) Linton to Eban, 23 July 1948, 93.01/2180/22. Linton reported that he had raised the question of the Cyprus detainees

at the Foreign Office. He inquired whether Shertok would agree to their evacuation under the supervision of the Mediator. (The last sentence in the telegram is garbled). (2) See editorial note, p. 63.

Editorial Note before No. 369 (Main Volume, pp. 392-3)

On 23 July 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel published a statement concerning the reopening of the Haifa oil refineries. For (English) text see editorial note, Main Volume, pp. 392-3.

No. 369

(1) See editorial note above and Main Volume, pp. 392-3.

No. 370

(1) Bernstein instructed Gass to try to get offers from suitable sources of crude oil. (See telegram of 23 July 1948, 93.03/129/11). (2) Bernstein replied: "First — agree; please emphasize provisional character our present limited programme. Second — being done. Third — doing so; please approach them also your side. Fourth — we also trying this direction; prospects not bad. Fifth — agree; cable to whom offer should be made. Sixth — conform. Seventh — above after Shertok consulted have given instructions to approach eastern sources [...]. Agree taking no decision before reply American companies received." (Bernstein to Gass, [received] 27 July 1948, 93.03/129/11).

No. 371

(1) See No. 342. A similar telegram was sent to Eban (23 July 1948, 93.03/2180/22). (2) One sentence not printed here.

No. 372

(1) See No. 342 and note 1 there. (2) Eban to Shertok, 23 July 1948, 93.03/72/16).

No. 373

(1) George Ignatieff, member of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. (2) See No. 247 and note 3 there. (3) See editorial note, pp. 113-4. (4) No. 282. (5) See Mediator's Suggestions of 27 June 1948 — No. 239.

No. 374 (Hebrew)

(1) No report of this interview has been traced. Namir was sent to Rumania on a special assignment in order to negotiate oil purchases and to try to attain permission for the resumption of immigration from Rumania. There had been no legal immigration from Rumania after the departure of the *Pan* ships in December 1947. (See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 40; Main Volume, No. 58). (2) Arie (Ricu) Lupescu (Lufi), emissary of Mosad le Aliya (Haganah immigration organization) in Rumania under the assumed name of Mendelson.

No. 375

(1) See Nos. 348, 357.

No. 376

(1) Presumably No. 368.

No. 377

(1) Untraced. (2) Interviews with the President and Secretary of State — see Nos. 383, 399.

No. 378

(1) No. 282. Shertok had deliberately delayed his reply "with a view to avoiding giving a lease on life on our part to his mission." (See Shertok to Eban, 26 July 1948, 130.09/2329/1). (2) No. 266. (3) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 157, and Main Volume, p. 786.

No. 379

(1) The first and last parts of the letter as well as a postscript dated 26 July are not printed here. (2) Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(3) Reference is apparently to the draft constitution prepared by Leo Kohn. Enclosure untraced. (4) See No. 328.
(5) France was at the time in the midst of a government crisis. On the following day, 26 July, Robert Schuman succeeded Georges Bidault as Minister of Foreign Affairs. (6) One paragraph not printed here. (7) Untraced. (8) No. 371.

No. 380

(1) See No. 324 and note 3 there. (2) Ben-Gurion made this statement in the Provisional Council of State. (See Provisional Council of State, *Record of Discussions,* I, 11th Session, 22 July 1948, pp. 9-10. (3) No. 378. (4) See No. 289.
(5) No. 358. (6) See No. 389. (7) See No. 352 and note 5 there. (8) Untraced. (9) Mistake in original ("Douglas").

No. 381

(1) No. 388. Copy in file dated 28 July. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 15 above). (2) Last part of paragraph not printed here.

No. 382

(1) No. 361. (2) Eban to Shertok, 23 July 1948, 93.03/72/16 (identical with No. 372).

No. 384

(1) See No. 370, note 2. (2) Robert H. Eakens. (3) Gordon H. Mattison. (4) No. 385. (5) Gass learned from his conversations with representatives of the two companies that they strongly desired the reopening of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline to Haifa, but would also be prepared to deliver crude oil by tanker. Both emphasized the need to get the consent of the management to the reopening of the refineries and to secure the cooperation of the British oil companies. (See Gass to Bernstein, 28 July 1948, 93.03/129/11).

No. 385

(1) No. 195.

No. 386

(1) The telegram relates to the Mediator's statement to Shertok (see No. 380, p. 414) that the Government of Israel was free to appeal to the Security Council against his ruling that the cease-fire resolution decreed a numerical limitation on the number of men of military age entering Israel. (See telegram of 27 July 1948 in file 130.09/2329/1).

Editorial Note before No. 387 (Main Volume, p. 422)

At the request of the British representative, the Security Council discussed the detention of the five British employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation. (See No. 327 and note 1 there). The British representative submitted a draft resolution supporting the demand of the Truce Commission for release of the detained persons and their surrender to the Commission. The discussion was adjourned without the draft resolution being put to the vote. (See *SCOR, Third Year*, 340th Meeting, 27 July 1948, pp. 34-50).

No. 387

(1) On 27 July the five detainees were remanded by a Tel Aviv magistrate for a period of fifteen days (see No. 395). Following the discussion in the Security Council, the British delegation again approached Eban, urging that the judicial proceedings be accelerated. (See Shertok — Eban exchange of telegrams, 28-30 July 1948, 93.03/72/30).

No. 388 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 380 and note 2 there.

No. 389

(1) See No. 380. (2) No. 358.

No. 390

(1) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. (2) See No. 380.

No. 391

(1) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 340th Meeting, 27 July 1948, p. 35. The reference in the document is to the provisional records of the Security Council.

No. 392

(1) Refers specifically to the seizure of a building belonging to the Capuchin monastery by the Israeli forces and its use as a military convalescent home. The French Consul protested that the Israeli authorities had failed to obtain the consent of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shertok replied that the Consul himself had agreed that the building be used for that purpose. (See Fischer to Shertok, 28 July 1948, 130.09/2329/23; Shertok to Fischer, 5 August 1948, 130.02/2413/11). (2) The St. Joseph Convent and church in the village of Abu Gosh, west of Jerusalem. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs tried to obtain the evacuation of the building or at least to have restrictions imposed on its use by Israeli forces. (See Shertok to the Jerusalem District Commander, 30 June 1948, 130.02/2413/11). (3) Possibly No. 385.

No. 393 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 380. (2) Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 666-7.

No. 394

(1) See No. 193. (2) See No. 399.

No. 395

(1) See No. 387. (2) No 391. (3) Eventually, charges were brought against only two of the suspects. They were tried by

the Jerusalem District Court, which found one of them (Frederick Sylvester) guilty and sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment. Sylvester appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision and orderd the release of the appellant.

No. 396

(1) See No. 405.

No. 397

(1) I.e., the Governments of Belgium, France and the United States; members of their armed forces served as observers on the U.N. truce supervision organization. (2) See No. 426.

No. 398

(1) See text in No. 403. (2) Rule 58 provides that a state which desires to become a member of the U.N. shall submit an application to the Secretary-General containing a declaration that it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter. (3) See No. 427.

No. 399

(1) Epstein was received by President Truman on 29 July 1948 on the occasion of assuming his post as Special Representative of Israel in Washington. He was received at the express wish of the President and not in accordance with standard protocol. (See Epstein to Shertok, 2 July 1948, 130.09/2308/6). (2) See No. 378. (3) See No. 394.

No. 400

(1) Fischer had earlier informed Shertok that French opinion was disturbed by what was seen as a Jewish claim to Jerusalem. Fischer had given assurances that to the best of his knowledge Israel's attitude (support for internationalization) was unchanged; he asked Shertok for confirmation. (See Fischer to Shertok, 28 July 1948, 130.09/2329/23). (2) See No. 200 and note 3 there. (3) See No. 358 and note 2 there. (4) The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of the contents of this telegram — see No. 454.

No. 401

(1) Bernstein replied that efforts to restart production by the Haifa refineries on a normal basis through the Mediator might take months. He asked Gass to inquire into the possibility of obtaining American crude oil, adding that he would not be able to delay much longer negotiations with East European sources since stocks of crude oil in Haifa were almost exhausted — see also No. 404. (See telegram of 3 August 1948, 93.01/2207/1).

No. 402

(1) Léon Blum had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister in the Cabinet of André Marie. (2) The rest of the letter is not printed here.

No. 403

(1) Andrew J.L. McNaughton, Permanent Representative of Canada at the U.N. (2) Article 4 deals with the admission of new members to the U.N. It states that membership is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able

and willing to carry out these obligations. (3) See also memorandum entitled "The admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations", 2 August 1948, 93.03/72/16.

No. 404

(1) See No. 384 and note 5 there.

No. 405

(1) Shertok to Eban, 1 August 1948, 93.03/94/11. Shertok requested information concerning British intentions to raise the refugee question in the Security Council. (See No. 396).

No. 406

(1) The letter was published as U.N. document S/949. The date given there is 30 July 1948. (2) See No. 390. (3) See No. 380. (4) See No. 345.

No. 407

(1) See No. 399.

No. 408

(1) Heinz Graetz, owner of a shipping agency. He was then conducting trade negotiations in France on behalf of the Government of Israel. (2) Graetz to Shertok, 23 July 1948 (130.09/2329/23). Graetz reported on conversations he had had in the Vatican, where he had found unanimity as to the need to give an international status to Jerusalem. He expected to meet Domenico Tardini, Vatican Acting Secretary of State, and requested Shertok to send his comments.

Editorial Note before No. 409 (Main Volume, p. 445)

On 2 August, the British representative in the Security Council initiated a discussion on the problems of the Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe and on the Palestinian Arab refugees. He proposed that the Council draw the attention of the Mediator to the gravity of the Arab refugee problem and that the international Red Cross be requested to send a mission to the Middle East to examine the scope of the problem and formulate recommendations. The representative of Israel stated that the problem of the Arab refugees was being discussed between the Mediator and the Israeli Government, and announced that he intended to raise the matter of the Cyprus internees in the Council. In his summing up the President of the Council declared that the parties involved and the Mediator should be requested to supply information on all questions which had been raised. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 343rd Meeting, 2 August 1948).

No. 409

(1) See editorial note above and No. 405. (2) See editorial note, p. 130).

No. 410

(1) See No. 287. The supply of water to Jerusalem through the old pipe was not resumed during the second truce because of the impossibility of repairing the pumping station situated in no man's land near Latrun. (2) See No. 422 (par. g).
(3) No reply by Shertok has been found, but see No. 422.

No. 412

(1) See Nos. 394, 399. (2) See No. 82. (3) Untraced.
(4) Correspondence untraced. (5) See No. 394.

(6) The State Department did not reply to this letter — see No. 482.

No. 413

(1) Postscript to letter of 2 August (not printed here).
(2) Albert Vanthier, in charge of Palestine affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From November 1948 — French Consul in Tel Aviv. (3) Last paragraph not printed here.

No. 414

(1) Mme Mayer, wife of the French Minister of Defence René Mayer, visited Israel in July 1948.

No. 415

(1) Enclosed with Fischer's letter to Hirsch of 4 August 1948. (2) The fate of the former Italian colonies was discussed by representatives of the great powers in 1947-48. The attitude of the Soviet Union was the most favourable from the Italian point of view: she proposed U.N. trusteeships with Italy as trustee. In 1949 the U.N. was asked to decide the issue.

Editorial Note before No. 416 (Main Volume, p. 453)

(1) Eliahu Sasson, Director of the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, went to Paris at the beginning of July in order to establish contacts with official and other Arab representatives, which, it was hoped, might lead to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Sasson was accompanied by a group of assistants, including Zalman (Ziama) Selikson (Shmuel Divon) and Tuvia Arazi. (See Sasson to Shimoni, 30 June 1948, 130.15/3749/1).

No. 416

(1) Sasson reported that the Transjordanian Minister had come to Paris "to exchange views with me and investigate possibilities understanding." (See Sasson to Shimoni, 3 August 1948, 130.09/2329/23). (2) Untraced. (3) See No. 428.

No. 417

(1) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 320th Meeting, 15 June 1948, pp. 5-6. Reference in document is to the provisional records of the Security Council. (2) The Appendix is not printed here. For French amendment see No. 260 and note 3 there. (3) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 333rd Meeting, 13 July 1948, p. 18. (4) Quotation from the Mediator's report to the Security Council of 12 July 1948 (U.N. document S/888). (5) David Rees-Williams, Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Colonies. (6) See reference in note 3 above.

No. 418

(1) See No. 366 and note 3 there. (2) According to Crum, who had been a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine in 1946, Bevin had promised to accept the Committee's recommendations. (See Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain,* p. 61). (3) I.e., the recommendation to allow 100,000 Jews into Palestine. (4) For details of McDonald's meeting with Bevin see James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel,* pp. 23-6. (5) Michael Wright, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office.

No. 419

(1) See No. 404; No. 401, note 1. (2) See No. 424. The meeting took place at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Tel Aviv.

No. 420

(1) The resolution of the U.N. General Assembly providing for the appointment of a Mediator for Palestine — see *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 157, and Main Volume, p. 786. (2) On the following day, Eban informed Shertok that, according to Bunche, the Mediator had abandoned his proposal to put Jerusalem under Arab rule. (See telegram of 6 August 1948, 93.01/2180/22).

No. 422

(1) See No. 410.

No. 423

(1) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 14.
(2) Shabtai Rowson (Rosenne), Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 424

(1) Shertok made this statement in the course of a press conference in Tel Aviv, on 2 August, with reference to the occupation of Bir Asluj by Egyptian forces after the cease-fire went into effect. Shertok said that he had informed the chief of the truce observers in Haifa that if the Egyptians continued to violate the truce, "we shall be free to undertake drastic action not only at Bir Asluj but against any Egyptian position we choose." (See *Davar,* 3 August 1948). (2) See Provisional Council of State, *Record of Discussions,* I, 12th Session, 29 July 1948, pp. 5-6. (3) *Sic.* (4) Sir Raphael Cilento, Director of Social Activities Division, U.N. Secretariat. (5) See No. 406. (6) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 157 and Main Volume, p. 786. (7) See Nos. 358,389.

(8) See Joseph to Nieuwenhuys, 3 August 1948, 130.02/2443/2. Joseph explained the Israeli attitude to the proposed demilitarization of Jerusalem. For a similar explanation by Shertok see below. (9) See No. 389. (10) See No. 397. (11) Colonel Nils Brunsson, Chief U.N. Observer in Jerusalem. (12) Five British planes were made available to the Mediator and his staff together with their crews. Their engagement by the U.N. was the subject of widespread criticism in Israel. (13) Letter untraced. (14) Reference is apparently to a meeting which took place on 26 July, although the question of food supplies for Jerusalem is not mentioned in the minutes of the meeting nor in the relevant telegram to Eban of 26 July (93.03/94/10). (15) Mistake in original ("July"). (16) See No. 156, par. 6 (viii). (17) Mistake in original ("May"). (18) A number of paragraphs relating to a certain U.N. observer are not printed here. (19) See No. 245. (20) See No. 380. (21) See No. 431.

No. 425

(1) See Douglas to Secretary of State, 2 August 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1266-71.

No. 426

(1) See No. 397. (2) Reference is apparently to the chapter dealing with Jerusalem in the U.N. General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947.

No. 427

(1) Venezuela, Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

No. 428

(1) See No. 416. These instructions were received after Sasson and the Transjordanian Minister in London had had two further meetings. In the course of these conversations Sasson reviewed developments from the Israeli point of view. He reported home that he had established friendly relations with the Transjordanian representative. (See Sasson to Shimoni, 3 August 1948, 130.15/3749/1).

No. 429

(1) See No. 212. (2) France was among the founding states of the U.N. and India was admitted as a member at a time when provisional governments were in office in these countries.

No. 430

(1) No. 429. (2) Nos. 398, 421. (3) See No. 364. (4) See Nos. 372, 403. (5) See No. 427. (6) See memorandum "Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations", 18 August 1948 (93.03/72/16). For main points of memorandum see No. 448. (7) See "The admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations", 2 August 1948 (93.03/72/16).

No. 431

(1) See No. 424, Main Volume, p. 486. (2) Only the Egyptian Government replied, absolutely rejecting the proposal. (See Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release No. 3, 20 August 1948, 130.02/2410/1).

No. 432

(1) Shertok to Eban, 6 August 1948 (130.09/2329/1). The telegram contains the text of No. 431. (2) This section provides that the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means — negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration etc. (3) President of the Security Council (Representative of the U.S.S.R., Y. Malik).

No. 433

(1) No. 421 (with regard to the proposal of J. Ross, that Israeli representatives sound the attitude of Soviet representatives to the suggested simultaneous admission of Israel and Transjordan to the U.N.). (2) With the representative of Transjordan. (See editorial note, p. 136).

No. 434

(1) The issue is not mentioned in extant reports of conversations with the Mediator, but see No. 168, par. 8. (2) See No. 481.

No. 435

(1) No. 431.

No. 436 (Hebrew)

(1) B.S. Shitreet, Minister of Police and Minorities in the Provisional Government. (2) The League for National Liberation in Palestine — an Arab Communist party founded in the early 1940s. Following the capture of central Galilee and Nazareth by Israeli forces, the United Workers Party (Mapam) established

relations with the League and put it in control of the newly opened labour exchange in Nazareth. (See Shimoni to Sasson, 19 August 1948, 130.15/2570/11).

No. 437

(1) Shertok instructed Sasson to continue his endeavours to establish contact with other Arab representatives, without awaiting the outcome of his talks with the representative of Transjordan. (See Shimoni to Sasson, 13 August 1948, 130.09/2329/23).

No. 438

(1) No 432. (2) See No. 439.

No. 439

(1) No 432.

No. 440

(1) José Arce, Permanent Representative of Argentina at the U.N.

No. 441

(1) See No. 431. (2) Jamil Mardam, Prime Minister of Syria. In the 1930s he had on several occasions met with Zionist leaders and representatives, including Shertok. (3) General William E. Riley, Chief of the American truce observers in Palestine; at the end of September he was appointed Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Observation Organization. (4) Yosef Shnurman (Shani), Liaison Officer with the truce observers in Jerusa-

lem. (5) Jonah John Adler, Liaison Officer with the truce observers in Jerusalem. (6) Zvi H. Wax, Military Secretary to the Military Governor of Jerusalem. (7) The two villages are situated in the Latrun area. The U.N. Truce Observation Organization demanded their evacuation by Israeli forces as a prerequisite for the reactivation of the Latrun water pumping station. (8) See also No. 452. Actually, the Arab Legion did not evacuate its positions in no man's land and the agreement was not honoured. In reply to a further inquiry by Shertok, the Mediator informed him that the Arab Legion Commander in Jerusalem had assured him that the two positions would be evacuated immediately and that the truce observers had already reported the evacuation of one position. He had instructed the observers to request immediate withdrawal from the other position. The Mediator appealed to Shertok to do whatever possible to stop firing in Jerusalem. (See exchange of telegrams between Shertok and Bernadotte, 18 August 1948, 130.02/2425/1).

No. 442

(1) Sobolev to Eban, 3 August 1948 (93.03/94/6); see editorial note, p. 135. (2) In June 1945, Harrison was sent on a mission by President Truman in order to investigate the situation of homeless Displaced Persons, and especially of Jewish Displaced Persons in Germany. (3) No. 406. (4) No. 417.

No. 443

(1) Joseph C. Satterthwaite. (2) Gordon H. Mattison. (3) Robert H. Eakens. (4) Nos. 195, 385. (5) See No. 450 and Bernstein's telegram to Gass of 12 August 1948 (93.01/2207/1), in which he reported a shortage of crude oil.

No. 444

(1) No. 433. (2) Transjordan. (3) Reference is possibly to the talk with Y. Malik on 5 August — see No. 447.

No. 445

(1) See No. 430, note 7. (2) Fischer telegraphed in reply that the question of Israel's admission to the U.N. had not yet been studied by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but that according to his information it would be considered favourably, though not before the beginning of September. (See Fischer to Eban, 13 August 1948, 93.03/127/9).

No. 446

(1) B. Shiva Rao, Indian journalist, member of the Indian delegation to the U.N. (2) Sir Benegal Rama Rau.

No. 447

(1) The representative of Syria.

No. 448

(1) See No. 430 and note 7 there. (2) Of the U.N. Charter. (3) See No. 403.

No. 449

(1) See advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, 28 May 1948, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48,* pp. 796-801. (2) The Second Special Session of the U.N. General

Assembly, which convened in April 1948 to discuss the Palestine question and the American proposal for a temporary trusteeship regime.

No. 450

(1) No. 443. (2) See No. 460 and telegram from Epstein and Gass of 18 August 1948 (130.09/2308/6). They pointed out that the negotiations with the State Department with regard to the supply and refining of oil had been conducted since June on lines agreed upon with Shertok. They asked Shertok to inform them whether he wished to reverse the instructions, although such a reversal would result in the termination of the conversations with the State Department and the American oil companies. See also further telegram from Epstein to Shertok, of same date, *ibid.* (3) See No. 424, Main Volume, pp. 483-4.

Editorial Note before No. 451 (Main Volume, p. 518)

During the night of 11/12 August, an Arab unit blew up the pumping station in no man's land near Latrun, thus preventing resumption of the water supply to Jerusalem through the old pipe. On the following day, the Mediator informed the Security Council that he had authorized the Israeli Government to postpone compliance with his decision with regard to the evacuation of the two Arab villages, which he had formerly made a prerequisite for the renewal of pumping by the Latrun station. (See No. 441 and note 7 there). For the Mediator's communication see U.N. document S/963.

The matter was discussed by the Security Council on 13 August. The Council instructed the President to inform the Mediator that it had taken note of his telegram and to ask him to make all efforts to ensure the water supply to the population of Jerusalem. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 349th Meeting, 13 August 1948).

No. 451

(1) On the preceding day, Shertok had telegraphed to Eban the text of his communication to the President of the Security Council concerning the destruction of the Latrun pumping station — see editorial note above. (Telegram in file 130.09/2329/1).

No. 452

(1) The Mediator made this statement when he was interviewed by newspaper correspondents at Haifa airport on 11 August, before his departure abroad. (See "Points from Count Bernadotte's conversation with journalists" in file 130.02/2425/1).
(2) See No. 441. (3) The letter is in file 130.02/2443/2. (4) See Joseph to Riley, 13 August 1948, 130.02/2443/2.

No. 453

(1) The first part of the document is not printed here. It relates to a scheduled visit of police representatives to the British Consulate in Haifa for the purpose of clarifying certain questions with regard to members of the Consulate's staff and to weapons held by them. (2) The management of the Haifa oil refineries — see editorial note, p. 126. (3) Sir Hugh Dow, the British Consul-General in Jerusalem.

No. 454

(1) See No. 400 and note 1 there. (2) Neuville had protested against the alleged removal of the Soeurs de Sion from their convent in Ein Karem, near Jerusalem. When he learned that the complaint was unfounded, he withdrew his protest and apologized. (See exchange of telegrams between Fischer and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 11-12 August 1948, 130.10/2540/3).
(3) See No. 413.

No. 455

(1) See editorial note, p. 145. (2) The Security Council was due to meet on that day to continue its discussions on the maintenance of the truce in Palestine — see No. 464 and note 2 there. In his reply to this telegram, Shertok stated that the Mediator was presumably in touch with the Security Council with regard to the supply of new machinery for the Latrun pumping station. (See Shertok to Eban, 17 August 1948, 130.09/2329/1).

No. 456

(1) See No. 451. (2) At the opening session of the Union of Poalei-Zion-Hitahdut (Zionist Labour Party), on 14 August 1948, Ben-Gurion declared that Israel could not agree indefinitely to a truce without a time limit. He said that if the U.N. was unable to secure peace within a short period of time, Israel would have to achieve this goal through her own resources. (See *Davar,* 15 August 1948). (3) Reference is presumably to an interview which Shertok gave to the correspondent of the *New York Daily Worker,* in the course of which he criticized the basic approach of the Mediator and his suggestions for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He declared that these suggestions put a premium on aggression. The interview was published in the *Palestine Post* of 13 August 1948. (4) See No. 464.

No. 458

(1) For a report on the meeting with Schuman see No. 454. A report on the meeting with Guy Mollet, Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party, is attached to this letter but is not printed here. (2) Marc Sangnier, Honorary President of the M.R.P., Co-President of the French Committee for the recognition of Israel. (3) Last part of letter not printed.

No. 459

(1) Zvi Infeld, Secretary-General of the Zionist Federation of South Africa. (2) See No. 338. (3) See No. 425. (4) See No. 399. (5) The Royal Institute of International Affairs. (6) See No. 418.

No. 460

(1) See Nos. 443, 450. (2) No. 385.

No. 462

(1) See No. 437.

No. 463

(1) Yehoshua Behar (Shai), Director-General of the Ministry of Immigration. (2) Eban reported on the same day that the Mediator had complained to the U.N. Secretary-General about the excessive proportion of men of military age among the immigrants, and had asked him to draw the attention of the governments concerned to this matter. Lie, he reported, had advised the Mediator to reach an understanding with the Government of Israel or to ask the Security Council for a definite ruling. (See Eban to Shertok, 18 August 1948, 130.09/2337/7).

No. 464

(1) No. 456. (2) On 18 August, the Security Council discussed the Palestine truce. The representatives of the U.S. and Canada criticized the Israeli demand that a time limit be fixed for the truce. The representative of Israel declared that Israel would observe the truce as long as it remained in force, but urged the

Council to fix a time limit and to press the parties concerned to undertake direct peace negotiations before the expiration of the truce. No resolution was adopted. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 352nd Meeting, 16 August 1948).

No. 465

(1) Uriel Heydt (Heyd), Assistant to Special Representative of Israel in Washington. (2) Gordon H. Mattison. (3) See No. 383. (4) See No. 470. (5) Cf. report on this conversation in *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1316-17.

No. 466

(1) Lourie to Shertok, 16 August 1948 (130.09/2337/7). Lourie requested information on the results of James McDonald's interview with the Pope. (2) Cardinal Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York. President, Catholic Near East Welfare Association. (3) See also James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel,* pp. 32-5.

No. 467

(1) On 19 August, the Security Council, on request of the Mediator, discussed truce violations in Jerusalem. The Council adopted a resolution directing the attention of the parties to their obligations in accordance with the Council's resolution of 15 July 1948. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 354th Meeting, 19 August 1948).

No. 468

(1) No. 463. (2) Shertok replied on 22 August: "...by all means act accordance last two sentences your telegram." (Telegram in file 130.09/2329/1).

No. 469

(1) The *Pan York* arrived in Haifa from Marseilles on 18 August with 2200 immigrants on board. Of these, almost one thousand were persons of military age. (See list of immigrants of military age, 17 August 1948, 130.02/2426/9). (2) Two days later, Eban reported that Bunche had apparently not spoken sincerely about the immigration issue and that more drastic interference was being contemplated. It was therefore preferable that the Mediator, not the Government of Israel, should take the initiative in the Security Council, in view of the Council's tendency to reject new proposals. (See Eban to Shertok, 21 August 1948, 93.03/126/2).

No. 470

(1) No. 463. (2) In reply to a letter from Epstein, the State Department informed him that the prohibition on the exit of emigrants "identified as fighting personnel" for Israel from the American zones in Germany and Austria would continue to be in force unless advance clearance for emigration was obtained from the Mediator. (See Epstein to the Secretary of State, 26 August 1948, 93.08/364/10; Ch. Saltzman to Epstein, 3 September 1948, *ibid.*).

No. 471

(1) See memorandum from Marshall to President Truman, 16 August 1948, *FRUS,* V, 1948, pp. 1313-15. See also No. 472.

No. 472

(1) In the original the word "Government" is repeated here.
(2) See also No. 471 and note 1 there. (3) Gerold Frank, an American journalist. (4) Following receipt of this tele-

gram and of No. 471, Shertok instructed Epstein to come to Israel for urgent consultations. (See telegram of 25 August 1948, 93.01/2207/1).

No. 473

(1) Presumably the meeting of 15 August — see No. 331.
(2) The future residence of the Israeli Mission in London.
(3) See C. Marriott to the "Jewish Authorities", 20 July 1948 (130.02/2457/4). See also editorial note, p. 126. (4) See No. 453, note 1.

No. 474

(1) Fischer reported that there was a good likelihood of French recognition within one month if no unexpected factor intervened. (See Fischer to Eytan, 19 August 1948, 130.02/2382/12).
(2) See "Note sur les hésitations du Parti M.R.P. dans la question de la reconnaissance", 20 August 1948, 93.03/127/9. (The enclosure is not attached to the original letter in file).
(3) Avraham Goldberg (Gilboa) was appointed Israeli Consul in Paris. (4) Goldberg received only an oral exequatur, but Fischer was assured that there was practically no difference between his status and that of other consuls. (See minute of conversation with J. Binoche, 25 August 1948, 93.02/172/15).
(5) Isaiah L. Kenen, Director of Information for the Israeli delegation to the U.N. (6) *Bulletin de l'Agence juive pour la Palestine,* issued by the Paris office of the Jewish Agency during 1947-48.

No. 475

(1) See Appendix G, Main Volume, p. 671, and No. 467.
(2) In reply, the U.N. Secretariat informed Shertok that his telegram had been circulated to all members of the Security Council.

(See Director in Charge of Security Council Affairs to Shertok, 24 August 1948, 130.02/2425/1).

No. 476

(1) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. Mistake in original ("19 July"). (2) See No. 424, Main Volume, pp. 474-8.

No. 477

(1) Shertok informed the U.S. representative that the plan could not constitute a basis for discussion, mainly because a U.N. force would not be able to prevent the Arabs from occupying the whole of Jerusalem. As to the future of Jerusalem, he declared that Israel reserved the right to re-examine the possible inclusion of the city within the State of Israel. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 25 August 1948).

No. 479

(1) The National Convention of the Democratic Party in Phila-delphia — see No. 322.

No. 480

(1) See No. 469 and note 2 there. (2) The representatives of members of the Security Council and part of the staff of the U.N. Secretariat were on their way to the General Assembly's session in Paris.

No. 481

(1) See No. 380. (2) See Eytan to Reedman, 12 August 1948, 130.02/2426/7. (3) See for instance No. 434.

(4) Letter in file 130.02/2426/7. (5) In reply, Mohn sent Eytan a detailed list of U.N. observers and their location. (See letter of 29 August 1948, *ibid.*).

No. 482

(1) No. 264. (2) Untraced. (3) No. 479.
(4) No. 412.

No. 483 (Hebrew)

(1) The name of the addressee — an Arab personality — is not printed here. Letter untraced. (2) See note 1 above.
(3) Refers to reports published in the Israeli press about comprehensive peace talks with Arab representatives, which were said to be taking place in Paris. The reports were denied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (See *Davar,* 25-26 August 1948).

No. 484

(1) The British representative served as President of the Security Council during September. (2) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 668-70. (3) No reply to this telegram has been traced. Except for a commemorative session following the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the Security Council did not discuss the Palestine problem during September, and consequently the question of Israel's participation did not arise.

No. 486

(1) No record of this meeting has been traced, but see No. 480. (2) On the following day, Shertok informed Lourie that "Reedman told Shiloah view this letter feels justified undelivering us ultimatum, deferring matter Mediator's return." (See telegram of 31 August 1948, 93.03/94/11).

No. 487 (Hebrew)

(1) The International Conference of the Red Cross convened in Stockholm at the end of August. The Government of Israel was invited to attend in the capacity of an observer; its delegation was headed by Avraham Katznelson, Director-General of the Ministry of Health. (2) The points of intersection between the Arab state and the Jewish state according to the partition plan of 29 November 1947.

No. 488

(1) King Abdallah. For his approach to Shertok through the Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem see No. 461. (2) Abd al-Gani al-Karmi, a member of King Abdallah's entourage. (3) See No. 483 and note 3 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 18 above). (4) Fawzi al-Mulqi, Transjordanian Minister of Defence. (5) Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Minister in Amman.

No. 489

(1) No. 480. (2) Actually, 887 immigrants of military age arrived in Israel during the first truce. (See Shertok to Lourie, 31 August 1948, 93.03/94/11).

No. 490

(1) Herbert E. Gaston, Vice-Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

No. 491 (Hebrew)

(1) The first four paragraphs are not printed here.
(2) Transcripts of broadcasts of Arab broadcasting stations, pre-

pared by the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Not printed here. See in file 130.15/2570/11. (4) The Political Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, headed by Reuven Shiloah. The Division was responsible for the gathering and evaluation of information and for the establishment of contacts with Arabs in Israel and abroad.

No. 494

(1) The date of the copy in the Weizmann Archives is 2 September 1948, but in the letter which was actually sent to Truman it was changed to 6 September. (See photocopy in Frank J. Adler, *Roots in a Moving Stream,* p. 215). (2) Jacobson to Weizmann, 6 August 1948, W.A.

No. 495

(1) Following the State Department's declaration concerning the maintenance of the prohibition on the emigration of "fighting personnel" from Germany and Austria to Israel (see No. 470 and note 2 there), the Israeli Mission in Washington published a communiqué criticizing the American decision and expressing the hope that it did not represent the definitive stand of the U.S. Government. (See *New York Times,* 5 September 1948).

No. 496

(1) See Fischer to Shertok, 6 September 1948, 130.09/2344/4. (2) On 28 August, the month-old cabinet of Marie resigned following a debate on the Government's economic policy. Schuman was appointed Prime Minister, but resigned on 7 September after only two days in office. A new cabinet was then formed by Henri Queuille, with Schuman as Minister of Foreign Affairs. (3) Claude de Boisanger, senior official in French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an expert on Palestine affairs. See

also No. 413, where Albert Vanthier is mentioned as a candidate for the post. (4) See Fischer to Binoche, 6 September 1948, 130.02/2382/12. Fischer assured Binoche that Israel would respect the rights and privileges of the French religious institutions in Israel. (5) See No. 492. (6) L. Kohn to Fischer, 1 September 1948 (130.02/2382/12). The letter contains a general survey of the situation and an assessment of Count Bernadotte's mission. It was to be shown to Trygve Lie and to other persons to be determined by Fischer. (See Eytan to Fischer, 1 September 1948, *ibid.*). (7) Untraced. (8) See Weissman to Eytan, 3 September 1948, 130.02/2384/16. Weissman reported on meetings in Paris and Brussels. On Weissman's mission see editorial note, p. 157. (9) Untraced. (10) See No. 483 and note 3 there. (11) Two postscripts not printed here.

No. 497 (Hebrew)

(1) Letter untraced, but see M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* pp. 41-2.

No. 498

(1) Shertok to Linton (for Goldmann), 7 September 1948, 130.09/2318/1. Shertok referred to reports by Robert Weltsch, published in *Ha'aretz,* according to which Goldmann had returned to London for discussions with the British. Shertok cautioned Goldmann against any new approach to the Foreign Office. (2) Up to that time — the address of the offices of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency.

No. 499

(1) The Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem, Jean Nieuwenhuys. (2) See No. 488. (3) The delegation of Transjor-

dan to the session of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Alexandria. (4) Fawzi al-Mulqi. (5) Said al-Mufti.

No. 500

(1) See Fischer to Shertok, 8 September 1948, 130.09/2344/4. In the same telegram Fischer pointed out that Israeli neglect of the Vatican had a very harmful influence on the attitude of France and other Catholic countries. (2) Members of the Western Union — see No. 240 and note 2 there. (3) The detained employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation — see No. 327 and note 1 there. (4) Gabriel Bonneau, Director of the Africa-Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (5) See No. 478. (6) See note 1 above. (7) Letter in file 130.02/2382/12. The points mentioned below are: the status of the Israeli Consul in Paris, Avraham Goldberg (see No. 474 and note 4 there); the training of Israeli police officers in France; provision of information to M. Weissman (see editorial note below). (8) Several appendices which are attached to this letter are not printed here.

Editorial Note before No. 501 (Main Volume, p. 579)

Michael Weissman, a Tel Aviv lawyer who had been a prominent member of the Zionist Organization in Rumania, was charged with a political mission to the Benelux countries. The objectives of the mission were: "a) to visit the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the three countries in order to explain the current problems of the Middle East, the present situation and future plans of the State of Israel, further relations between the State of Israel and the three above-mentioned states, etc.; b) to try to induce the governments of the three countries to recognize Israel; c) general information work in political and press circles in the three countries." (See Eytan to Weissman, 19 August 1948, 130.02/2384/16. See also Weissman's first report of 3 September 1948, 130.02/2384/16).

No. 501

(1) Reference is evidently to Shertok's letter to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of 26 August 1948. The letter recommends Weissman and explains his mission. (Letter in file 130.02/2385/24). (2) See No. 240 and note 2 there.

No. 502 (Hebrew)

(1) For Lie's statement see No. 492. For the statement of Cordier (actually Executive Assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General) see Robinson and Rafael to Eban, 9 September 1948, 93.02/182/4. (2) The American representative was due to succeed the British representative as President of the Security Council on 1 October. (3) Cf. No. 515. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 24 above). (4) These instructions, with the exception of the paragraph concerning Jerusalem, were approved by the Government on 12 September. With regard to Jerusalem it was decided by a majority of six to four to oppose Arab rule in any part of the city. It was also decided to abstain from any initiative with regard to the establishment of an international regime for the city, but to agree to such a solution if it secured Israel's hold on the new city. The two last-mentioned decisions were approved by a majority of five to four. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 12 September 1948). The question of Jerusalem was discussed again a fortnight later. At this meeting the Government, at the instance of Shertok, decided to revise its former decision: the Israeli Mission at the U.N. was to be instructed not to oppose Arab rule in (the Arab) part of the new city if the establishment of an international regime for the entire city could be forestalled by these means. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 26 September 1948).

No. 503

(1) See also detailed report of 9 September 1948 (130.02/2426/5).

No. 504

(1) The first part of the document, which is not printed here, conveys the contents of the message transmitted by the U.S. Special Representative to Shertok on 9 September — see No. 493. (2) Mistake in original ("include"). Corrected in conformity with incoming text. (3) The contents of the telegram were transmitted to Golda Meyerson in Moscow.

No. 505

(1) Klein met President Truman twice on the same day (9 September) — first at the head of a delegation of the Jewish War Veterans and a second time alone. (See detailed report by Akzin to Silver, 10 September 1948, 93.08/365/10). (2) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* No. 163, note 2. (3) After the meeting, Klein declared that Dewey supported immediate U.S. de jure recognition of Israel as well as financial assistance and abolition of the arms embargo if the Arabs violated the truce. Dewey refused to comment on Klein's announcement. (See *New York Times,* 11 September 1948).

No. 506 (Hebrew)

(1) Shmuel Friedman (Eliashiv), Director of the Eastern European Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) See Nos. 470, 486. (3) Moshe Halevi, Director of Ha'ohel Theatre. (4) Mikhail Moukhine. (5) Vladimir Rojkov. (6) Nicolai Sergeev. (7) Mitrofan Fedorin. (8) Zvi Prihar (Friedberg), Director of Postal Services in the Ministry of Communications. (9) David Remez, Minister of Communications. (10) Yeshayahu Klinow, Director of the Department of Press, Information, Radio and Cinema in the Ministry of the Interior. (11) The Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. (since 1936 — The Supreme Soviet).

No. 507

(1) See No. 503. (2) The press conference was held on the occasion of the Mediator's arrival in Haifa on 7 September. (See *Mishmar,* 9 September 1948). (3) Roland Marti, Head of Medical Division of the International Red Cross and formerly head of its delegation to Palestine. (4) See proposal of the Truce Commission and counter-proposal of the Jewish Agency Executive in C.Z.A. S25/8176 and S25/5176. For the Red Cross proposal see file 134/778/2. (5) A note by Shertok on this document reads: "I suggest that you write to the Governor of Jerusalem and propose that he should formulate a programme."

No. 508

(1) Gass to Bernstein, 8 September 1948, 93.01/2220/1. Gass reported that large quantities of cheap crude oil were being exported from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. (2) Shell had originally made the supply of oil to Israel conditional on the cancellation of Israeli orders from Rumania. (See Bernstein to Gass, 6 September 1948, 93.01/2220/11).

No. 509

(1) See No. 498. Shertok congratulated Linton on the inauguration of the new offices of the Israeli Mission in London. He expressed apprehension that Goldmann was becoming a victim of wishful thinking with regard to Anglo-Israeli relations, as information received from Paris indicated implacable British hostility. (See No. 496). Shertok asked Linton for his personal appreciation of the situation. (See Shertok to Linton, 13 September 1948, 130.09/2318/1).

No. 510 (Hebrew)

(1) Frederick G. Bestall, British Vice-Consul in Jerusalem.

No. 511 (Hebrew)

(1) On the conversation with Zorin see M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* pp. 52-4.

No. 513 (Hebrew)

(1) Israel Barzilai had been appointed Israeli Minister in Warsaw and was on his way to take up his post.

No. 514

(1) Antonius Lovink, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2) Cornelis Adriaanse, Director of the Department of Judicial and Administrative Affairs in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) The last sentence in this paragraph was added by hand. (4) Refers to the dispute between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, which had been established in Java and Sumatra after the Japanese withdrawal. (5) See No. 436. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 16 above). (6) Hendrik N. Boon, Director of the Department for Political Affairs in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No. 515 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 491. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 20 above). (2) See No. 502. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 20 above). The second instruction has not been traced. (3) Shimoni complained that the telegrams and reports received from Paris did not convey a clear picture of the activities of Sasson and his team. He suggested that they keep a detailed diary. (See Shimoni to Sasson, 26 August 1948, 130.15/2570/11).
(4) See No. 491 and note 4 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 20 above). (5) Paragraphs 5-18 are not printed here.

No. 516

(1) See McDonald to Truman, 12 September 1948, *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1392-4. (2) No. 505. (3) Five words are not printed here. (4) See No. 529. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 27 above).

No. 517

(1) Untraced, but see Nos. 505, 516.

Editorial Note before No. 518 (Main Volume, p. 605)

Count Bernadotte and a French U.N. observer, Colonel Serot, were assassinated in Jerusalem on Friday, 17 September. Bernadotte was on his way to a meeting with the Military Governor, D.B. Joseph, and was accompanied by an Israeli military liaison officer. An organization of Lehi members calling itself Hazit Hamoledet (Fatherland Front) assumed responsibility for the assassination.

Following the assassination, the U.N. truce observation staff headed by General Lundstrom decided to withdraw the U.N. personnel from the Jewish sector of Jerusalem. Before the completion of the evacuation the decision was reversed and the observers subsequently reoccupied their positions. In the meantime, Israeli forces had occupied the agricultural training farm situated between the Arab and Israeli lines in south-eastern Jerusalem. Shortly after the assassination, the Israeli authorities announced the adoption of emergency measures and ordered the arrest of Lehi members throughout the country.

No. 519

(1) In the course of the press conference, Shertok and Yadin (the Army's Chief of Operations) criticized the U.N. truce observation

machinery. They maintained that control in Arab countries was ineffective, that the observers were taking a more serious view of Arab complaints of truce violations than of Israeli complaints, and that they tended to deal with minor matters rather than with grave violations. See also No. 520.

No. 520

(1) No. 519. (2) No. 518. (3) The statement called upon all citizens "to give active and unflinching assistance to the armed forces and police in their efforts to discover the assassins and their accessories and to free the land of Israel from the curse of terrorism." (See *Ha'aretz,* 19 September 1948). (4) See No. 519 and note 1 there.

No. 521 (Hebrew)

(1) At the beginning of September, Yeshayahu Wolfsberg and Eliezer Weissbord were sent on a diplomatic mission to Scandinavia, the objectives of which were: a) recognition of Israel by the Scandinavian countries; b) Scandinavian support for the admission of Israel to the U.N. (2) See Weissbord to Shertok, 19 September 1948, 130.02/2384/17. The letter contains additional information on the meeting with the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, B.O. Undén, and on Swedish attitudes following the assassination of Count Bernadotte. (3) Hilel (Gilel) Storch, leading member of Zionist Federation and of World Jewish Congress in Sweden. (4) Part of the sentence, pertaining to a personal matter, is not printed here. (5) The U.N. Palestine partition plan of November 1947. At that time, the sessions of the U.N. General Assembly were held at Flushing Meadow.
(6) The assassination of Count Bernadotte. (7) Benjamin Slor, Chairman of the Zionist Federation in Denmark.
(8) Karl (Kale) Berman, prominent member of the Zionist Federation in Sweden, member of the Swedish Socialist Party.

No. 522

(1) For earlier meeting between the Belgian Consul-General and King Abdallah, and Shertok's reaction see No. 499.

Editorial Note before No. 523 (Main Volume, p. 612)

The report of the Mediator to the U.N. Secretary-General was published on 20 September 1948. The Mediator's main conclusions and recommendations were: Replacement of the truce by a formal peace or at least by a stable armistice; recognition of the permanent existence of the State of Israel; the partition boundaries to be revised: the Negev, south of the Majdal-Faluja line, to be Arab territory, and the whole of Galilee — Jewish territory; it was recommended that the Arab territory in Palestine be merged with Transjordan; the port of Haifa to be declared a free port and the airport of Lydda — a free airport; the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory to be affirmed, and those who chose not to return, to be compensated. The Mediator also proposed the establishment of a Palestine conciliation commission which should: recommend and take steps with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine; promote the cultivation of friendly relations between Jews and Arabs; supervise the observance of arrangements relating to boundaries, roads, railroads, free port, free airport and minority rights and other arrangements made by the U.N. (See *Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,* 16 September 1948, U.N. document A/648, pp. 17-19).

No. 523

(1) See editorial note above.

No. 524

(1) No. 520. (2) See No. 520, note 3. (3) No. 518. (4) No. 519.

No. 525

(1) Shertok to Lourie, 20 September 1948 (130.09/2329/1). Shertok informed Lourie of the attempts made prior to the assassination of Count Bernadotte to reach an agreement with the I.Z.L. and Lehi on the disbandment of their military units in Jerusalem and of the measures adopted following the assassination in order to achieve this end.

No. 526

(1) Cf. No. 530, note 1.

No. 527 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 519. (2) Telegrams untraced. (3) No. 220. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 7 above).

No. 528 (Hebrew)

(1) Chaim Hoffmann (Yahil), headed the Jewish Agency's mission in Germany, 1945-48; Consul of Israel in the American Zone of Occupation, 1948-49. (2) Hoffmann reported on the regulations in force with regard to the emigration of men of military age from Germany to Israel (see No. 470) and requested instructions. (See Hoffmann to Eytan, 7 September 1948, 93.08/376/20). (3) Telegram in file 93.08/376/20. (4) See Hoffmann to General Clay (U.S. Military Commander for Germany), 7 September 1948, *ibid.* (5) William Haber,

Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the U.S. military administration in Germany and Austria. (6) The International Refugee Organization. (7) S. Adler-Rudel, Director of Section for Relations with International Organizations, London Office of the Jewish Agency; in charge of refugees and D.P. affairs.

No. 529 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 506. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 22 above). (2) See No. 504. (3) See No. 447.
(4) Two paragraphs, concerning appointments to the staff of the Israeli legations in Warsaw and Bucharest, are not printed here.

No. 530 (Hebrew)

(1) The U.S. view on the Conclusions of the Mediator's Report was announced in the form of a statement by Secretary of State Marshall, released in Paris on 21 September. Marshall stated that the U.S. considerd that the Conclusions offered a generally fair basis for the settlement of the Palestine question and urged the parties and the U.N. General Assembly to accept them in their entirety and avoid a protracted debate on details. (See *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1415-16). Foreign Secretary Bevin stated in the House of Commons on 22 September that the Conclusions must be considered as a single integrated plan and that the plan should be put into operation in its entirety. He announced that the British Government supported the recommendation that the Arab part of Palestine be merged with Transjordan. (See *456 H.C. Deb.* 5s., cols. 898-900). The French Council of Ministers decided to adopt the Bernadotte Plan as a possible basis for a solution. (See Fischer to Shertok, 22 September 1948, 130.09/2344/4).
(2) The total rejection of the Mediator's proposals by the Arab states was announced in Cairo, on 21 September, by Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League. (See *Davar,* 22 September 1948). (3) See statement by the Israeli delegation in Paris — No. 531, and statement by the Government Spokesman — No. 536.

No. 531

(1) See No. 530. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 28 above). The statement was issued by the Israeli delegation in Paris after several of its members had pointed out that the lack of an official reaction to the Bernadotte Plan was causing difficulties. (See minutes of the second meeting of the mission, 22 September 1948, 93.03/131/3). (2) Shertok subsequently instructed Eban not to repeat this formula because it might be understood to mean that Israel was ready to accept most of the provisions of the Mediator's report. (See telegram of 23 September 1948, 93.02/185/1).

No. 532

(1) See No. 530, note 1. (2) See Weizmann to Rosenman, 21 September 1948, W.A. See also No. 543. (3) Mistake in original ("are strongly warned"). (4) Hector McNeil. On the meeting with him see No. 533.

No. 533

(1) Untraced. (2) See No. 415, note 2.

No. 534

(1) See Nos. 493, 504. (2) See No. 530 and note 1 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 28 above).

No. 535 (Hebrew)

(1) Reference is to an article by Ilya Ehrenburg in *Pravda* of 21 September 1948. Ehrenburg expressed unqualified opposition to the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and other Commu-

nist states to Israel, which he described as a capitalistic country. (See No. 544; M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* pp. 242-50). (2) No reply has been traced.

No. 536

(1) The statement was published in the Israeli press on 24 September 1948.

No. 537

(1) See memorandum: "The importance of the Negev to the State of Israel", [November 1948], in file 93.02/186/16. The memorandum was circulated among U.N. members. (2) On 22 September, the Arab Higher Committee in Damascus announced the establishment of an Arab Palestinian Government with its seat in Gaza. Ahmad Hilmi was appointed Prime Minister and Jamal al-Husseini — Minister of Foreign Affairs. King Abdallah denounced the establishment of the Gaza Government. (3) For a full report of this meeting — see Sasson to Shimoni, 23 September 1948, Ben-Gurion Archives, file 1520.

No. 538

(1) The conference, attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Great Britain and the U.S., was held on 22 September. (2) See No. 496.

No. 539

(1) The last paragraph of the telegram, relating to the United Jewish Appeal, is not printed here.

No. 541 (Hebrew and French)

(1) An emissary of the Egyptian Court. Name not printed here. (2) Letter untraced. (3) See No. 483 and note 3 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 18 above). (4) No. 462.

No. 542

(1) When this telegram was sent Shertok had not yet received Sasson's report on his first meeting with the emissary of the Egyptian Court. (No. 541. Hebrew. For English summary see p. 29 above). (2) Last sentence not printed here.

No. 543

(1) See No. 532 and note 2 there. (2) See Weizmann to Jacobson, 27 September 1948, W.A. (3) For Israel. (4) Draft untraced. (5) Benjamin Cohen, member of the U.S. delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 544 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 511. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 23 above). (2) On the meeting with Feodor Gousev see Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* p. 56. (3) Ivan Bakulin, Director of the Near East Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the meeting with him see *ibid.,* pp. 54-6. (4) See No. 535 and note 1 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 28 above). (5) Shmuel Mikunis, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Israel. (6) Mikunis made this statement in the course of a debate in the Provisional Council of State on the Banknotes and Currency Ordinance. (See Provisional Council of State, *Record of Discussions,* 15th Session,

16 August 1948, pp. 13-14). (7) The Jewish anti-Fascist Committee, composed of prominent members of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia, was set up during the Second World War at the instance of the Soviet authorities with a view to winning international Jewish support for the Soviet war effort. The Committee was liquidated at the end of November 1948, when most of the leading figures of the Jewish intelligentsia were arrested. See also M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow,* pp. 250-1. (8) Ralph Parker, representative of the Telepress news agency in Moscow. (9) Marian Naszkowski, Ambassador of Poland to the U.S.S.R. (10) See Nos. 421, 433.

No. 545

(1) See No. 473. (2) See No. 536. (3) The last paragraph of the letter is not printed here.

No. 547

(1) See editorial note, p. 164. (2) See Comay to Shertok, 23 September 1948, 130.02/2425/2. (3) See No. 537 and note 2 there. (4) No. 524. (5) No. 519. (6) Mistake in original ("unlisted").

No. 549 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 374. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 15 above). (2) The Jewish Democratic Committee — the Jewish Communist party organization in Rumania, established in 1945. (3) First part of sixth paragraph not printed.
(4) Three words not printed. (5) The Zionist General Council, at its session held on 22 August — 3 September 1948, adopted a number of resolutions concerning immigration, which *inter alia* regulated the division of responsibilities between the Zionist Organization and the Government of Israel. The Zion-

ist Organization was to be responsible for the organization of immigration. Its Immigration Department was to propose immigration quotas for final confirmation by the Government. The distribution of the quotas among the various countries was to be made in consultation with the Government. The selection of immigrants within each quota was also to be undertaken by the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department, with the exception of capitalists, dependents of residents of Israel, students at educational institutions in Israel, experts etc., who were to receive their permits from the Government of Israel. (See text of resolutions in file 93.03/125/18). (6) Reuven Rubin, Minister of Israel in Rumania from December 1948. (7) Last part of sentence not printed.

No. 550 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 530, note 1. (2) See No. 493. (3) See No. 502, par. 4. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 21 above). (4) See No. 536. (5) No. 502. (Hebrew. For English summary see p. 20 above). (6) See Provisional Council of State, *Record of Discussions*, 20th Session, 27 September 1948. The record of this closed session was published at a later date. (7) See No. 272 and note 9 there. (8) See No. 545.

No. 551 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 533. (2) See No. 532. (3) See No. 537 and note 2 there. (4) See No. 537. (5) Israel Rokah, Mayor of Tel Aviv. (6) Mikhail Moukhine, Counsellor at the Soviet Legation in Israel.

No. 552

(1) Sir Benegal Rama Rau. For earlier conversation see No. 446. (2) Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador to

U.S.S.R. and Head of the Indian delegation to the U.N. session in Paris.

No. 553

(1) See Bunche to the U.N. Secretary-General, 27 September 1948, U.N. document S/1018. Bunche stated, *inter alia,* that the Government of Israel had been solely responsible for the protection of the Mediator and his staff. He maintained that the Government had taken no measures to check the underground organizations or to prevent the formation of a public opinion hostile to the Mediator's mission and personality and had moreover itself contributed to its aggravation.

No. 554 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 512. (2) Pietro Sigismondi, of the Vatican Secretariat of State. (3) Domenico Tardini, Vatican Acting Secretary of State; see also No. 408. (4) Antonio Vergani, General Vicar of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for Galilee. During the summer of 1948 he made a number of visits to Christian holy places in the north, on which he reported to the Vatican. (See correspondence and reports in file 130.02/2397/7).
(5) Gustavo Testa, Apostolic Delegate to Palestine.
(6) The Congregazione Orientale in the Vatican, dealing with the affairs of the Catholic communities in the East.
(7) Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President of the U.S.A. to the Pope.

No. 555

(1) Per T. Federspiel, member of the Danish delegation to the U.N. Formerly member of U.N. Palestine Commission.
(2) One paragraph not printed here. It relates to Federspiel's version of his attitude and activities when serving as member of the U.N. Palestine Commission (January — May 1948).

Editorial Note before No. 556 (Main Volume, p. 656).

On 29 September the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed the order of priorities of the various items on the agenda of the Assembly's third session. The British representative (McNeil) proposed that the Palestine question be first on the agenda. The U.S. delegation supported the British proposal. The Eastern bloc suggested that the Palestine question be discussed after the items dealing with disarmament. The Arab representatives wanted the discussion to be postponed in order to enable them to study the Mediator's report and to hold consultations. The British motion was rejected by 22 to 16 votes; the Committee adopted the proposal of the Chairman (Spaak) and placed the Palestine question as third item on the agenda. (See *GAOR, Third Session,* First Committee, 143rd Meeting, 29 September 1948, pp.1-12; Eban to Epstein, 30 September 1948, 93.08/377/8).

No. 556

(1) See No. 530 and note 1 there. (Hebrew document. For English summary see p. 28 above).

No. 557

(1) David Ben-Gurion. (2) At the Government's session on 26 September Ben-Gurion suggested that an attack be launched against Arab Legion positions in the Latrun sector, even without Arab provocation. A majority of Cabinet members, including Shertok, objected. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 26 September 1948).

No. 558 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 535, note 1.

INDEX

TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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* *Abbreviations*
b. — born
n — note
edn — editorial note
CV — Companion Volume
IDF — Israel Defence Forces